

SRH 011

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

in
SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC

(January, 1943 - October, 1943)

VOLUME VI

The Contributions of Communication Intelligence
to the Operations of the Commander of the United
States Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

(July, 1943)

11 January 1946

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(July 1943)

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INTRODUCTION

This volume is one of a series of historical studies which will be devoted to an attempt to determine the accuracy and reliability of the operational intelligence, derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to submarine commanders operating under the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. It is hoped that correlation and interpretation of the source material available in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the United States Naval Communication Intelligence organization will produce valuable lessons for the future.

For the sake of convenience the year 1943 was selected as a beginning point for this series since it was an outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. Furthermore, since the records for this period are more complete than those of 1941 and 1942, it was felt that a more accurate appraisal of the worth of communication intelligence could be made.

During this period all American submarines operating below the equator and east of

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longitude 130° were under the command of Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet; all submarine operations above the equator and west of longitude 130° E were the direct responsibility of the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. The relationship of communication intelligence to the operations of submarines under the Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet, will be discussed in a different series, when research in the operational files of the command can be effected.

There were few activities during World War II which received so little attention as the campaign waged so successfully in the Pacific by the submarines of the United States Navy. Co-ordinated attacks by American submarines and air fleets from 1941 to 1945 resulted in the destruction of most of the Japanese merchant fleet, the crippling of Japanese industry by cutting off its source of supply, the hampering of Japanese Army and Navy movements, and the isolation of many Japanese garrisons. The destruction of over six million tons of merchant shipping meant that Japan could not

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effect its ambition of creating an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

As for the part played by American submarines in the elimination of Japan as a military power, statistics indicate that the greater part of Japanese shipping was already destroyed when Allied amphibious forces seized the bases which made possible daily air strikes at Japanese home ports. Although there is no need to enter the current controversy as to whether or not the B-29's won the Japanese war, it suffices to say that the far reaching effects of United States submarine warfare in the Pacific cannot be overlooked by any objective observer. As of August 30, 1945, 1256 Japanese ships had been sunk by American submarines.

During the war submarine operational authorities were in constant communication by a direct telephone line with the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization, and the information made available to them was used to such good advantage that many targets, which otherwise might easily have slipped by the submarine patrols, were sent to the bottom of the sea. This


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does not mean that American submarines were not able to operate independently and efficiently on their own account. On some occasions, when the Japanese had changed their cipher systems and for a short period of time no information could be derived from their communications, American submarines sank almost as many, if not just as many, Japanese ships as when the Japanese messages were being read. Submarine operational authorities have pointed out, however, that the information made available when the Japanese cipher messages were being read currently was of great value in the carry over period till American naval cryptanalysts solved the new Japanese cipher systems. Analysis of previously deciphered messages supplied valuable data as to the favorite routes and procedures of Japanese merchant ships, and, thus, even when the flow of intelligence decreased temporarily American submarine commanders could be directed to productive areas.

Chart A shows the relationship between the number of Japanese messages translated by American naval cryptanalysts and the tonnage of sunken Japanese shipping.

Red line - tonnage sunk
Black line - GZ translations

Chart A



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Though United States submarines were not always able to sight targets reported to them by communication intelligence sources, submarine authorities have attributed much of their success to information derived from enemy communications. On April 14, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:

...High percentage of submarine sinkings is based on ULTRA information ... (131237. NCR (1231)).

On July 3, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet sent the following to the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization:

"Commander Submarine Force desires to express his admiration and appreciation to the officers of ComIntOrg for the splendid support and coverage given by you to the recent submarine operation in the Japan Sea. May the great success of this expedition repay you somewhat for your tireless efforts to strike this blow at the heart of the enemy's empire. It could not have been done without your help."

The use of communication intelligence helped revolutionize submarine strategy in the Pacific.

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for operational authorities, because of the continuous flow of communication intelligence which they were receiving, were able to station submarines in certain areas which would not normally be considered productive of targets. Though the routes of Japanese convoys were being constantly shifted to avoid reported American submarines, the messages announcing the change of course were deciphered and made available to American submarine commanders. Thus, many otherwise unavailable targets were provided, torpedoes were expended profitably, long patrols in unproductive areas were avoided, and the morale of officers and men was improved.

This volume outlines the relationship of Communication Intelligence to American submarines operating in the Pacific during July, 1943. Subsequent volumes will continue the story. Each volume has an appendix which contains the following material source for each case discussed:

A. Source of Intelligence

Japanese messages deciphered and translated by the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization.

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B. Operational Dispatch

A message containing the information derived from (A), sent by the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet to American submarines.

C. Submarine Action Report

Pertinent data extracted from the action report of the submarine or submarines concerned.

Chart B summarizes the results of action taken by United States Submarines from January through October, 1943, as a result of Communication Intelligence. Another general summary of results will be made in the volumes dealing with November, 1943 to December, 1944.

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CHART B

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

Grand Total - January-October 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 810

I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 445

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 4
2. Submarine not in area..... 100
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 88
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 223
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine..... 5
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 20
7. Information cancelled as incorrect..... 7

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 354

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 120

- (1) Sunk..... 33
- (2) Damaged..... 58
- (3) No perceptible damage..... 16
- (4) Missed..... 15

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked..... 234

- (1) Unfavorable position
of submarine..... 63
- (2) Rough weather-poor
visibility..... 16
- (3) Submarine attacked by
escorts..... 9
- (4) Target showed hospital
ship markings..... 3
- (5) Engaged with other
targets..... 137
- (6) Target not worth torpedo
expenditure..... 4

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to charts, Jan-Oct)

- A. Positive..... 112
- B. Probable..... 11
- C. Possible..... 24

III. Number of Potential Targets for which
the Results Are Unknown..... 11

*The number of potential targets in each Case is

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derived from the number in the ComSubPac Ultra dispatch. If, however, ComSubPac did not state the number but merely described the target as a convoy, the target is reckoned as one (an escort is not counted unless specified as a destroyer or a larger ship). But if the target was sighted, then the number named in the submarine patrol report is the number computed in the analysis. If ComSubPac was indefinite, stating the target to be "several" ships, the target, if not sighted, is counted as two. For example, in Case 41 of October ComSubPac described the target as "2 AUXILIARY CARRIERS SEVERAL DESTROYERS". The target, which was not sighted, was reckoned as four.

Thus the reckoning is often arbitrary and therefore the figures are only approximate. This applies also to the reasons given for the failure of a submarine to sight, or to attack, an Ultra target assigned to it. If none of the reasons listed in the analysis precisely cover a given case, the case is then reckoned under the most nearly equivalent reason. If two submarines are named as addressees, the reason reckoned in the analysis may be that of the first addressee (e.g., Case 23 of July-Chapter VII) or it may be the reason of the majority if three or more submarines are action addressees (Case 47 of July).

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It should be noted that research in this regard was handicapped seriously by the fact that submarine commanders were under orders to omit all references to Communication Intelligence in their reports as will be seen in the following dispatches:

A. FROM: COMINCH
TO: CTF 17
CTF 71
CTF 72
INFO: COMSOPAC
CINCPAC
PREC: DEFERRED
18/1836 May

SUPER SECRET X ULTRA X WAR DIARIES OF SUBMARINES
BASING WEST AUSTRALIA FOR MONTHS NOVEMBER
DECEMBER JANUARY CONTAIN NUMEROUS REFERENCES
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE X ALL MENTION THIS
SOURCE MUST BE ELIMINATED FROM ORIGINAL AND ALL
COPIES OF PAST AND FUTURE DIARIES

B. FROM: CINCPAC
TO: COMSOPAC
PREC: ROUTINE
18/1836 May

PASS COMINCH 181836 TO COMSOPAC FOR ACTION

C. FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY
13/0935 July

NEITHER ACTUALLY NOR BY IMPLICATION
SHOULD REFERENCE BE MADE TO ULTRA MESSAGES SENT
BY THIS COMMAND X SAME RULE APPLIES FOR WRITING
UP PATROL REPORTS

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ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

July, 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 131

I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 70

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 0
2. Submarine not in area..... 17
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 10
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 37
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine..... 2
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 4
7. Information cancelled as incorrect..... 0

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 58

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 20

- (1) Sunk..... 3
- (2) Damaged..... 12
- (3) No perceptible damage..... 1
- (4) Missed..... 4

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked..... 38

- (1) Unfavorable position of submarine..... 19
- (2) Rough weather-poor visibility..... 3
- (3) Submarine attacked by escorts..... 7
- (4) Target showed hospital ship markings..... 0
- (5) Engaged with other targets..... 9
- (6) Target not worth torpedo expenditure..... 0

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to Chart-July)

- A. Positive..... 24
- B. Probable..... 0
- C. Possible..... 1

III. Number of Potential Targets for which the Results are Unknown..... 3

*A convey of unknown number of ships has been considered as but one target.

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July 1942

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
1. 02-1149	U.S.S. Halibut	Three merchant ships and an escort will pass through the fol- lowing positions at 0300(GCT) on July 3, 4, and 5 respectively: 16-24N, 143-50E, and 08-05N, 146-20E, and 07-25N, 149-30E.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received the Halibut sighted two merchant ships at 1100(GCT) July 4 at 8-06N, 146-13E but was unable to get in position to attack.
05-1801 (additional information)	U.S.S. Pogy	Convoy of dispatch 02-1149 in six hours late and consists of only two merchant ships. Halibut did not attack.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received the Pogy sighted and attacked the convoy at 0800 (GCT) July 5 at 7-25N, 149- 35E and scored one hit.
2. 02-1820	U.S.S. Jack	Two merchantmen to be at the following posi- tions at the times and dates given: 0300, 2 July, 31-37N, 143-55E, 0300, 3 July, 33-35N, 141-05E, 2400, 3 July, arrive at Yokosuka. All times GCT.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received the Jack, though in this area, did not sight the Ultra target.

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July, 1941

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
3. 04-0917	U.S.S. Gurnard	One merchantman will pass through 26-32N, 134-30E at 0300(GCT), July 6 then through 31-05N, 134-47E to 32-10N, 133-21E at 0300(GCT) on July 7.	Unknown	The Sturgeon was in the area but the report for July 6-1 is unavailable at this writing.
4. 06-0551	U.S.S. Gurnard	Convoy (Convoy O #404) will pass through the following positions at 0300(GCT) on July 9, 10 and 11 respectively: 16-35N, 132-10E, 13-15N, 132-00E and 09-55N, 132-05E.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received The Gurnard at 1754(GCT) July 10 at 13-10N, 131-55E sighted 4 ships and an es- cort; attacked and sank one The Mingo did not assist bu sought another Ultra target (See Case 5).
07-1015 See Case 7, B-1 10-0840 See Case 8, B-1 (Additional Information)	U.S.S. Mingo to assist if able.	The convoy will also pass through 10N, 132E and 7-50N, 133-15E and may be a day late The convoy should be 7 miles to the east on July 11 and may be escorted.		
5. 07-0911	U.S.S. Mingo	One merchantman, type unknown, will be in the following positions on July 9 at the GCT given: 06-15N, 145-20E, 0300; 07-00N, 148-00E, 1500; 08-15N, 148-10E, 1900.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received The Mingo patrolled the area from July 8-10 but sighted nothing.

July, 1943

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Op.	ComSubpac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressed(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
5.	(Cont.) 09-1015. See Case 7, B-1 (Additional Information)				
			The ship may be a large tanker.		
6.	07-0749 U.S.S. Pogy to take station at 10-26N, 150-53E.		A carrier, cruiser and DD's leaving Yokosuka will pass through 10- 26N, 150-53E at 0900 (OCT) July 10.	Positive	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Pogy sighted 3 ships at 1016 (OCT) July 10 at 10-24N 150-53E but DD prevented attack.
	U.S.S. Hullbut to take station 5 miles N.W. of Pogy			Positive	The Hullbut at 1017 (OCT) at 10-34N, 150-45E sighted a carrier and cruiser, made 3 hits in the cruiser.
	U.S.S. Steelhead to take station 5 miles S.E. of Pogy			Positive	The Steelhead at 10-21N, 150- 49E made 3 hits on the carrier.
	U.S.S. Sturgeon		Two carriers, cruisers and DD's from Inland Sea and a carrier from Yokosuka might rendezvous at 27-40N, 137-38E (at 2100 (OCT) July 10 accord- ing to Japanese dispatch)	Positive	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Sturgeon at 2103 (OCT) July 10 sighted a seaplane tender and DD and at 2205 sighted 2 carriers and 6 cruisers at 27-42N, 137-38E but was unable to attack.

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ComSubpac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
6. (Cont.)	U.S.S. Seavayen		Positive	The Seavayen at 2320 (GCT) all sighted this force at 27-33 137-22E and was also unable to close to attack.
7. 09-1015	U.S.S. 8-28	One freighter will pass 2-20N, 167-12E at 0300 (GCT) on July 11 and 6-15N, 167-30E at 0300 (GCT) July 12.	Unknown	Radio reception extremely poor. 8-28 was at Dutch Harbor July 5-13. (8-38 was in the area of the Ultra target but the patrol report prior to July 15 is unavailable at this writing.)
8. 10-0940	U.S.S. Hingo	Four ships, including the Gyoho Maru, Iveyo Maru and Tokai Maru will pass through the following 0300 GCT positions on July 11, 12 and 13: 2-50N, 138-31E, and 1-38N, 141-22E, and 0-26N, 144-10E.	Positive	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Hingo attacked a convoy of 4 freighters and 2 escorts at 0619 (GCT) 12 July in position 1-00N, 142-59E. It probably hit two of the freighters.
9. 10-1725	U.S.S. Flying Fish	Three merchant ships, and three escorts will pass through the following positions on July 12, 13 and 14 at 0300 (GCT):	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The Flying Fish was in the area July 12-13 but did not sight the convoy.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
(Cont.)	U.S.S. Searaven	27-30N, 141-30E, 24-20N, 140-20E, 21-10N, 140-55E.	None	The Searaven patrolled the area July 12-15 but made no contact.
11-0947	U.S.S. to Tinian to take station 10-15N, 151- 30E.	About 3 cruisers, 2 carriers, 1 auxiliary carrier and destroyers on course 180°, speed 24 knots will pass through 10-50N, 151- 30E at 1900(GCT) July 14.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 2100(GCT) July 14 the Tinian sighted the force, fired 4 torpedoes which were evaded.
	U.S.S. Porpo to take sta- tion 08-40N, 151-30E.		Positive	At 0216(GCT) July 15 the Porpo sighted the force but was unable to close.
	U.S.S. Steel- head to take station 08-30N, 151-30E.		Positive	At 0251(GCT) July 15 the Steelhead sighted 2 cruisers and DD but was unable to close.
11-1037	U.S.S. Searaven	Convoy (same as in Case 9) will pass through the following positions at 0300(GCT) on July 14, 15, 16 & 17: 21-10N, 144-55E, 18-00N, 141-30E, 14-50N, 142-00E and 11-45N, 143-15E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Searaven patrolled in the area but sighted nothing.
	U.S.S. Haddock		None	The Haddock was waiting off Pagan Island for another target; see below in this Case.

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No.	ComSubpac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
11.	(Cont.)	<u>U.S.S. Bearaven</u>	Six merchant ships and escort will pass through the following positions at 0300 (GCT) on July 12, 13, 14, 15; 21-23N, 144-49E, 19-31N, 145-49E, and 17-34N, 145-36E, and 15-32N, 145-36E.	None	The Bearaven was looking for the previous Ultra target.
		<u>U.S.S. Haddock</u>		None	The Haddock waited off Pago Island about 184, 146E July 14-15 but sighted nothing.
		<u>U.S.S. Gurnard</u>	Convey will pass through None 15-45N, 131-00E at 0300 (GCT) on July 11 and 10-40N, 131-00E at 0300 (GCT) on July 12 thence to Palau.	None	The Gurnard was leaving the area for Midway, having ex- pected all its torpedoes in an attack on a previous con- vey July 10. (See Case 4)
		<u>U.S.S. Halibut</u>	Ten Hairy (either 072 or 264 Popcorn) to be at the following 0300 (GCT) positions on July 12, 13 and 14: 12-10N, 142-10E, and 10-30N, 146-15E, and 10-10N, 141-21E.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received The Halibut patrolled the area but sighted nothing.

12-0917

Information for

Halibut cor-

rected.

264 Popcorn (p. 264
in Japanese Merchant
Ships Manual - O.N.I. 208-J)
to be at the following 0300
(GCT) positions:

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
11.	(Cont.)		12-10N, 142-10E, 10-30N, 146-55E, and 08-10N, 151-20E.		
12.	11-1954	<u>U.S.S. Flying Fish</u>	Geoghegan Mary and other unidentified merchant ships will pass through 28-51N, 145-39E at 0300 (GCT) July 12, 25-29N, 149-32E at 0300 (GCT) July 13, 22-29N, 142-53E at 0300 (GCT) July 14 and 18-56N, 155-14E on July 15.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received The <u>Flying Fish</u> was not in the area. The <u>Bearfish</u> , possibly not in the area, made no contact on July 14-15.
13.	13-0739	<u>U.S.S. Sturgeon</u>	One carrier, <u>Otake</u> , and an unidentified ship will leave Sasebo at 0800 (I) July 15 and arrive at Shikaura (?) 1200 (I) July 17 by way of 31-12N, 130-10E at 0600 (GCT) July 15, 30- 10N, 130-52E at 1200 (GCT) None July 15, 30-00N, 136-00E at 0300 (GCT) July 16 and 34-00N, 138-38E at 2000 (GCT) July 16.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received The <u>Sturgeon</u> sighted nothing possibly because of bad weather and visibility. The <u>Pompano</u> sighted only small boats on these days. The <u>Sawfish</u> was not in the area. The <u>Skinlark</u> was in the area July 16 but did not sight the ultra target.
		<u>U.S.S. Pompano</u>			
		<u>U.S.S. Sawfish</u>			
		<u>U.S.S. Skinlark</u>			

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Subsiding Addresses(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
14.	13-1037	U.S.S. S-38	One freighter will pass 08-00N, 167- 26E at 0300(GCT) July 15 en route to Kwajalein which it will reach July 15.	Unknown (but probable)	ComSubPac dispatch received S-38 patrol report between the hours 1805(OCT) July 14 and 0747(GCT) July 15 is un- available at this writing, as is also the contact repo- The S-38 was at the southern approach to Kwajalein at the time and attacked a freight- there according to a dis- patch sent at 15-1222.
15.	16-0711	U.S.S. Haddock	Convoy "FU" 406, will pass through 14-05N, 134-30E at 0300(GCT), July 16 and 17-20N, 134-30E at the same time on the following day, and 30N, 134E at 0300(GCT) July 21, due at Mayasui Seto at 1230(I) July 22.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received The Haddock searched for the convoy but did not sight it
		U.S.S. Sturgeon		None	The Sturgeon, in bad weather sighted nothing.
		U.S.S. Spearfish	Convoy, from Kwajalein to Yokosuka will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 17, 18, 19 and 20:	None	The Spearfish made no con- tacts from July 16 to 27.
		U.S.S. Hearsey		None	The Hearsey patrolled be- tween 151 and 152E, north of

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches No. (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
15.	(Cont.)	11-05N, 160-45E, 14-05N, 158-15E, 17-10N, 155-50E, and 20-05N, 153-10E.		21W, July 18-21, but sighted nothing.
	U.S.S. Halibut	Convoy, due at Yoko- suka 0600(I) July 25 will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 16, 17, 18 and 19: 14-45N, 145-32E, 17-17N, 145-52E, 18-54N, 142-40E, and 21-10N, 140-32E.	None	The Halibut searched the convoy route on July 16 but did not sight the convoy.
16-0912 (additional information)	U.S.S. Skipjack	Convoy, due at Yoko- suka 0600(I) July 25, will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 20, 21, 22 and 23: 23-45N, 138-58E, 26-24N, 138-58E, 29-10N, 138-58E, and 31-56N, 138-44E.	None	The Skipjack sighted a con- voy on July 22 at 34-12N, 138-31E, a position two days ahead of the Ultra's schedu-
	U.S.S. Kingfish		None	The Kingfish, approaching from the east, did not sight either the convoy on Empire Kwajalein route or the Yoko- suka convoy.
	U.S.S. Kingfish	Convoy, travelling SE, will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 18, 19 and 20:	None	See above for the Kingfish, Pearlman and Shearfish.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
15.	(cont.)	U.S.S. Garracon	22-23N, 150-40E, and 19-05N, 152-10E and 16-00N, 154-05E. (dates may be one day wrong)		
		U.S.S. Spearfish			
16.	16-1830	U.S.S. S-38	Unidentified merchant ship will pass through 02-32N, 161-14E at 0300(GCT) July 18 and at 02-00N, 164-10E at 0300(GCT) July 19 ar- riving Nauru 0100(GCT) July 20. Two warships (Isuzu) on course 135, speed 20, will reach position 00- 10N, 166-13E at 2100(GCT) July 18 arriving Nauru 2400(GCT) July 18.	None	ComSubPac dispatch receive S-38 patrolled off Nauru July 17-22 but did not sig- the Ultra targets approach- ing the island.
17.	17-0453	U.S.S. Steelhead	One tanker, course 90 speed 12, will pass through 25-10N, 143- 00E at 0900(GCT) July 19 and 05-10N, 149-20E at 1000(GCT) July 20.	None	ComSubPac dispatch receive Steelhead was engaged with another Ultra target. (See Case 18)
		U.S.S. Tinosa	Positive		The Tinosa sighted the tan- at 2113(GCT) July 19 at 5- 10N, 147-15E on course 90, speed 13. It attacked but missed.

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July 1943

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
18. 17-1745	<u>U.S.S. Tingra</u>	Convoy, course 168, will pass 12-32N, 146- 18E at 0300(GCT) July 18.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Tingra</u> was searching for another Ultra target, July 18 to 20, see Case 17.
19-0947 (additional information)	<u>U.S.S. Tingra</u>	Same convoy (3 mor- chantmen, 1 escort) will pass through 10- 03N, 147-42E at 0300 (GCT) July 19, 08-48N, 148-22E at 1500(GCT) July 19 and 08-22N, 149-45E at 0300(GCT) July 20.	Positive	See above for <u>Tingra</u> . ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Steelhead</u> sighted 3 freighters and escort at 102 (GCT) July 20 at 8-08N, 150- 12E. Escort prevented attack.
	<u>U.S.S. Pony</u>		Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Pony</u> at 0942(GCT) July 20 sighted 4 freighters and escort at 8-22N, 149-44E, attacked but missed.
	<u>U.S.S. Huron</u>	Convoy will pass through 30-00N, 134-00E at 0300(GCT) July 21.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Huron</u> , in a typhoon, sighted nothing; see Case 15.
19. 18-0742	<u>U.S.S. Hailbut</u>	Convoy of loaded trans- ports will pass through 18-20N, 134-00E at 0300	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Hailbut</u> departed for Midway on July 21.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
19.	(Cont.)	U.S.S. Haddock	(GCT) July 20 and 15- 15N, 134-00E at 0300 (GCT) July 21.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Haddock at 2315 (GCT) July 20 sighted 4 troop laden ships on southern course in 16-48N, 134-00E, hit all four, sank one.
20.	18-0714	U.S.S. Mingo	Two tankers, Nissho and Kenyo Maru, will pass through the fol- lowing positions at 0300 (GCT) on July 25, 26, 27 and 28: 03-00N, 133-50E, 03-00N, 138-40E, and 03-00N, 143-50E and 04-35N, 148-10E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Mingo was in the area attacking another target as it reported to ComSubPac; see 26-1056 below.
		U.S.S. Tinosa		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tinosa was ordered to re- turn to Pearl Harbor July 24
		U.S.S. Haddock		Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Haddock sighted the two tankers at 2229 (GCT) July 25 at 2-52N, 137-40E and damaged one. The Haddock had already made the contact before receiving ComSubPac's 26-1056
	26-1056	U.S.S. Haddock			Disregard Serial 71 (Case 28) remain within 100 miles of 3N, 138E. Mingo reports 1 tanker, 1 freighter, 1 escort at 0200 (GCT) July 26 at 3-40N, 134-28E course 090, speed 13.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
21.	19-1632	U.S.S. <u>Porky</u>	One unidentified ship with destroyer escort will sail from Nauru to Truk through 04-45N, 157-17E at 2000 (GCT) July 20 and 06-47N, 154- 41E at 0800 (GCT) July 21.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. Porky was in the area but did not sight the target.
22.	20-0943	U.S.S. <u>Skink</u>	Two or three carriers and other warships at speed 18 will reach 31- 01N, 136-44E at 0530 (GCT) July 23.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 0753 (GCT) July 23 at 30- 57N, 137E the Skink sighted a DD and 2 carriers. High seas prevented attack.
		U.S.S. <u>Pompano</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pompano was not in the area on July 23.
20-1018 (additional information)		U.S.S. <u>Skink</u>	Take position 34-30N, 139-07E at 2000 (GCT) July 23.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Skink was in the area but did not sight the target.
		U.S.S. <u>Pompano</u>	Take station 6 miles and bearing 270 from Skink	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. See above for Pompano.
		U.S.S. <u>Lapon</u>	Patrol the area.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Lapon at 0440 (GCT) July 23 at 34-28N, 130-58E sighted one carrier and 2

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
22.	(Cont.)			destroyers on a course to the southeast, position and course do not agree with the ultra data.
23.	22-0847	U.S.S. <u>Hamm</u>	1 tanker will pass through 47N, 157E at 0200 (GCT) July 22, 40N, 152E at 1600 (GCT) July 23 and 35N, 144E at 0900 (GCT) July 25.	ComSubPac dispatch received The <u>Hamm</u> suffered from engine trouble July 24. On July 25 it searched for another Ultra target to the southeast.
		U.S.S. <u>Salmon</u>		ComSubPac dispatch received The <u>Salmon</u> , enshrouded in heavy fog, made no contacts in the area on these days.
24.	22-1207	U.S.S. <u>Tinosa</u>	1 tanker, No. 3 Tanager, to be at 03-28N, 138-00E at 1000 (GCT) July 21 and 7-00N, 147-05E at 1830 (GCT) July 22. Thence via Pulawat to South Channel, Truk.	ComSubPac dispatch received The <u>Tinosa</u> at 1955 (GCT) July 23 in position 6-55N, 147-10E attacked a tanker on course 073. Two hits damaged it. ComSubPac dispatch received The <u>Steelhead</u> made no contacts because of mechanical difficulties.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
24. (Cont.) 23-0911	All subs	Advance the dates given in 22-1207 by one day and change type Pulwats to read "North of Pulwats."		
23-1755	U.S.S. Tinosa	#3 Tonan Maru to be at 7-00N, 143-24E at 0300 (Oct) July 24.		See above.
	U.S.S. Steelhead			See above.
25. 23-0823	U.S.S. Tinosa	Asakaze Maru and five other ships will be at the following 0300 (GCT) positions on July 26, 27 and 28: 15-30N, 145-53E, 13-05N, 147-40E and 10-40N, 149-35E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tinosa had received orders on July 24 to return to Poser Harbor.
26. 23-0833	U.S.S. Narwhal	Awata Maru will pass through 46-15N, 156-25E at 0500 (GCT) July 23, 34-40N, 146-00E at 0100 (GCT) July 26 and 34-35N, 139-53E at 2100 (GCT) July 26.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Narwhal was searching for another Ultra target east of Awata's course July 25.
	U.S.S. Halron		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Halron was fog bound on these days.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
26. (cont.)	U.S.S. Skipjack		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Skipjack at 1540 (GCT) July 25 in position 34-17N, 140-29E sighted one large escorted ship Tokyo bound.
	U.S.S. Tanaka		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tanaka was in the area but sighted nothing July 25 and set its course for Midway July 26.
27.	U.S.S. Pearlfish (search North of 14-30N, 154-00E)	The carrier, Tanaka, and one DD to be at 31-10N, 145-40E at 0005 (GCT) July 24, 14(?)N 154-00N, 2015 (GCT) July 26, 12-40N, 154- 00E at 0300 (GCT) July 27 and 7-00N, 154-00E at 2100 (GCT) July 27	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pearlfish made no con- tacts on these days.
	U.S.S. Pony (search south of 14-30N, 154-00E)		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pony, patrolling the Empire-Truk lanes July 25-28 made no contacts.
	U.S.S. Steelhead		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Steelhead, troubled with mechanical difficulties, made no contacts July 23-30.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
28. 24-0711	U.S.S. Haddock	A convoy will pass through 03-50N, 128-183E at 0300 (GCT) July 25 and 06-04N, 131-01E and 07-40N, 134-05E at the same time on the following two days.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Mine</u> was not in the area on these days.
	U.S.S. Haddock		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Haddock</u> was pursuing another target on these days see Case 20.
29. 24-0917	U.S.S. Seadragon	1 merchantship will be at 08-55N, 167-40E, time unknown on July 23 and at 2000 (GCT) July 26 will reach Wako Island area, carrying very important cargo. Our bombers will be after the ship also.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 2210 (GCT) July 26 the <u>Seadragon</u> fired 2 torpedoes at a freighter grounded at Wako and being repaired by the enemy. One hit. At 0620 (GCT) July 29 the <u>Seadragon</u> sighted a small freighter anchored at Wilkes Island adjoining Wako, waited till the freighter left port, overtook and attacked it at 0149 (GCT) July 31 at 17-40N 163-58E. It fired 3 torpedoes, of which one hit effectively. The freighter was heavily escorted and was on a southern course.
27-1932 (additional information)		The ship is probably delayed by bombing raids.		
28-1904 (additional information)		The ship believed anchored or stranded in Wako area. Destroy her before she unloads.		
30-0307 (additional information)		This ship, it is believed, will pass through 17-40N, 164-38E at 1100 (GCT) July 30, 19-00N, 164-38E at 1700 (GCT) July 30, 18-10N, 164-		

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addresses(a)	Type, No. of Ships, Positioning Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
29. (Cont.)		15E at 2200 (GCT) July 30, 17-38N, 164-15E at 0300 (GCT) July 31, 16-54N, 164-15E at 0800 (GCT) July 31, 14-23N, 162-51E at 0300 (GCT) August 1 and 12-08N, 160-14E at 0300 (GCT) on August 2.		
30. 24-0931	U.S.S. Tullibee	1 merchant ship, small but important, will pass through 61-25N, 172-56E, time unknown, July 28, approaching from northwest possibly about dawn.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tullibee at 1630 (GCT) July 27 (0630 H. zone, July 28) sighted an escorted tanker approaching Tarawa from the northwest. The submarine was unable to at- tack before the target reached the lagoon.
31. 24-1707	U.S.S. Swafish	The Kiyokawa Maru, 1 merchant ship and a DD escort to be at 26-35N, 121-45E at 0300 July 24, at 29- 37N, 125-44E at 0300 July 25, at 31-53N, 128-50E at 2330 July 28 (31-53N, 128-50E, at 2130 July 25, ac- cording to Japanese message) All times GCT.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 1325 (GCT) July 25, the Swafish attacked two freighters with DD escort in position 31N, 127-30E but missed.

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ComSubPao Operational Dispatches	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
No.	(Date-Time)			
32.	24-1530	U.S.S. Steelehead	None	ComSubPao dispatch received. The Steelehead, in mechanical difficulties, reported no contacts July 23-30.
	24-1753 (additional information)			
		About 7 escorts and destroyers en route to aid Tinian's target (#3 Tonan Mary) The tanker (#3 Tonan Mary) is badly needed, in position 6-51N, 147-54E at 2000 (GCT) July 24.		
33.	25-0733	U.S.S. Narwhal	None	ComSubPao dispatch (Serial 76) received. The Narwhal searched the area July 25-26 but sighted nothing.
		Search out and destroy a patrol boat in positions 30-51N, 153-43E, 33-01N, 157-30E, 32-40N, 156-08E, 30-20N, 154-30E, 30-40N, 150-00E, 27-37N, 153-14E, 25-33N, 155-50E.		
34.	25-0912	U.S.S. Sawfish	None	ComSubPao dispatch received. The Sawfish did not search for this target but for another nearby, given in ComSubPao's Ultra of 25-0943. See Case 35.
		Six merchantships to be at the following 0300 (GCT) positions on July 25, 26, and 27. 31-06N, 124-37E, 28-31N, 122-28E and 25-50N, 120-45E.		

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressed(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
35. 26-0943	U.S.S. Bayfish	1 or more merchant ships will pass through the follow- ing 0300(GCT) posi- tions on July 26, 27 and 28: 28-42N, 122-24E, 31-02N, 125-28E, and 33-15N, 128-08E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 1006 (GCT) July 26 the Bayfish sighted 4 merchant ships with DD escort on course 050 in position 31-32 N, 127-20E but lost contact. This convoy was 40 hours ahead of the Ultra schedule. At 0235(GCT) July 27 the Bayfish attacked a convoy, 5 ships and DD, at 32-32N, 127-41E, course unknown. This convoy was not in the position scheduled for the Ultra.
36. 25-1011	U.S.S. Skink	Two heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 1 DD to be at 15-15N, 151-40E at 1030(GCT) July 24 and 32-55N, 140- 30E at 0500(GCT) July 27.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Skink patrolled the approaches to Yokosuka July 26-27 but did not sight this Ultra target. ComSubPac dispatch received. The Skink patrolled the area of 33N, 141E July 27 but sighted nothing.
37. 25-1817	All subs	The Mogami Kawa Maru	Positive	ComSubPac dispatches re-

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addresses(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
37. (Cont.)		the <u>Yamagiri Maru</u> , 1 merchant ship (<u>Saiko Maru</u>) and 1 escort will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 26, 27 and 28: 29-30N, 145-35E, 25-25N, 147-20E, 21-20N, 149-00E. Additional information in 27-0817 gives the following positions for July 29, 30 and 31: 17-20N, 150-40E, and 13-15N, 152-15E and 09-10N, 153-20E.	None	received. The <u>Pony</u> at 1813 (GCT) July 30 sighted 3 ship and DD escort in position 13-50N, 152-00E. At 1402 (GCT) July 31 in position 11-16N, 153-34E it attacked and sank the <u>Kozumi Maru</u> .
27-0017	U.S.S. <u>Pony</u>		Positive	See above for <u>Pony</u>
	U.S.S. <u>Haddock</u>			ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Haddock</u> at 1900(GCT) July 31 in position 11-20N, 153-30E sighted the <u>Saiko</u> <u>Maru</u> , attacking and damaging it at 2107 (GCT).
38. 26-0825	U.S.S. <u>Haddock</u>	Two tankers to be at the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 26, 27 and 28: 4-15N, 137-30E, 3-20N, 132-15E, 3-20N, 126-45E,	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Haddock</u> expended its torpedoes attacking an Ultra target July 25-26; see Case 20.
	U.S.S. <u>Wingo</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Wingo</u> attacked another target travelling course 090 on July 27, 500 Case 20.

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July 1942

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
39.	26-1017	<u>U.S.S. SAURY</u>	1 cruiser, 1 tanker, and 2 DD's will pass through 15N, 140E at 0400(GCT) July 28, 21- 26N, 138-25E at 1030 (GCT) July 29 and 34- 14N, 132-33E at 2030 (GCT) July 31.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 1325(GCT) July 30 the SAURY sighted a tanker, a cruiser and 1 DD in posi- tion 26N, 135-56E. The sub- marine was rammed and damaged by the DD before it could fire torpedoes.
40.	27-0042	<u>U.S.S. SAURY</u>	Force of warships in- cluding battleships (to be at 31-32N, 132- 56E at 1100(GCT) July 31, at 30-00N, 136-00E at 2100(GCT) July 31 and Nono 22-40N, 138-56E at 2300 (GCT) August 1.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The SAURY was damaged in an encounter with an Ultra tar- get July 30 and set its course for Midway August 1. ComSubPac dispatch received. The Paddle scoured the route of the warships but sighted enemy planes only.
	27-0848	<u>U.S.S. TULLIHAN</u>	Must reach area 15 (Truk) not later than August 4. Look at 27-0042.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tullihan reached Truk August 4 where it contacted the Task Force; see Vol. VII Case 1. But the submarine made no contacts on its way to Truk as ComSubPac sug- gested in this dispatch.

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JULY 1942

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressed(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
41. 28-0402	U.S.S. Sauri (do not let this interfere with more important jobs)	Alkohol Mari will pass through 29-10N, 135- 15E at 0300(GCT) July 28 and 24-15N, 138- 30E at 0300(GCT) July 29.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Sauri pursued a more important Ultra target and attacked it on July 30; see Case 39.
28-0743	U.S.S. Porv	Alkohol Mari will pass through 16-10N, 151- 00E at 0300(GCT) August 1, 9-25N, 152-40E at 1330(GCT) August 2 and then head for North Chan- nel, Truk.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Porv patrolled the Empire-Truk route August 1 and headed for Ulul Island, N.W. of Truk, August 2 but did not sight the Ultra target.
	U.S.S. Steelhead		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Steelhead attacked an- other Ultra target at 11-20N 153-50E on July 31. The submarine made no contacts on August 1 and 2.
	for the U.S.S. Steelhead only	1 or more merchant ships on course 133.8° speed 12 at 0900(GCT) July 29 will pass, 8 hours later, southwest of Ulul Island.	None	See above.

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July 1943

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)	
				ComSubPac	Other
42. 28-0751	U.S.S. Hull	1 merchant ship will reach 6-45N, 131-37E at 0300(GCT) July 29. Also, two tankers are headed your way from position 05-00N, 139-00 E at 1600(GCT) July 26.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. On July 28 and 29 the HULL moved from 3-20N, 133-40E northeast to Borol Island, about 8N, 140E. It did not search for the Ultra target.	
43. 28-0758	U.S.S. Bulky	About six ships of un- known type will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on July 31, August 1 and 2. 25-20N, 137-55E, 28-20N, 136-40E and 30-50N, 134-35E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The BULKY was forced by damage received July 30 (See VII, Case 39) to set its course for Midway July 31.	
44. 29-0926	U.S.S. Porky	A convoy will pass through 15-12N, 144- 12E, 11-34N, 146-38E, and 08-06N, 149-00E at 0300(GCT) on August 1, 2 and 3.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The PORKY set its course for Johnston Island August 2. The Steelhead searched for the Ultra target August 3 but did not sight it.	
45. 29-0937	U.S.S. Hull	2 transports will pass through 01-46N, 132-32E at 0300(GCT) July 30 and at 06-24N, 133-45E at 0300(GCT) July 31.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The HULL was in the vicinity of Borol Island, about 8N, 140E, on July 30 and 31, in a N.E. of the convoy route.	

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
46.	30-1901	U.S.S. Skipjack	Two merchant ships and a DD will pass through 30-55N, 170-7 22E at 0300(GCT) July 31 and 34-39N, 139-32E at the same time on the following day.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Skipjack patrolled the area but did not sight the Ultra targets.
47.	30-2046	U.S.S. Pollack	A convoy will pass through the following 0300(GCT) positions on August 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6: 32-52N, 136-40E, 29-50N, 140-35E, 26-55N, 142-00E, 23-50N, 142-45E, and 20-40N, 143-50E, and 17-40N, 144-50E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pollack sighted two northbound convoys on August 6 in vicinity of 20N, 141E but did not sight the south- bound Ultra target.
		U.S.S. Paddle		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Paddle patrolled the area of the convoy August 4-5 but made no contacts.
		U.S.S. Pike		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Pike was in the vicinity of Marcus Island seeking an- other Ultra target, a carrier, which it attacked on August 5; see Vol. VIII for August, Case 8.

Chapter VII

July 2, 1943

Case 1

Naval Communications Intelligence learned that a convoy, composed of the Tonan Maru, the Koan Maru, one other maru, and an unidentified escort vessel would sail from Yokosuka to Truk between June 25 and July 5. The noon positions for these days were included in the intercepted Japanese dispatch.¹

On July 2 ComSubPac sent the positions of the convoy at 0300 (GCT) on July 3, 4, and 5 to the U.S.S. Halibut and the U.S.S. Pogy.²

The Halibut reported a contact with two freighters at 8-08 N, 146-13 E at 1100 (GCT), on July 4, but was unable to approach for an attack, and finally abandoned the chase.³

To the Pogy, on July 5, at 1801 (GCT), ComSubPac reported that the Halibut had sighted but not attacked the convoy, which seemed to consist of two ships rather than three as had been previously reported.⁴

1 - Appendix VII, Case 1, No. A-1, hereafter noted as VII, Case 1, A-1.

2 - VII, Case 1, B-1.

3 - VII, Case 1, C-1 - C-3.

4 - VII, Case 1, B-2.

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But at 0800 (GCT) on July 5 the two-ship convoy had already been intercepted by the Pogy at 7-26 N, 149-33 E. Of five torpedoes fired, only one hit was made in the leading freighter, and the escort forced the Pogy to submerge.⁵ This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Case 8

Known positions of two unidentified merchantmen sailing from Marcus Island to Yokosuka were obtained from an intercepted Japanese dispatch of June 28.⁶

Although ComSubFac's operational dispatch was sent to the U.S.S. Jack at 1820 (GCT) on July 2, the 0300 (GCT) positions for July 2 and 3, and the time of arrival at Yokosuka (2400 GCT, 3 July) were included, in order that the Jack might plot the vessel's course and intercept as soon as possible.⁷

The Jack made no contacts on July 3, but at 0520 (GCT) July 4 while patrolling the entrance to Suruga Bay it attacked and sank an escorted merchant ship rounding Iro Saki, i.e., sailing south-west away from Yokosuka. This therefore cannot have been the

5 - VII, Case 1, C-4 - C-6.
6 - VII, Case 2, A-1.
7 - VII, Case 2, B-1.

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Ultra target which was due in Yokosuka five hours earlier.
The Ultra target was not sighted.⁸

July 4, 1943

Case 3

Points through which the Akitsu Maru, would pass en route from the west entrance of Palao to Ujina were listed in a Japanese dispatch intercepted by Communication Intelligence on July 3.⁹

The vessel's positions for July 6 and July 7 were sent to the U.S.S. Sturgeon. ComSubPac advised that the ship's course might not be a direct one, since there were indications that it would pass through 31-05 N, 134-47 E as well as between 26-32 N, 134-30 E and 32-10 N, 133-21 E.¹⁰

The contact report of the Sturgeon shows that the submarine was in the area (it sighted a destroyer on July 5 in position 32-56 N, 133-59 E).¹¹ However, neither the contact report nor the patrol report for July 6 - 10 inclusive is available at this writing, so that the results of this case are unknown.

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- 8 - VII, Case 2, C-1 - C-3.
 - 9 - VII, Case 3, A-1.
 - 10 - VII, Case 3, B-1.
 - 11 - VII, Case 3, C-1.

July 6, 1943

Case 4

It was learned from a Japanese dispatch of July 4 that a convoy designated as "O" #404 Convoy, of which the Kayo Maru was a unit, would sail from Saeki to a location possibly identified as Falso.¹²

With instructions to the U.S.S. Gurnard to attempt interception, and to the U.S.S. Mingo to assist if able to reach the convoy's track without excessive expenditure of fuel, ComSubPac in Serial 11 (06-0551) transmitted the convoy's positions for July 9,¹³ 10, and 11.

The Gurnard, while patrolling on the shipping lanes north of Palau, sighted a convoy of four merchant ships and an escort in position 13-10N, 131-55E at 1754 (GCT) July 10. The submarine attacked and sank one merchant ship two hours later. With all torpedoes expended, the Gurnard then set its course for Midway.¹⁴

This is a positive contact with the Ultra target, which was due to reach 09-55N, 132-05E by 0300 (GCT) on July 11. An intercepted Japanese message of July 11 confirms the sinking.¹⁵

12 - VII, Case 4, A-1 - A-3.

13 - VII, Case 4, B-1. ComSubPac added a bit more information for the Gurnard in a dispatch of July 10-0840 (see VII, Case 8, B-1).

14 - VII, Case 4, C-2 - C-3.

15 - VII, Case 4, D-1.

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The Mingo did not attempt to intercept this
convoy since on the advice of a later ComSubPac dispatch,
it moved to meet another Ultra target nearer its
¹⁸
area.

July 7, 1943

Case 5

On July 7 ComSubPac suggested that the
U.S.S. Mingo not act upon the information of serial 11
dispatched the previous day (see VII, Case 4, B-1), but
that the submarine intercept another ship travelling east
in the Truk area July 9-11 (06-15 N, 145-20 E; 7 N, 148 E;
¹⁷
08-15 N, 148-10 E).

From July 8-10 the Mingo patrolled in the
vicinity of Satawal Island (7 N, 148 E) but did not
¹⁸
sight the Ultra target, which ComSubPac suggested in a
later dispatch (see VII, Case 7, B-1) might be a tanker.

Case 6

On July 7 at 0749 (GCT) ComSubPac sent
information to all submarines regarding two important
¹⁹
task forces sailing from the Empire to Truk.

The first task force, (mentioned second

18 - See VII, Case 5, B-1 - C-2.

17 - VII, Case, B-1.

18 - VII, Case 5, C-2.

19 - VII, Case 6, B-1.

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in ComSubPac's 070749) consisting of a carrier Uyo,
a cruiser Aikoku, and several destroyers leaving Yokosuka
on July 6, would pass through 10-26 N, 150-53 E, at
0900 (GCT) July 10 and arrive North Channel Truk 11 hours
later, according to intercepted Japanese dispatches.²⁰
ComSubPac ordered the U.S.S. Pogy to take station at the
above position while the U.S.S. Halibut and the U.S.S.
Steelhead were to take positions 5 miles to the northwest
and southeast respectively.²¹

The second task force, (mentioned first in
ComSubPac's 070749) consisting of carriers, cruisers, and
destroyers, would leave the Inland Sea on July 10 and
arrive at Truk on the 15th., according to an intercepted
dispatch of July 6.²² Another Japanese dispatch of July 5
reported that a carrier, Chuyo leaving Yokosuka at
0400 (I) on the 10th., would rendezvous with another force
at 0600 (I) July 11 in position 27-40 N, 137-38 E.²³
ComSubPac suggested that this carrier was joining the task
force from the Inland Sea at the named position and ordered
the U.S.S. Sturgeon and the U.S.S. Searaven to take action
in that area. ComSubPac added that further information

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- 20 - VII, Case 6, A-1 - A-2.
 - 21 - VII, Case 6, B-1.
 - 22 - VII, Case 6, A-3 - A-4.
 - 23 - VII, Case 6, A-5.

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would be sent later to our submarines in the Truk area,
24
where the force was due July 15; this is the subject
of VII, Case 10.

On July 10 the Pogy, the Halibut, and the
Steelhead were awaiting the first task force in their
appointed places near 10-28 N, 150-53 E. At 1016 (GCT)
the Pogy sighted three ships of this force but was compelled
to submerge by an enemy destroyer and was unable to
25
attack. The Halibut, a few miles north of the Pogy,
sighted a carrier and auxiliary cruiser at 1017 (GCT)
and was able to fire six torpedoes at the cruiser, three
of which hit. A destroyer forced the submarine under
26
with depth charges. On the next day, at 11-1000, the
Halibut, half its crew ill from food poisoning, reported
27
its action to ComSubPac.

The Steelhead, originally stationed a few
miles south of the Pogy, witnessed the Halibut's
attack and was about to put more torpedoes into the
damaged cruiser when it sighted the carrier. Firing
five torpedoes, of which at least three hit, the Steelhead
turned away at top speed on the surface, observing in

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- 24 - VII, Case 6, B-1.
25 - VII, Case 6, C-2 - C-3.
26 - VII, Case 6, C-4 - C-6.
27 - VII, Case 6, B-2.

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the meantime that the carrier had been hard hit and that
the cruiser was listing. The Steelhead reported its
action to ComSubPac at 11-1440.

These were all positive contacts with one
of the Ultra targets, -the task force from Yokosuka due
at Truk July 10.

Meanwhile the second task force, which left
the Inland Sea on July 10 and which was due at Truk the
15th., was to rendezvous at 2100 (GCT) July 10 with still
another force (including the Uryu) from Yokosuka in
position 27-40 N, 137-38 E where the Sturgeon and the
Searaven were lying in wait.

At 2103 (GCT) July 10, in 27-42 N, 137-38 E,
the Sturgeon sighted a seaplane tender with destroyer
escort but was unable to maneuver into a position to
attack. An hour later, at 2205 (GCT), the submarine saw
two carriers and six cruisers speeding to the southeast
but they were so well covered by carrier planes it was not
possible to close for an attack.

A few miles to the southeast of the Sturgeon,
the Searaven, after first sighting a destroyer on patrol,

28 - VII, Case 6, C-7 - C-9. (The auxiliary carrier Uryu,
reached Truk, however, and was able to return
to Yokosuka later in July; see VII, Case 22).

29 - VII, Case 6, B-3.

30 - VII, Case 6, C-10 - C-11.

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contacted this same task force at 2320 (GCT) and was also³¹
unable to close with the fast moving Japanese warships.

These were positive contacts with the second Ultra target, the task force due at Truk July 15, where it was awaited by our submarines in that area; (see VII, Case 10).

July 9, 1945

Case 7

It was learned from an intercepted dispatch of July 5 that the No. 20 Mikage Maru, escorted by an unidentified ship would leave Truk at 1630 (I) on July 5, and en route to Kwajalein would stop at Hauru at 0300 (I) on July 10. At 1800 (I) on the same day, it would leave Hauru, arriving at Kwajalein on July 12. Noon positions³² of the vessel for July 6 through July 12 were listed.

Sending this intelligence to the U.S.S.S.-28 ComSubPac gave the maru's positions for July 11 and 12 and then added further bits of information for the U.S.S. Halibut, the U.S.S. Pogy, and the U.S.S. Steelhead (see Case 6), for the U.S.S. Gurnard (see Case 4), and for the³³
U.S.S. Mingo (see Case 5).

31 - VII, Case 6, C-12 - C-15.

32 - VII, Case 7, A-1.

33 - VII, Case 7, B-1.

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The S-28 was at the Submarine Base at Dutch Harbor from July 5 to 13.³⁴ No doubt the action addressee of ComSubPac's 09-1015 should read S-32, which was in the Kwajalein area from July 15 on.³⁵ However, the report of the S-38 prior to July 15 is not at the moment available. Therefore the results of this case at the present writing are unknown.

July 10, 1943

Case 8

An unidentified convoy consisting of the Ryoyo Maru, the Shoho Maru, and an unidentified number of army transports, and also the Hokkai Maru escorted by two unidentified vessels, departed Palao at 1000 (I) on July 9, and was scheduled to arrive at Rabaul at 1500 (I) on July 16.³⁶

With a warning to watch for one of our own submarines which might possibly be near the eastern end of the area, ComSubPac sent this information to the U.S.S. Mingo on July 10. It was added for the information of the U.S.S. Gurnard that the position given for its target on July 11 (See Case 4) might possibly be 7 miles farther

34 - VII, Case 7, C-2.
35 - VII, Case 7, C-3.
36 - VII, Case 8, A-1.

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37

east, and that an escort vessel might be added.

On July 10 the Mingo discontinued its search for a previous Ultra target (see Case 5) in the vicinity of Truk and set its course to the southwest to intercept the new target en route from Palau to Rabaul. It sighted the convoy at 2024 (GCT) July 11, four freighters in two columns with escorts outboard of the column at 0627 (GCT) July 12. The Mingo was able to attack both ships of the left column, Ryoyo Maru class freighters, and fired three torpedoes at each. While submerged under a depth charge attack, the submarine heard four of the six torpedoes explode but never actually saw the results of the attacks. The Mingo did not pursue the convoy over the equator since it would then be entering the area of the submarines of the South West Pacific Command. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

38

Case 9

Listing the usual noon positions, a movement report of a Japanese convoy, sailing between Yokosuka and Truk, was sent on July 9 from the Chief of Staff of the Yokosuka Naval District to an unidentified addressee.

37 - VII, Case 8, B-1.

38 - VII, Case 8, C-2 - C-3.

37

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The convoy, which would be made up of three marus, some escort ships and Special SubChaser No. 13, would leave Yokosuka on July 9, arriving at Truk about July 20.³⁹

Alerted for this target were the U.S.S. Flying Fish and the U.S.S. Searaven, and positions were sent for 0300 (GCT) on July 12, 13 and 14.⁴⁰

En route to Midway the Flying Fish out across the route of the convoy on July 12 and 13 but did not sight the Ultra target.⁴¹ On July 12 and 13 the Searaven patrolled the route over which the convoy was scheduled to pass but sighted nothing. Bad weather hampered the submarine on the 15th and on July 16 the Searaven headed for an area to the south east.⁴² No contact was made with the Ultra target.

July 11, 1943

Case 10

On July 10 the Captain of the Chuyo reported that his ship had just left Yokosuka enroute to a rendezvous with a task force at 27-40 N, 137-38 E.⁴³ on July 11, 1943. The Captain had previously sent the date of his departure and point of rendezvous on July 5, and on the basis of the

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- 39 - VII, Case 9, A-1.
 - 40 - VII, Case 9, B-1.
 - 41 - VII, Case 9, C-1 - C-3.
 - 42 - VII, Case 9, C-4.
 - 43 - VII, Case 10, A-1.

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information ComSubPac had ordered the U.S.S. Sturgeon and U.S.S. Searaven to intercept the warships at the rendezvous (see Case 6, A-5 and B-1). Both submarines sighted the force of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers which was travelling so fast and was so well covered by carrier planes that the submarines could not attack.

ComSubPac knew from a Japanese dispatch intercepted on July 6 that this force would arrive off Truk at 10-50 N, 151-30 E at 0400 (I) July 15 (1900-GCT, July 14)⁴⁴.

On July 11, therefore, ComSubPac ordered the U.S.S. Tinosa, U.S.S. Pogy, and U.S.S. Steelhead to take stations on meridian 151-30 E, the Tinosa at 10-15 N, the Pogy at 08-40 N, and the Steelhead at 08-30 N in time to "render suitable honors"⁴⁵.

At 2112 (GCT) on July 13 the Tinosa arrived at its station and submerged. At 2057 (GCT) on July 14, the Tinosa first sighted two carriers, one auxiliary carrier, one seaplane tender, two heavy cruisers and several destroyers in position 10-20 N, 151-25 E. The submarine was never able to obtain a closer range than 9000 yards on the leading section of this group of ships.

44 - VII, Case 10, A-2 (See also VII, Case 6, A-3 and 4).
45 - VII, Case 10, B-1.

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An attack of four torpedoes made on a carrier in the rear section of the group failed when the target sighted the torpedo wakes and turned away.⁴⁶

The Pogy sighted this task force at 0216 (GCT) on July 15 in position 8-41 N, 151-33 E speeding at 25 knots on course south-southeast. The submarine⁴⁷ was unable to close to a firing position.

At 0251 (GCT) the Steelhead sighted two Morani class cruisers and a destroyer escort in position 8-31 N, 151-30 E but, because of their radical zig and speed of over 24 knots, was also unable to close the range to⁴⁸ attack.

These were all positive contacts with the Ultra target headed for Truk.

Case 11

On July 10, at 1725 (GCT), ComSubPac had sent a dispatch informing the U.S.S. Flying Fish and U.S.S. Searaven of a convoy from Yokosuka bound for Truk and giving noon positions for July 12-14 inclusive. Neither submarine sighted the target (see VII, Case 9). This information was repeated in another dispatch of July 11 which added the

46 - VII, Case 10, C-1 - C-3.
47 - VII, Case 10, C-4 - C-6.
48 - VII, Case 10, C-7 - C-8.

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noon positions for July 14-17 inclusive and named the ⁴⁹
Searaven and the Haddock as action addressees.

This dispatch of July 11 included three more
Ultra targets. A second assignment for the Searaven
and Haddock was a convoy of six ships and escort bound
from Chichijima to Saipan down the west side of the
Marianas, 19-31 N, 143-49 E July 13; 17-34 N, 145-36 E
July 14; 15-32 N, 145-36 E July 15. Assigned to the ⁵⁰
U.S.S. Gurnard was convoy #703 of which the vessels
designated as "A" would sail through 15-45 N, 131-00 E ⁵¹
July 11; 10-40 N, 131-00 E July 12 and thence to Palau.
Assigned to the U.S.S. Halibut was the "B" part of this
convoy, the Tca Maru, which would leave the "A" vessels
on July 10 and proceed alone eastward through noon
positions 12-10 N, 142-10 E July 12; 10-30 N, 146-15 E
July 13; and 10-10 N, 151-21 E July 14. ⁵²

The Searaven patrolled south along the lane
the convoy was scheduled to follow but left it at
latitude 21 N on July 16, and patrolled to the east with-
out sighting the Ultra target. ⁵³

On July 14-15 the Haddock was patrolling

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- 49 - VII, Case II, B-1 and A-1.
 - 50 - VII, Case II, B-1 and A-2.
 - 51 - VII, Case II, B-1 and A-3.
 - 52 - VII, Case II, B-1 and A-3 - A-4.
 - 53 - VII, Case II, C-1.

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just off Pagan Island in the Marianas, a few degrees east of the convoy route and did not move to intercept this convoy, probably because it was waiting for its other Ultra assignment, the convoy of six ships and escort bound for Saipan and scheduled to sail along the Marianas, 19-31 N, 145-49 E (just off Pagan Island) July 13; 17-34 N, 145-36 E July 14; and 15-32 N, 145-38 E July 15. It did not sight the convoy and left the area for Palau late July 15.⁵⁴

The Gurnard, having expended its last torpedoes in an attack of July 10 upon a previous Ultra target (convoy "O" #404, bound for Palau, according to messages intercepted July 4 - see VII, Case 4), had set its course for Midway. The convoy of this ComSubPac dispatch of July 11 is apparently another group of ships (#703) also bound for Palau over a similar route not many hours later. It was not sighted since the Gurnard was leaving the area.⁵⁵

The Halibut on July 13-14 patrolled northwest of Truk in the area through which the Toa Maru was scheduled to travel but sighted nothing. No contacts were⁵⁶

54 - VII, Case 11, C-3.
55 - VII, Case 11, C-4.
56 - VII, Case 11, C-6.

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made with the Ultra target.

Case 12

The schedule of the Gosyu Maru and another vessel which had departed Yokosuka on July 10 was recovered from an intercepted dispatch of July 10. It was believed that the message was only partially intercepted, since the recovered noon positions took the two ships only half way to Jaluit where the ships were assumed to be headed.⁵⁷

On July 11 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S. Flying Fish the noon positions of these ships for July 12-14.⁵⁸ In a dispatch of July 12, the U.S.S. Spearfish was given the noon positions of the Ultra target for July 14-15.⁵⁹

The Flying Fish, patrolling near the Bonin Islands on July 13, was in a position too far to the west to intercept the convoy which was travelling on a southeast course well to the east of the Bonin Islands.⁶⁰ The Spearfish had attacked a destroyer on July 13 in position 11-12N, 161-50E, northwest of Jaluit.⁶¹ The submarine's report for July 14 and 15 states that it was en route to its area, which is not named, however.⁶² The Spearfish made no contact

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- 57 - VII, Case 12, A-1.
 - 58 - VII, Case 12, B-1.
 - 59 - VII, Case 12, B-2.
 - 60 - VII, Case 12, C-1.
 - 61 - VII, Case 12, C-4.
 - 62 - VII, Case 12, C-3.

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on these days. No contact was made with this Ultra target by any of the subs assigned to the task.

July 13, 1943

Case 13

From a movement report sent by the Captain of the Otake, Communications Intelligence learned on July 12 that this carrier and one other ship would leave Sasebo at 0800 (I) on July 15, and would arrive at an unknown destination, (near Suruga Bay) at 1200 (I) on July 17. Requesting that an anti-submarine sweep be made on July 15 in the Tanegashima Island area, and on the 17th to the eastward of Zenisu, the Captain included four positions on the route he would travel between the two ports.⁶³

ComSubPac informed on July 13 the U.S.S. Sturgeon, U.S.S. Pompano, U.S.S. Sawfish and U.S.S. Skipjack of the carrier's route and included four positions for July 15-16.⁶⁴

Because of a storm and poor visibility, the Sturgeon made no sightings on these days.⁶⁵ The Pompano, patrolling in the area, sighted several small boats which

63 - VII, Case 13, A-1.

64 - VII, Case 13, B-1.

65 - VII, Case 13, C-2.

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were not considered to be worth torpedo expenditure.⁶⁶
Patrolling in Lat. 30-56 N, Long. 140-12 E at 0310 (GCT)
on July 15, the Sawfish was 10 degrees east of the
Ultra's position, 31-13 N, 130-10 E. It is not known
whether CcmSubPac's dispatch was received or whether the
Sawfish actually searched for this target.⁶⁷

At 1330 (GCT) July 13 the Skipjack had
received an operational order from the Commander of
Task Force 17 changing its patrol area to the section
just off the coast of Yokosuka. This should have placed
the Skipjack in a good position to intercept the Otake
and the unidentified ship due at 2000 (GCT) on July 16
at 34 N, 138-38 E. But though a small tanker was sighted
by the Skipjack at 33-53 N, 140-01 E, no other contact
was reported on July 16.⁶⁸ No contact was made with the
Ultra target.

Case 14

On July 13, CcmSubPac, utilizing the in-
formation contained in a Japanese dispatch of July 5,⁶⁹
sent the positions of a cargo vessel, possibly the Honkan
Maru, to the U.S.S.S-38.⁷⁰

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- 66 - VII, Case 13, C-4.
 - 67 - VII, Case 13, C-5 - C-8.
 - 68 - VII, Case 13, C-7 - C-9.
 - 69 - VII, Case 14, A-1.
 - 70 - VII, Case 14, B-1.

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The cargo vessel was due to reach 08-00 N, 167-26 E, less than a degree south of Kwajalein, at 0300 (GCT) July 15 and later in this day was due to reach anchorage in the atoll. An imperfect copy of the S-38's Ninth Patrol Report at hand at this writing reads that the submarine was patrolling submerged in the southern approaches to Kwajalein at 1805 (GCT), July 14. A break in the report follows, until 0747 (GCT) July 15 when the S-38 surfaced and cleared to the south. On July 16, 0312 (L) (1312 (GCT) July 15), the S-38 report reads "Sent dispatch 15-1222 to ComSubPac regarding attack on freighter." This statement makes it most probable that the S-38 attacked the Ultra target, due at Kwajalein soon after 0300 (GCT) July 15th. But the break in the copy of the report at hand and the lack of the sub's contact report for July 15 at this writing compel us to state the results of the case as unknown, since the complete patrol report is unavailable.

Case 15

According to an intercepted dispatch of July 14 a convoy designated as "Pu"406" was scheduled

71 - VII, Case 14, C-2.

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to reach Hayaumi Seto at 1200 (I) July 22 along a course⁷²
for which noon positions were given for July 15-21.

Two separate convoys were also scheduled to reach Yokosuka on July 25. The more important, an unknown number of ships travelling from the Truk area, was⁷³ due at Yokosuka at 0600 (I) July 25. The other convoy, or a single ship, had left Kwajalein on July 15 and was⁷⁴ due in Yokosuka at an unknown time on July 25.

On July 16 at 0711 (GCT) ComSubPac sent the noon positions of the "Fu-406" convoy for July 16-17 to the U.S.S. Haddock and sent the convoy's position for July 21 to the U.S.S. Sturgeon. This Ultra dispatch also reported to the U.S.S. Spearfish and U.S.S. Searaven the noon positions for July 17-20 of the convoy (or ship) bound from Kwajalein for Yokosuka. This dispatch concluded with the noon positions (July 18-19) of the convoy scheduled to arrive at Yokosuka from the Truk area at 0600 (I) July 25; the U.S.S. Halibut and Searaven were⁷⁵ assigned this target.

In another dispatch sent two hours later (16-0912) ComSubPac gave the July 20-23 positions of the

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- 72 - VII, Case 15, A-1 - A-2.
 - 73 - VII, Case 15, A-3.
 - 74 - VII, Case 15, A-4 - A-5.
 - 75 - VII, Case 15, B-1.

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Truk-Yokosuka convoy to the U.S.S. Skipjack and the ⁷⁶U.S.S. Kingfish. (For the information and possible action of the Kingfish, Searaven, and Spearfish this dispatch contained another Ultra, a convoy (for which the Japanese message is unavailable) travelling southeast on July 18-20 toward the Marshall Islands.-Ed. Note)

Late in the day of July 15 the Haddock set its course from the Marianas for Palau toward the route of the "Fu" convoy at a time probably calculated to meet it. It patrolled the Palau area for the next two ⁷⁷days but sighted nothing. By noon July 21 the convoy was due at 30 N, 134 E. The Sturgeon was patrolling in the ⁷⁸area, but the weather was heavy and nothing was sighted.

⁷⁹The Spearfish made no contacts from July 18 to 27. From July 18 to 21 the Searaven patrolled between 151 and 152 E north of 21 N, the area through which the ⁸⁰convoy from Kwajalein should pass, but it sighted nothing. The Searaven was too far to the east to look for the other Yokosuka bound convoy, which the Halibut, however, was seeking. On July 16 the Halibut was patrolling off Guam and Rota along the Empire lanes where the Truk-Yokosuka convoy was expected that day (noon position

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- 76 - VII, Case 15, B-2.
 - 77 - VII, Case 15, C-2.
 - 78 - VII, Case 15, C-4.
 - 79 - VII, Case 15, C-5.
 - 80 - VII, Case 15, C-6.

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and 20. The Iauzu, a light cruiser, and an unidentified ship would pass a point bearing 315 degrees, 60 miles distant from Nauru at 0600 (I) July 19 and would arrive at Nauru three hours later.⁸⁴ Also an escorted merchant ship was scheduled to reach Nauru at 1000 (I) July 20⁸⁵ along a series of noon positions given for July 15-19.

On July 16 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S. S-38 the positions of the merchant ship as it approached Nauru (its 19 July position was 01-12 N, 166-55 E) and the position of the warships 00-10 N, 166-15 E at 0600 (I) July 19 (2100 (GCT) July 18).⁸⁶ The next day, ComSubPac sent the S-38 a second dispatch authorizing the submarine to delay its time schedule in order to patrol at Nauru⁸⁷ until July 20.

Although the S-38 patrolled off Nauru in the vicinity of 1-37 N, 166-04 E from July 17 to 22, it did not sight the Ultra targets approaching the island. On July 22 it sighted two small freighters in the harbor,⁸⁸ one of which may have been the merchant ship scheduled to arrive July 20 and which might have slipped into port unobserved.

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- 84 - VII, Case 16, A-1.
85 - VII, Case 16, A-2.
86 - VII, Case 16, B-1.
87 - VII, Case 16, B-2.
88 - VII, Case 16, C-1 - C-3.

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Case 17

The noon positions of an unidentified unit sailing from the vicinity of Balikpapan, Borneo, to Truk were recovered from a message intercepted July 12.⁸⁹ The unit would arrive at Truk on July 21 at 1400 (I). Later Japanese messages (July 14 and 16) urged the immediate sailing of the unit, evidently a tanker, because fuel⁹⁰ supplies were running low.

On July 17 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S. Steelhead and U.S.S. Tinosa the ship's course and speed, 90 degrees and 12 knots, and two positions: 5-10 N, 143-00 E at 0900 (GCT) July 19 and 5-10 N, 149-20 E at⁹¹ 1000 (GCT) July 20.

The Steelhead was engaged on July 20 with another Ultra target (see VII, Case 18) somewhat to the⁹² north of the tanker's route. The Tinosa, however, was searching the Borneo-Truk route on July 17, and sighted a tanker similar to the Hippon Maru at 2113 (GCT) July 19. The submarine, after firing four torpedoes which missed, pursued the target through the next day but was prevented from attacking again by the presence of planes

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- 89 - VII, Case 17, A-1.
 - 90 - VII, Case 17, A-2 - A-3.
 - 91 - VII, Case 17, B-1.
 - 92 - VII, Case 17, C-1.

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⁹³
and a destroyer. The tanker was travelling at an estimated speed of 13 knots on course 90 and was loaded. It had first been sighted at 2113 (GCT) July 19 in position 5-10 N, 147-15 E.⁹⁴ This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

July 18, 19, 1943

Case 18

A Japanese dispatch of July 16 disclosed that a convoy designated 3702, consisting of three merchant ships and an escort, would leave Japan for Truk at 1200 (I) July 17 and would arrive at the North Channel at 0600 (I) July 21. Four positions through which the convoy was scheduled to pass during July 18-20 were also listed.⁹⁵ From a later dispatch Communications Intelligence learned that the convoy's course on the morning of July 18 would be 168 degrees and that the Commander of the Guam Detachment would carry out an anti-submarine patrol for the convoy.⁹⁶ A further Japanese dispatch, July 18, gave the noon position of the "Pr 406" convoy for July 21.⁹⁷

On July 17 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S.

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- 93 - VII, Case 17, C-3.
94 - VII, Case 17, C-4.
95 - VII, Case 18, A-1.
96 - VII, Case 18, A-2.
97 - VII, Case 15, A-3.

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Tinosa the course and noon position of July 18 only for
98
convoy 3702. In a second dispatch sent on July 18
ComSubPas gave all four positions of convoy 3702 to the
U.S.S. Steelhead and U.S.S. Pogy as well as to the Tinosa
and added for the U.S.S. Sturgeon the July 21 position of
99
the "Pu" 405 convoy.

The Tinosa did not search for convoy 3702
because from July 17-20 it was searching out and pursuing
another Ultra target on the Borneo-Truk route (see VII,
100
Case 17).

Both the Pogy and the Steelhead, however,
were evidently looking for convoy 3702 on July 20. At
0438 (GCT) the Pogy sighted a convoy of four freighters
and an escort in position 8-22 N, 149-44 E. It attacked,
missed, and was then attacked in turn. At 0942 (GCT)
101
the submarine cleared the area to the northeast. Convoy
3702 was scheduled to pass through 08-42 N, 149-45 E at
0300 (GCT) July 20. This is a possible contact with the
Ultra target since the time and place agree although there
is a discrepancy in the number of ships. The Pogy failed
to report the course of this convoy.

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- 98 - VII, Case 18, B-1.
 - 99 - VII, Case 18, B-2.
 - 100 - VII, Case 18, C-1.
 - 101 - VII, Case 18, C-2 - C-4.

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A few hours later the Steelhead, after successfully evading a series of attacks by four airplanes and two patrol boats, sighted a convoy of one large and two small freighters with an escort (destroyer or torpedo boat) at 0828 (GCT) July 20 in position 8-08 N, 150-12 E. The submarine was about to attack when forced to dive. The target dispersed and contact with them was lost. The three freighters and escort were on a southeast course. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

On July 21 the Sturgeon was patrolling under typhoon conditions in the area through which the "Fu" convoy was to pass, but it made no contact. This convoy, the subject of several other ComSubPac dispatches (see VII, Case 15), was never sighted.

Case 19

On July 16 a Japanese message was intercepted which gave the noon positions (July 16-24) of a convoy of several ships carrying personnel and supplies to Palau.

On July 18 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S. Halibut and U.S.S. Haddock the convoy's noon positions, a

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- 102 - VII, Case 18, C-5 - C-6.
 - 103 - VII, Case 18, C-7.
 - 104 - VII, Case 18, C-8.
 - 105 - VII, Case 19, A-1 - A-3.

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18-20 N, 134-00 E July 20 and 15-15 N, 134-00 E July
108
21.

The Halibut, which had been patrolling in the vicinity of the Marianas, left the area for Midway
107
on July 21. The Haddock, however, searched for the convoy and at 2315 (GCT) July 20 sighted four ships on a southerly course in position 16-48 N, 134-00 E. The ships, loaded with troops, were arranged in two columns accompanied by two escorts. Carefully planning its approach, the Haddock fired seven torpedoes in two attacks, hitting all four ships before the escorts sighted the submarine and forced it down with depth charges. One ship was heard breaking up
108
and was believed sunk.

This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Case 20

According to a Japanese dispatch of July 17 two large tankers, the Nissho and Kenyo Maru, were scheduled to leave Singapore on July 18 and arrive at Truk
109
July 29 at noon.

On July 18 ComSubPac, giving the noon positions

106 - VII, Case 19, B-1.
107 - VII, Case 19, C-2.
108 - VII, Case 19, C-3 - C-5.
109 - VII, Case 20, A-1.

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for July 25-28 inclusive, instructed the U.S.S. Mingo,
U.S.S. Haddock, and U.S.S. Tinosa to intercept the
110
tankers.

On July 24 the Tinosa was occupied with
another Ultra target north of Truk and at the end of this
day was ordered to return to Pearl Harbor. 111
The Mingo
was in the area. On July 26 it sighted a tanker which was
112
not the Ultra target. The Mingo reported the contact to
ComSubPac as involving a tanker, a freighter, and an
escort on course 090 at 3-40N, 134-28 E. ComSubPac returned
this information to the Haddock in the dispatch of July
26-1056 and asked that the Haddock patrol in the vicinity
113
of 3 N, 138 E. The Nissho and Kenyo Maru were due at
3 N, 138-40 E by 0300 (GCT) July 26. But the Haddock
had moved south of Palau after its successful attack of
July 21 on four troop ships (an earlier Ultra target; see
VII, Case 19) and had already sighted the two large
tankers at 2229 (GCT) July 25 in position 2-52 N, 137-40 E.
The submarine engaged the unescorted Ultra targets in a
running attack for many hours and fired fifteen torpedoes
on one of the tankers, but made only two hits. The
damaged tanker kept afloat and maintained its speed.

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- 110 - VII, Case 20, B-1.
111 - VII, Case 20, C-1.
112 - VII, Case 20, C-3.
113 - VII, Case 20, B-2.

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Finally, at 1812 (GCT) July 27, having expended all but one of its torpedoes, the Haddock broke off the pursuit leaving the two tankers still under way at 4-59 N, 139-04 E. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Case 21

Having arrived at Nauru at 0630 (I) on July 19, the Captain of the Urakaze disclosed in an intercepted transmission that his ship would complete unloading and would sail with a destroyer escort for Truk at 1000 (I) on the same day. After passing through the two listed positions the ship would arrive at North Channel at 0500 (I) July 22.

In dispatch 19-1632 ComSubPac sent this information to the U.S.S. Pogy.

The Pogy was patrolling northwest of Truk and on July 20 it attacked a convoy at 8-22 N, 149-44 E (see VII, Case 18). After this the submarine moved to the northeast to patrol the Guam-Saipan-Truk route. Though the Pogy evidently received dispatch 19-1632, there is no evidence that it searched for this Ultra

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- 114 - VII, Case 20, C-5 - C-6.
 - 115 - VII, Case 21, A-1 - A-2.
 - 116 - VII, Case 21, B-1.
 - 117 - VII, Case 21, C-2 - C-3.
 - 118 - VII, Case 21, C-1.

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target sailing from Nauru to Truk.

July 20, 1943

Case 22

On July 6 the auxiliary carrier Unyo, the auxiliary cruiser Aikoku, and destroyers (including the Ushio) left Yokosuka for Truk (see VII, Case 6, A-1 and 2). The carrier and cruiser were attacked by our submarines off Truk (see VII, Case 6, C-1 - C-9). Both were damaged, the Aikoku more severely.

On July 10 another auxiliary carrier, the Chuyo (see VII, Case 6, A-5; also Case 10, A-1) left Yokosuka, joined a force of carriers, cruisers, and destroyers from the Inland Sea, and arrived safely at Truk July 15 (see VII, Case 10).

On July 11 at the time of these extensive warship movements, a Japanese message made arrangements for the return of the warships from Truk to the Empire¹¹⁹ at some later date in the same month. On July 17 and 18 other intercepted Japanese messages added further information. Three carriers (Hayataka, Hyoko, Unyo) with destroyers would leave Truk keeping in the Truk

¹¹⁹ - VII, Case 22, A-1 - A-2.

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Communication zone until 0400 (I) July 20 when they would enter another zone (MA51) and finally still another, the Kure Communication zone. Moreover, the ¹²⁰Unyo (and the Chuyo) accompanied by several destroyers including the Ushio would part from the rest of the force bound for Kure at 1430 (I) July 23 in position 31-00 N, 136-44 E ¹²¹and would proceed to Yokosuka.

On July 20 ComSubPac sent two dispatches regarding this carrier force. The first (serial 56) sent at 0943 to the U.S.S. Sturgeon and U.S.S. Pompano stated that warships including two or three carriers at a speed of 18 knots would arrive at 0530 (GCT) July 23 in position 31-01 N, 136-44 E. ¹²²The second dispatch (Serial 57) sent at 1018 (GCT) was addressed to the same submarines and also to the U.S.S. Lapon and U.S.S. Skipjack. The latter was instructed to take a position July 23 at 34-30 N, 139-07 E while the Pompano was to take station six miles distant and bearing 270 from the Skipjack. ¹²³The Lapon was to patrol the area meanwhile.

The Sturgeon reported a typhoon and mountainous waves on July 19. On July 23 the seas were still very high when the submarine at 0753 (GCT)

120 - VII, Case 22, A-3.
121 - VII, Case 22, A-4.
122 - VII, Case 22, B-1.
123 - VII, Case 22, B-2.

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in position 30-57 N, 137 E sighted a destroyer and then two carriers. The Sturgeon was unable to attack.¹²⁴ This is a positive contact with part of the carrier force, which was scheduled to reach 31-00 N, 136-44 E at 0530 (GCT) July 23.

The Pompano apparently did not attempt to look for this Ultra target since on July 23 it was patrolling at 34-10 N, 148-34 E, ten degrees east of the carriers' route.¹²⁵ The Skipjack, patrolling in the assigned area, attacked an escorted AI at 34-12 N, 138-31 E on July 22. On July 23 it sighted a patrol boat at 34-10 N, 138-49 E, but it did not sight the carriers.¹²⁶

The Lapon, while patrolling two degrees to the east of the Skipjack on July 23, sighted at 0440 (GCT) two destroyers and a carrier travelling at 20 knots to the southeast. Attacked by airplanes and the destroyers the submarine was forced to remain submerged while the target escaped.¹²⁷ This carrier cannot have been one of the Ultra targets since its course and position entirely disagree with the Ultra information. Of the four submarines assigned to this target, only the

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- 124 - VII, Case 22, C-1 - C-2.
 - 125 - VII, Case 22, C-3 - C-4.
 - 126 - VII, Case 22, C-5.
 - 127 - VII, Case 22, C-6 - C-8.

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Sturgeon contacted it.

July 21, 22, 1943

Case 23

A Japanese message intercepted July 21 described the sailing of an escorted tanker from Paramushiru Island July 21. The tanker would arrive at Yokosuka July 26. Three positions through which the ship would pass were included.¹²⁸

On July 21 CincPac notified ComNorPac of this Ultra target.¹²⁹ On July 22 ComSubPac sent the same information to the U.S.S. Narwhal and U.S.S. Salmon with a warning to watch out for S boats (the submarines of the North Pacific Command) which would also be looking for the target.¹³⁰

The Narwhal reported engine trouble on July 24. On July 25 it was searching for another Ultra target (given by ComSubPac's 25-0733) considerably to the south and east of the tanker's route (see VII, Case 33).¹³¹

The Salmon during this time was en route from its base at Midway to its patrol area, where it arrived on July 25. From July 25 until July 31 it

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- 128 - VII, Case 23, A-1.
 - 129 - VII, Case 23, B-1.
 - 130 - VII, Case 23, B-2.
 - 131 - VII, Case 23, C-2.

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132
patrolled in dense fog and made no contacts.

July 22, 23, 1943

Case 24

On July 22 at 1136 (I) the Captain of the number 3 Tonan Maru, a large tanker, reported a change in the course of his ship to take effect at 1900 (I) July 21 (7 probably July 22) at 03-26 N, 138-00 E, thence to a point 25 miles south of Sataval Island at 0330 (I) July 23, thence via Puluwat to South Channel, Truk. 133 Later, at 1105 (I) July 23 the Captain reported that his ship would rendezvous with escorts at 07-04 N, 140-24 E at 0930 (I) July 24. 134

At 1207 (GCT) July 22 ComSubPac in serial 63 sent this information to the U.S.S. Tinosa and U.S.S. Steelhead and gave two positions: 03-26 N, 138-00 E 1000 (GCT) July 21 and 07-00 N, 147-05 E 1230 (GCT) July 22. 135 On the following day, after the Captain's second report had been intercepted, ComSubPac sent two more dispatches. The first (23-0911, Serial 68) advanced by one day the dates given in Serial 63 and changed "Puluwat" to read "north of Puluwat". 136 The second (23-1751

132 - VII, Case 23, C-3 - C-4.
133 - VII, Case 24, A-1 - A-2.
134 - VII, Case 24, A-3 - A-4.
135 - VII, Case 24, B-1.
136 - VII, Case 24, B-2.

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gave the tanker's expected position at 0030 (GCT)

137

July 24 at 7-C4 N, 148-24 E.

The Steelhead, preoccupied with mechanical difficulties from July 22 on, made no contacts. 138

The Tinosa, at 1955 (GCT) July 23, sighted a tanker at 6-55 N, 147-10 E on course 073 and in two attacks fired six torpedoes, of which at least two hit effectively. The tanker stopped, began to settle, but did not sink. In the next two hours the Tinosa fired nine more torpedoes, one by one; all hit but none exploded. Meanwhile, a destroyer arriving on the scene 139 forced the submarine down with depth charges.

This is a positive contact with the Ultra target and is confirmed by a message from the Isuzu, a light cruiser, coming with a destroyer (the Asanagi) 140 to the relief of the stricken tanker.

Case 25

A convoy made up of the Asakaze Maru and about five other ships was scheduled to leave Yokosuka on July 19 and to arrive at Truk on July 29. The intercepted Japanese message giving this information

137 - VII, Case 24, B-3.
138 - VII, Case 24, C-1 - C-2.
139 - VII, Case 24, C-3 - C-5.
140 - VII, Case 24, D-1 - D-2.

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included the noon positions from July 20 to 29.¹⁴¹

On July 23 ComSubPac sent the positions for July 26, 27, and 28 to the U.S.S. Tinosa.¹⁴² The Tinosa, however, had expended most of her torpedoes in an attack on a tanker July 24 (see VII, Case 24) and was ordered at the end of that day to return to Pearl Harbor.¹⁴³

Case 25

A Japanese dispatch of July 22 revealed that the Avata Maru, had left Paramushiru Strait for Yokosuka and after passing through 46 N, 156-25 E and 34 N, 146 E would arrive at its destination at 1000 (Y)¹⁴⁴ on July 27.

Directed to intercept these targets if possible were the U.S.S. Marshal, the U.S.S. Salmon, the U.S.S. Skipjack and the U.S.S. Lapon if it were still in that vicinity.¹⁴⁵

On July 26 the Marshal was searching for another Ultra target in an area somewhat to the east of the Avata's course; see VII, Case 33.¹⁴⁶ The Salmon was bound by heavy fog at this time.¹⁴⁷

At 1540 (GCT) on July 25, the Skipjack sighted one large ship and two escorts bound for Tokyo.

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- 141 - VII, Case 25, A-1.
 - 142 - VII, Case 25, B-1.
 - 143 - VII, Case 25, C-1.
 - 144 - VII, Case 26, A-1 - A-2.
 - 145 - VII, Case 26, B-1.
 - 146 - VII, Case 26, C-1.
 - 147 - VII, Case 26, C-2.

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Bay at 34-17 N, 140-29 E, but could not maneuver to
148
attack.

According to ComSubPac's operational dispatch, however, the Awata Maru would be found at 34-39 N, 139-53 E, at 2100 (GCT) on July 26. The convoy discovered by the Skipjack was near this approximate position thirty hours before the time estimated for the Ultra target. The times given by ComSubPac were only approximate, based on calculations at operational headquarters, since the specific times for the positions were not listed in the intercepted Japanese dispatch. However, the sighting made by the Skipjack on July 25 can hardly be considered a possible contact with the Ultra target since the discrepancy in time is so great.

The Lapon patrolled to the east of the approaches to Yokosuka on July 25 but sighting nothing, and on July 26 it set its course for Midway. No contact was made with the Ultra target.

Case 27

The Commanding Officer of the Otaka, sending a movement report on July 23, listed the noon posi-

148-VII, Case 26, C-4 - C-5.
149-VII, Case 26, C-7.

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tions (X time) through which his ship would pass en route from Yokosuka to Truk. Accompanied by the destroyer the Maikaze, the Otaka would depart that morning and was scheduled to arrive at 1430 (I) on July 28.
150

Three submarines were assigned to search for this important carrier. The U.S.S. Spearfish and the U.S.S. Pogy were instructed to patrol in areas north and south, respectively, of 14-33 N, 154 E, and the Steelhead was to intercept it between 8 and 12 degrees north should the target escape the other two submarines.
151

The Spearfish searched in the assigned area but made no contacts, and on July 28 set its course for Midway.
152

Patrolling the Guam-Saipan-Truk route on July 22-23, the Pogy moved to the Empire-Truk lane where it remained searching through July 28. It did not contact the target.
153

The Steelhead continued to search in the vicinity of Truk as long as its defective mechanical condition permitted, but made no contacts from July 23 to

150 - VII, Case 27, A-1.
151 - VII, Case 27, B-1.
152 - VII, Case 27, C-2.
153 - VII, Case 27, C-4.

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154

July 30. No contacts were made with the Ultra target.

July 24, 1943

Case 28

Scheduled to sail at 0700 (I) on July 22, a convoy of six Japanese ships would depart from Tarakan, Borneo, three sailing to Palao, two to Ambon, and one to Davao. One of the ships in the group en route to Palao was identified as the Shinyu Maru and the arrival was scheduled for 1800 (I) on July 27. Listed in the movement report were noon positions for the separate groups.
155

ComSubPac sent the noon positions for July 25, 26, and 27 of the convoy en route to Palao to the U.S.S. Mingo and U.S.S. Haddock.
156

The Haddock was at this time pursuing the Kanyo and Hissyo Marus which were en route to Truk from Singapore and which were contacted south of Palau at 2229 (GCT) on July 25 (see VII, Case 20). No search was made for the convoy reported in this Ultra dispatch by the Haddock.
157

The Mingo, patrolling the southern approach

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- 154 - VII, Case 27, C-6.
155 - VII, Case 28, A-1.
156 - VII, Case 29, B-1.
157 - VII, Case 28, C-1. This dispatch Serial 71, was cancelled in a later dispatch to the Haddock. Serial 88, 26-1056; see VII, Case 20, B-2.

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the vessel leaving Kwajalein and added the information that it would arrive at Wake at 2000 (GCT) on July 26.

CcmSubPac further suggested that the submarine attack it at anchor when American bombers would be after this target too.¹⁶²

In a dispatch of July 27, CcmSubPac pointed out that the tanker had probably been delayed by bombing raids. If the Seadragon had not already contacted this ship, the submarine was to remain patrolling the southern approaches.¹⁶³

On the next day, CcmSubPac added that the target was anchored or stranded at Wake, and advised that every possible effort be made to sink the ship before it could unload.¹⁶⁴

However, later intercepted Japanese dispatches led operational headquarters to believe that the tanker scheduled to refuel the Wake Air Base was approaching from the north, touching port at Wake and proceeding southwest. CcmSubPac listed positions and specific times for July 30, 31 and August 1 and 2.¹⁶⁵

Patrolling south of Wake at 1400 (GCT) on July 26, the Seadragon sighted only a grounded freighter

162 - VII, Case 29, B-1.

163 - VII, Case 29, B-2 and A-5.

164 - VII, Case 29, B-3 and A-6 - A-8.

165 - VII, Case 29, B-4 and A-9 - A-11.

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on the beach at Wake at 2210 (GCT).

Two torpedoes, one a "dud", and another which was believed to have hit the target or a small barge nearby, were fired before the Seadragon was forced to submerge. On July 27, a periscope observation showed no other ship at Wake and no other vessel was sighted in the vicinity until 0620 (GCT) on July 29 when a small freighter of 3,000 tons was found to be anchored at Wilkes Island adjoining Wake. The Seadragon waited in the vicinity until 1920 (GCT) when the freighter sailed from port. At 0149 (GCT) July 31 the submarine overtook the target and fired three torpedoes, one of which was heard hitting aft with a low-order explosion. Since the small freighter was accompanied from Wake by two small escorts and one Mitsubishi 96 bomber, the Seadragon was depth charged and did not get another chance to attack, though it later sighted the target underway, smoking heavily. ¹⁸⁶ It is possible that the vessel was able to unload its supply of fuel at Wake before it was attacked. The amount of protection afforded the freighter indicates that the ship attacked on July 31 was

186 - VII, Case 29, C-1 - C-2.

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important. The Ultra target was scheduled, after a brief stop at Waka, to pass through 17-38 N, 164-15 E 0300 (GCT) July 31. The Seadragon attacked the freighter travelling course 188 at 0150 (GCT) July 31 in position 17-40 N, 163-58 E. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target of ComSubPac's fourth dispatch in this case (30-0307).

July 24, 1943

Case 30

On July 24 in an Ultra dispatch (for which the Japanese source message is unavailable) ComSubPac ordered the U.S.S. Tallibee to intercept an important target approaching position 01-25 N, 172-56 E (near Tarawa Island) from the northwest possibly about dawn on July 28.

At 0535 July 28 (at some time 1735 GCT July 27) the Tallibee submerged ten miles northwest of the entrance to Tarawa lagoon. An hour later it sighted a tanker escorted by a plane and a PC type boat approaching on radical zig. The submarine was unable to close

167 - VII, Case 29, C-3.
168 - VII, Case 30, B-1.

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169
with the target before it reached the lagoon. This is
a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Case 31

A special convoy, the L2, composed of the
Kiyokawa Maru, an unidentified merchantman, and a destroyer
escort, had sailed on July 23 from an unidentified port,
possibly Takao. The Kiyokawa Maru would arrive at Sasebo
at 1500 (I) July 26, while the other ship, hugging the
coast, would arrive at an unidentified port at 1300 (I)
on July 26.
170

Positions where the U.S.S. Sawfish could
find these ships at 0300 (GCT) on July 24, 25, and at
2330 (GCT) on July 28 were included in ComSubPac's
Ultra dispatch of July 24. It was added that the ships
would separate at the position given on July 28 with
the Kiyokawa Maru going to 33-07 N, 129-44 E.
171

At 1325 (GCT) on July 25, the Sawfish inter-
cepted two freighters with a destroyer escort in
position 31 N, 127-30 E. Although four torpedoes were
fired at the larger of the two targets, all missed,
and the pursuit was abandoned.
172

169 - VII, Case 30, C-1 - C-3.
170 - VII, Case 31, A-1.
171 - VII, Case 31, B-1.
172 - VII, Case 31, C-1 - C-3.

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The Ultra target, two freighters and a destroyer, was scheduled to pass through 29-37 N, 125-44 E at 0300 (GCT) July 25 and through 31-53 N, 128-50 E at 2130 (GCT) the same day (according to the Japanese message, although ComSubPac had given the time and date as 2330 July 28). The Sawfish contacted the three ships at 1325 (GCT) July 25 in position 31 N, 127-30 E on course 050, evidently en route to the 2130 position given in the Japanese message. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Case 32

Late on July 23 the U.S.S. Tinosa expended her torpedoes in damaging an important Ultra target, the tanker #3 Tonan Maru (see VII, Case 24.) A number of intercepted Japanese messages disclosed the attack together with the measures taken to protect and salvage the stricken ship. A light cruiser (the Isuzu), a destroyer (the Asanagi), special subchasers #5 and #12, the #2 Chonan Maru, and the Hoko Maru were dispatched to the scene of the torpedo attack.

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On July 24 ComSubPac sent two dispatches to the U.S.S. Steelhead in the Truk area. The first, at 1530, warned the submarine of the seven odd ships which were going to assist the torpedoed tanker; the second, at 1753, gave its position at 6-51 N, 147-54 E.

The Steelhead, however, was having mechanical difficulties which hindered effective patrolling. The submarine reported no contacts from July 23 to July 30.

July 25, 1943

Case 33

Directed by ComSubPac's Serial 76 on July 25 to search in several positions north of Wake Island for a patrol boat (the Japanese source message is unavailable), the U.S.S. Narwhal noted in its narrative account that it had received the dispatch, and had conducted an uneventful patrol in this vicinity.

Case 34

Communication Intelligence recovered from an intercepted message of July 23 the noon positions of a six-ship convoy sailing southwest from a position in

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- 174 - VII, Case 32, B-1.
 - 175 - VII, Case 32, B-2.
 - 176 - VII, Case 32, C-1.
 - 177 - VII, Case 33, B-1.
 - 178 - VII, Case 33, C-1.

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the East China Sea to a port on the island of Formosa
179
between July 24 and 28.

On July 25 at 0912 (GCT) ComSubPac informed
the U.S.S. Sawfish of this convoy and gave its noon
positions for July 25, 31-06 N, 124-37 E; for July 26,
29-34 N, 122-28 E; and for July 27, 25-50 N, 120-45 E.
180

On July 25 at 1325 (GCT) the Sawfish
sighted and attacked in position 31 N, 127-30 E another
Ultra target sailing northeast from Formosa to Sasebo
(see VII, Case 31). Upon breaking off its attack on
this target, the Sawfish did not turn south to search
for the Formosa bound convoy of ComSubPac's 25-0912.
181
Instead, it turned to the west, probably because the
submarine had received dispatch 25-0943 informing it of
another Ultra target, another north bound convoy which
was scheduled to pass only a few degrees west of the
Sawfish (see VII, Case 35). Consequently, no contact
was made with the south bound convoy of ComSubPac's
dispatch 25-0912.

Case 35

On July 25 at 0943 (GCT) ComSubPac informed
the U.S.S. Sawfish of one or more merchantmen sailing

179 - VII, Case 34, A-1.
180 - VII, Case 34, B-1.
181 - VII, Case 34, C-1.

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northeast through the East China Sea. This information was derived from part three of an intercepted message which had been sent by the Resident Naval Officer at Keelung in northern Formosa and which gave three noon positions; 28-42 N, 122-24 E July 26; 31-02 N, 125-28 E July 27; and 33-15 N, 128-08 E July 28.

183

At 1008 (GCT) July 26 the Sawfish sighted a convoy of four small merchantships with a destroyer escort on course 050 in position 32-33 N, 127-20 E. The convoy made a radical change of course and the submarine lost contact. Unless the Ultra target was very considerably ahead of schedule by some forty hours, this cannot have been a contact with it. At 0235 (GCT) July 27 the Sawfish sighted and attacked another convoy, five merchant ships and one destroyer, at 32-32 N, 127-41 E. The Patrol Report fails to give the course of this convoy, which cannot positively be identified with the Ultra anyway, for the Ultra target (an unknown number of ships) was scheduled to be at 31-02 N, 125-28 E at 0300 (GCT) July 27, more than a degree south and two degrees west of this contact at 0235. Thus the Sawfish, patrolling the route of the Ultra, made two

184

182 - VII, Case 35, B-1.
183 - VII, Case 35, A-1.
184 - VII, Case 35, C-1 - C-2.

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contacts, sinking a destroyer in the second convoy. But because of the incompleteness of the information, neither can be established as even a possible contact with the Ultra target of ComSubPac's 25-0943.

Case 35

The Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Second Fleet originated a movement report on July 23 concerning the sailing of the cruisers Atago, Takao, and Nagatsuki and a destroyer, the Suzukaze. According to the intercepted dispatch the ships would be at 15-15 N, 151-40 E (east of Saipan) on course 340, speed 20, at 1930 (I) July 24; then at 1400 (I) July 25 they were scheduled to reach position 32-55 N, 140-30 E on the approaches to Yokosuka.¹²⁵ The ships could not, however, cover the distance in a day's time, but rather three days would be required at a speed of 20 knots. Consequently, ComSubPac, sending the two positions to the U.S.S. Skipjack and U.S.S. Sturgeon, gave the date of the second position as July 27.¹²⁶

The Skipjack, patrolling along the approaches to Yokosuka on July 26, sighted a large ship and escorts

125 - VII, Case 36, A-1.
126 - VII, Case 36, B-1.

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(see VII, Case 26). On July 27 the submarine sighted
187
only patrol vessels.

The Sturgeon had begun its return to Midway
on July 25 but delayed in the vicinity of 33 N, 141 E to
patrol the area on July 27. The cruisers and destroyer-
were to reach 32-35N, 140-30 E at 0500 (GCT) July 27
according to ComSubPac's dispatch, but the Sturgeon
188
did not sight this Ultra target.

Case 37

In a dispatch of July 24 the Yokosuka
Chief of Staff listed the noon positions of convoy #3724
which was en route from Yokosuka to Truk, where it was
scheduled to arrive on August 1. The convoy would be
composed of the Hozanigawa Maru, the Yamaziri Maru(?),
189
the Seiko Maru, and the Fukuo Maru.

On July 25 ComSubPac sent this information
to all subs and gave noon positions for July 26, 27, and
190
28. The convoy escaped detection, however, along the
northern portion of its route and on July 27 ComSubPac
sent another dispatch adding the noon positions for
July 29 and 30 and addressing them to the U.S.S. Pogy

187 - VII, Case 36, C-2 - C-3.
188 - VII, Case 36, C-4 - C-5.
189 - VII, Case 37, A-1 - A-2.
190 - VII, Case 37, B-1.

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191
and U.S.S. Steelhead.

The Pogy at 1818 (GCT) July 30 sighted a
convoy of three ships and a destroyer escort in position
13-53 N, 152-00 E. The submarine began pursuit at a
distance on the surface. At 0900 (GCT) July 31 it sent
a contact report which the Steelhead, which was miles to
the south, picked up and utilized. At 1403 (GCT) the
Pogy, submerged within range of the targets at 11-16 N,
153-34 E, fired four torpedoes at the largest ship and
then dove to avoid the attacks of the escort. Two
torpedoes were heard to hit the Hogamigawa Maru, which
sank in ten minutes according to an intercepted message
from her Captain, who reported that the survivors were
being taken aboard the Fukuo Maru.¹⁹² Evidently the Fukuo
remained to pick up survivors while the Seiko (or Saiko)
continued en route to Truk.¹⁹³

Meanwhile the Steelhead, having received
the Pogy's contact report some hours before, had altered
its course to intercept the convoy. In position 11-20 N,
153-30 E at 1900 (GCT) July 31 the Steelhead sighted a
single freighter escorted by a PC boat. At 2007 (GCT)

191 - VII, Case 37, B-2.
192 - VII, Case 37, C-1 - C-3.
193 - VII, Case 37, D-1 - D-4.

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it fired four torpedoes and dove to avoid depth charges¹⁹⁴
from the escort. Two torpedoes were heard to explode.
They had hit the Saiko Maru at 0610 (I) August 1 (2110
00Z July 31) according to the intercepted message sent
by the Captain of the Hoganigawa Maru.

This Japanese message, sent at 1037 (I),
added that the Saiko had been hit by one torpedo in the
#4 hold and was able to continue at 11 knots despite¹⁹⁵
flooding. The Commanding Officer of the Steelhead,
however, heard the target's screws stop and later heard
the last of the breaking up noises at 0702 (I), so¹⁹⁶
concluded that the target sank.

These, then, are positive and confirmed
contacts with the Ultra targets.

July 26, 1945

Case 38

A partly decrypted message intercepted
July 23 gave the noon positions for July 25-29 of the
Nichiei Maru and perhaps one other tanker due to arrive¹⁹⁷
at Tarakan, Borneo, at 1000 (I) July 30.

-
- 194 - VII, Case 37, C-4 - C-5
195 - VII, Case 37, D-1
196 - VII, Case 37, C-5
197 - VII, Case 38, A-1

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On July 28 ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Haddock and U.S.S. Mingo of two tankers passing through positions 4-15 N, 137-30 E July 26; 3-20 N, 132-15 E July 27; and 3-20 N, 128-45 E July 28.

The Haddock on July 26-27 expended its torpedoes while pursuing two tankers sailing from Singapore to Truk. The Mingo on July 27 sighted a tanker in the vicinity of 3-40 N, 134-28 E, but the tanker was travelling on course 090, due east, and therefore could not have been the Ultra target. No contacts were made with the Ultra target.

Case 39

According to a message sent by the Captain of the Trako at 0734 (I) July 25, a force composed of the Tanker Trako, the Cruiser Acba, the Destroyers Amatsukaze and Urakaze would be sailing from Truk to Rura from 1615 (I) on July 25 until 0530 (I) on August 1. This information was telephoned by Communication Intelligence Officers to ComSubPac at 1840 (I) on July 25.

Assigning to the U.S.S. Saury the task

198 - VII, Case 38, B-1.
199 - VII, Case 38, C-1.
200 - VII, Case 38, C-2.
201 - VII, Case 39, A-1.

ORIGINAL

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of searching for this force, ComSubPac listed the positions of the group for 0400 (GCT) on July 28, 13 N, 140 E; for 1030 (GCT) on July 29, 21-26 N, 138-25 E; and for 2030 (GCT) on July 31, 34-14 N, 132-33 E. ²⁰²

A formation consisting of a tanker, a heavy cruiser, and a destroyer was sighted at 1325 (GCT) on July 30 in position 24 N, 133-56 E directly on the course between the July 29 and July 31 positions. No attack was made since the Saury, while attempting to gain a firing position, lost depth control and was rammed by the destroyer. ²⁰³ This sighting is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

July 27, 1943

Case 40

From an intercepted dispatch of July 25, it was learned that a ship, possibly the Battleship Yamato, the Unyo, and Destroyer Division 7 would depart from the Western Inland Sea on July 31 proceeding to Truk where they would arrive on August 5. The routes taken by this force were listed in a separate dispatch which was also intercepted by Communications Intelligence. ²⁰⁴ ²⁰⁵

202 - VII, Case 39, B-1.
203 - VII, Case 39, C-1 - C-3.
204 - VII, Case 40, A-1.
205 - VII, Case 40, A-2 - A-3.

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In a dispatch of July 27 at 0042 (Serial 89D) ComSubPac gave the U.S.S. Saury and the U.S.S. Paddle position 31-32 N, 132-56 E for 1100 (GCT) July 31; position 30 N, 136 E for 2100 (GCT) July 31; and position 22-40 N, 138-56 E for 2300 (GCT) August 1. ComSubPac in a second dispatch of July 27, at 0848, instructed the U.S.S. Tullibee, while travelling to Truk where it was due August 4, to search along the route of the warships.

On July 30 the Saury, encountering an Ultra target at 26 N, 135-56 E (see VII, Case 39), was rammed and so damaged that it set its course for its base on August 1.

The Paddle searched along the course of the task force for several days. On August 1 at 2000 (GCT) it patrolled at the exact position, 22-40 N, 138-56 E, where the Japanese warships were due at 2300 (GCT). Only planes were contacted in the area. Visibility during this period was variable because of showers.

The Tullibee, leaving Tarawa July 28 where it had sighted an Ultra target (see VII, Case 30), set

-
- 206 - VII, Case 40, B-1.
 - 207 - VII, Case 40, B-2.
 - 208 - VII, Case 40, C-1.
 - 209 - VII, Case 40, C-3.

210
its course for Truk. En route the submarine made no
211
contact with the warships. It did contact them, however,
on August 4 off Truk (see Chap. VIII for the month of
August, Case 1).

July 28, 1943

Case 41

From an intercepted Japanese message of
July 28 Communications Intelligence learned that an
unidentified ship leaving Bungo Channel July 27 and
travelling at 18 knots, would arrive at North Channel,
Truk, at 0600 (I) August 3. Noon positions were given
212
from July 28 through August 2. Another message inter-
cepted the same day gave the positions of an unknown ship
or ships approaching Truk from the west at a speed of
213
12 knots and due at North Channel at 1500 (I) July 30.

At 0402 July 28 ComSubPac sent to the
U.S.S. Saur the noon positions of the ship (perhaps
an Aikoku Maru type) leaving Bungo Channel July 27.
Its noon position for July 28 would be 29-10 N, 135-15 E,
and for July 29, 24-15 N, 138-30 E. The Saur was
instructed, however, not to let this Ultra interfere with

210 - VII, Case 30, C-4.
211 - VII, Case 40, C-5.
212 - VII, Case 41, A-1 - A-2.
213 - VII, Case 41, A-2 - A-4.

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214
more important jobs. At 0743 July 28 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S. Steelhead and U.S.S. Pogy this same target's positions for 0300 (GCT) August 1, 15-10 N, 151-00 E, and for 1330 (GCT) August 2, 9-25 N, 152-40 E. To the Steelhead only was assigned the other Ultra target, one or more merchantmen on course 133.9, speed 12, at 0800 (GCT) July 29, passing southwest of Ulul Island eight hours later. 215

The Saury reported nothing from July 26 to July 30. On the 30th it attacked another Ultra target at 26 N, 135-56 E (see VII, Case 39). This target, which included a heavy cruiser, was more important than the Ultra of ComSubPac's 28-0402, which 216 was not sighted.

On July 30 the Pogy sighted at 13-56 N, 152-00 E an important Ultra convoy which it pursued to the south and attacked the next day (see VII, Case 37). On August 1 it patrolled the Empire-Truk route and on August 2 it set its course for Ulul Island. The sub- 217 marine made no contacts.

The Steelhead had been troubled by

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- 214 - VII, Case 41, B-1.
 - 215 - VII, Case 41, B-2.
 - 216 - VII, Case 41, C-1.
 - 217 - VII, Case 41, C-2.

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mechanical difficulties from July 23 to 29 and made no
sightings on those days. ²¹⁸ On July 31 however, having moved
north to intercept the convoy which the Pogy was pursuing,
the Steelhead attacked one of the ships at 11-20 N,
153-50 E (see VII, Case 37). No contact was made with
the Ultra target approaching Truk from the west, south of
Ulul Island, ²¹⁹ July 30.

Case 42

From a message intercepted July 28
Communications Intelligence learned that the Choun Maru
would leave the West Channel of Palau at 1500 (I) July
28 on course 256 at a speed of 9.5 knots. At 1200 (I) ²²⁰
July 29 it would reach position 06-45 N, 131-37 E.

The July 29 position of this ship was sent
to the U.S.S. Mingo together with the information that the
two large tankers sighted by the Haddock (see VII,
Case 20) were heading toward the Mingo. ²²¹

On July 27 the Mingo was lying at 3-20 N,
133-40 E. On July 28 and 29 the submarine moved slowly
to the northeast on its auxiliary engine. It did not
seek the Ultra target sailing west from Palau (due at

-
- 218 - VII, Case 41, C-3.
219 - VII, Case 41, C-4.
220 - VII, Case 42, A-1.
221 - VII, Case 42, B-1.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

6-45 N, 131-37 E noon July 29) nor did it sight the
222
tankers damaged by the Haddock on July 26.

Case 43

A Japanese message of July 25 reported that two groups of a convoy would leave the Palau area on that day. Group "A", composed of about six ships, would sail to Ujima. Group "B", one ship and an escort, would sail to Yokosuka. Noon positions were given.
223

On July 28 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S. Saury the noon positions of the "A" convoy for July 31 and for August 1 and 2. The Saury, however, when attacking another Ultra target on July 30, was rammed and damaged (see VII, Case 39), and on July 31 the Saury set its course for Midway.
224
225

July 29, 1943

Case 44

Leaving Yokosuka at 1700 (I) on July 27, the #37 convoy composed of the Koogyo and two other mares would arrive at Truk on August 3, according to an

-
- 222 - VII, Case 42, C-1.
 - 223 - VII, Case 43, A-1 - A-2.
 - 224 - VII, Case 43, B-1.
 - 225 - VII, Case 43, C-1.

ORIGINAL
II January 1946

Case 45

A dispatch from the Captain of an unidentified warship disclosed that a convoy, possibly made up of the Hansei and the Nissho Maru, would leave Ambon at 1700 (I) on July 28 and would arrive at Palau at 1000 (I) on August 1. Noon positions were listed for July 29, 30, and 31.²³⁰

To the U.S.S. Mingo CcmSubPac sent the positions of the two transports for July 30 and 31.²³¹

The Mingo on July 30 and 31 was in the vicinity of Sorol Island, (8 N, 140 E), considerably northeast of the route of the convoy, approaching Palau from the southwest. No search was made for the Ultra target.²³²

July 30, 1943

Case 46

A Japanese message intercepted July 24 gave the noon positions from July 25 to August 1 of the Chihaya Maru, an unidentified maru, and a destroyer escort travelling from Truk to the Empire.²³³

Since the message was not read until July

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- 230 - VII, Case 45, A-1.
 - 231 - VII, Case 45, B-1.
 - 232 - VII, Case 45, C-1.
 - 233 - VII, Case 46, A-1.

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30, ComSubPac did not receive the information until 1805 (GCT) on July 30. In less than an hour the convoy's positions for July 31 and August 1 were transmitted to the U.S.S. Skipjack.²³⁴

The Skipjack, patrolling along the routes to Tokyo Bay, sighted only patrol ships and trawlers from July 31 until August 3.²³⁵

There was no contact with the Ultra target.

Case 47

According to a dispatch intercepted July 30 a convoy of three ships and an escort was scheduled to leave Yokosuka at 1200 (I) on July 31 for Saipan. The convoy's noon positions from August 1 through August 6 were listed.²³⁶

The task of intercepting this convoy was assigned by ComSubPac to the U.S.S. Pollack, which was to be assisted by the U.S.S. Paddle and the U.S.S. Pike. All six recovered positions of the ships from August 1 through August 6 were included in ComSubPac's dispatch.²³⁷

-
- 234 - VII, Case 46, B-1.
 - 235 - VII, Case 46, C-1 - C-3.
 - 236 - VII, Case 47, A-1.
 - 237 - VII, Case 47, B-1.

ORIGINAL
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No ship contacts were made by the Pollack between July 31 and August 4. On August 6, two freighters were sighted at 29-03 N, 141-12 E, the chase of which was abandoned when a three-ship convoy was seen in position 29-10 N, 141 E. The first convoy was headed north, the second southwest and both were well north of the positions scheduled for the Ultra target on these days, with which no contact was made by the Pollack.
238

The Paddle patrolled the area through which the convoy was scheduled to sail on August 4-5 but made no contacts.
239

The Pike did not search for this Ultra target, for it was in the vicinity of Marcus Island seeking bigger game, an aircraft carrier, also an Ultra target, which it damaged on August 5 (see Chap. VIII for August, Case 8).
240

238 - VII, Case 47, C-1 - C-3.
239 - VII, Case 47, C-4 - C-5.
240 - VII, Case 47, C-6 - C-7.

II January 1945

APPENDIX VII

Intelligence, Operational Dispatches, Submarine
Action Reports and Verifications - July 1945

Case 1

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Chief of Staff 25/1300 June
Tokusuka Naval
District)
TO: (Surface Escort
Unit #2)
INFO: (Chichijima Spec-
ial Base Force)
(Saipan Communi-
cation Unit)
(4th Fleet)

"Convoy #3625 consisting of Tonan Maru, Blank sen
Maru and Koan Maru escorted by -- unidentified
ship) departed 1200 the 25th for PT blanks. Noon
positions from 26 June to 5 July are as follows:

NEGAT COMMENT: (See next part timed 4 minutes later).

(para 1 of 2)

GI COMMENT: PT is Trak

(Continuation of one timed 4 minutes earlier).

June	26th,	32-12 North,	139-00 East.
	27th,	28-48 North,	139-00 East.
	28th,	25-blank N.,	139-00 East.
	29th,	22-00 North,	139-00 East.
	30th,	18-36 North,	139-00 East.
July	1st,	15-12 North,	139-00 East.
	2nd,	12-blank N.,	141-21 East.
	3rd,	10-26 North,	143-50 East.
	4th,	08-05 North,	146-20 East.
	5th,	07-25 North,	149-30 East.

11 January 1946

Case 1, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Scheduled to pass point H at 0300 the 6th (?).)

(Part 2 of 2)

OF COMMENT: Above information phoned Comdr. Voss
at 2025 (9) July 2.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSOPAC 02/1149 July
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING HPM FOX
SCHEDULES
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OP OP OP

GOOD NEWS X ULTRA X SERIAL 2 X 1 LEMON 3 POPLARS
PROBABLY BIG ONES AT 3 HOURS COT 3 JULY COT 2650
(10-25 NORTH 143-50 EAST) ALGARROBA DEES 0520
(3-05 NORTH 146-20 EAST) BUL 2530 (7-25 NORTH
149-30 EAST) HALIBUT AND POGY ATTEMPT INTEREST-
TION X WATCH OUT FOR EACH OTHER

No. B-2

FROM: COMSOPAC 05/1201 July
TO: CINCPAC ALL SUBS COPYING
HPM FOX
PREC: OP OP OP

ULTRA TO POGY X HALIBUT REPORTS CONVOY MENTIONED
BY SERIAL 2 IS 6 HOURS LATE X 1 AK MISSING BUT
HALIBUT DID NOT ATTACK

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Halibut

Fifth War Patrol

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 1, No. C-1 (Cont.)

Radio Reception: Communications were generally satisfactory throughout the patrol. Radio reception was good and no serials were missed.

No. C-2

July 3

0202 (K)

Made sound contact (#7) with high speed screws. Not sighted. The night was black with frequent rain squalls. Manuevered to avoid and lost contact twenty minutes later.

0436 (K)

1921 (K)

Submerged
Surfaced.

July 4

2100 (K)

Conducted surface patrol west of Truk. Sighted West Faya Island, bearing 293 degrees T distance 15 miles. Sighted black smoke on our starboard beam, bearing 245 degrees T, (contact #8) Barely made out a ship, estimated range 4000 yards. It was very dark with rain squalls all around. Sound could not pick up target. A minute or two later sighted a second ship which soon disappeared in a squall. Range to smoker seemed to be closing but we were unable to make an accurate estimate of the range, tell the angle on the bow or even get a good Tbt bearing. It was an ideal set up for a radar attack - if we had had a radar. Decided that our best bet was to make an end run to a position ahead on the track to Truk and attempt interception during daylight. Avoided further contact and headed south and then east.

July 5

0530 (K)

Changed course to the northeast to close target's estimated track.

0536 (K)

Just as it was getting light sighted smoke broad on our port bow. We were still 20 miles off estimated target track so decided

ORIGINAL
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Case 1, No. C-2 (Cont.)

to gain a little more distance before closing the track and turned back to the eastward. Had originally planned interception between Tarang Reef and Condor Bank but now saw that we would have to make our attack to the eastward of Condor Bank and before the convoy reached the vicinity of Fray Feather Bank. Was not sure of our position as a heavy overcast had prevented obtaining morning star sights. Got a sun line which gave us a fair check on our longitude and at

0730 (K) Changed course to the northeast again to close the track. Obtained occasional bearings on the smoke which seemed to indicate that the convoy was heading for the safety of the shoal water around Condor Bank.

0830 Submerged when estimated distance to track was five miles.

0954 Turned north to further close track but after an hour it became apparent that either the convoy had been further north than we had calculated or else it had reached Condor Bank and headed to the northeastward for Gray Feather Bank. Could not see the ships but the smoke was keeping the convoy well located for us. Changed to normal approach course.

1000 (K) Sighted stacks and masts of the two ships as they passed north of us at a range of 14000 yards.

1220 Reluctantly abandoned chase and turned south.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No:	8
Time:	2100 (K)
Date:	July 4
Position:	8-00N 146-13E
Type:	Two freighters

11 January 1945

Case 1, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Init. Range: 4000
Course: 110°T
Speed: 9 knots
How Contact: SH
Remarks: Later sighted 1130 (K)/5
7-37, 143-26

U.S.S. Porpo

Second War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete with no difficulty experienced in copying NFM on high frequency.

No. C-5

July 1

Patrolled submerged east of Wake Island during the day. No shipping or planes sighted. Wreck still high on reef.

July 2 to 4

En route patrol area.

July 4

1500 (K) Entered area.

July 5

On station, patrolling submerged east of Palap Island.

1300 (K) Sighted two ships to westward. Commenced approach.

1815 (K) Sunset.

1901 (K) In rapidly falling twilight, fired three torpedoes at leading ship and two torpedoes at second ship. One hit (MKT) only in first ship.

1907 (K) Depth charges and gunfire.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 1, No. C-5 (Cont.)

2002 (K) Surfaced in pursuit. Sighted glow of searchlight over horizon astern. Believed this to be escort rejoining.
2115 (K) Radar and sight contact on the two ships at 15000 yards. At this time escort, who had overhauled us astern, sighted us and turned on his light. Submerged to avoid escort. No depth charges.
2300 (K) Surfaced.

July 6 to 9

Surface and submerged patrol between Manomito and Hall Islands.

No. C-6

Description of Contact

No:	1
Time:	1304 (K)
Date:	July 5
Position:	7-20N 149-33E
Type:	Convoy of two freighters
Init. Range:	18000
Est. Speed:	9 knots
How Contact:	P
Remarks:	Attacked both ships with torpedoes. One hit in leading ship. Escort trailing 30 miles astern.

Case 2

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

(Marcus Island Force)

28/1405 June

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 2, No. A-1 (Cont.)

TO: (Yokosuka Chief of Staff)
(Yokosuka District Transp. Office)
INFO: (Yokosuka Munitions Section Chief)
(Yokosuka Naval Hospital)
(Yokosuka Civil Engineering Chief)

Unident Marus) depart at 2200 today.

Heem posits (North and East):

29th 25-30, 152-23
30th 27-32, blank-36
1st 29-35, 146-50
2nd 31-37, 143-55
3rd 33-35, 141-05

Arrive Yokosuka at 0900 on 4th. (rest deals with passengers and cargo, but unable to read).

GI COMMENT: Subs have by phone at 0250 1/3 July.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: JACK (SS 259)
PREC: OP OP

02/1820 July

IN A HURRY THIS ULTRA X AT 0300 OCT 02 JULY 2
POPLAES (MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) POSIT 31-37
NORTH 143-55 EAST ALGARORA 33-35 NORTH 141-05
EAST AND ARRIVE YOKOSUKA 21 HOURS LATER

- INTERCEPT -

11 January 1944

Case 2 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Jack

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete and satisfactory.

No. C-2

July 1 to 3

Patrolling western approaches to Sagami Nada.

July 4

Took station at the mouth of Suruga Bay on a line between Omai Saki and Iro Saki. Dodged three patrol boats during the day and at

1520 (H)

Saw a ship hull down and smoking (contact #9) coming around Iro Saki. After two observations which indicated his bearing was drawing toward the north a rain squall set in which reduced the visibility to about 3000 yards and he was lost from view. Turned north and had almost concluded that the ship had entered the bay instead of coming across it when the soundman, Ziegmann, D.M. picked up heavy screws bearing 56 degrees relative another set at 63 degrees relative and a light fast screw at 72 degrees relative. The rain lifted a little and a large merchantman was sighted with about a 70 degree port angle on the bow range 3600 yards. He obligingly zigged toward at a range of 3200 yards and away again at 1800 yards. At this time a second ship was sighted about 1500 yards astern of the first. The Jack

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 2, No. C-2 (Cont.)

1613 (Z)

was between the escort (a converted work-boat of about 200 tons) and the target. At Celebrated Independence Day by firing three torpedoes from a range of 1130 yards on about 67 degrees port track, three degrees divergent spread target speed nine knots - three hits. This target sank so quickly that it was at 250 feet before we were. We closed it considerably after firing and turned to opposite course. The sucking, crushing noises of its sinking were clearly audible through the hull. The escort dropped only two depth charges - neither of them close and the second ship in the column turned and ran back to Tokyo. An attempt to shoot at the other vessel in the convoy was not made because the range was rather long and at the time of firing the escort was about 400 yards astern and in excellent position to deliver a quick attack. On regaining periscope depth an hour later 5000 yards from the scene of the attack no ships were in sight - the visibility at this time was excellent. There were no counter measures other than the two depth charges dropped at random. The ship sunk was similar to KYOKKO MARU (page 191, ONI 208-J). She was riding light in the water.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No:	9
Time:	1520 (Z)
Date:	July 4
Position:	34-32N 138-35E
Type:	2 ship convoy
Course:	260
Speed:	9 knots
Remarks:	Sunk KYOKKO MARU class vessel (6783 ton gross) Other vessel un- identified. Escort was a converted work boat of about 200 ton.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 3

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

03/1203 July

TO:

INFO:

(Sasebo Defense
Force) (B)

"Akitsu Maru (chartered (?) vessel) departed Palao
West Entrance at 0700 July 3 for Ujina. Speed 13
knots. Will pass through following points:

(Part 1 of 2)

GI COMMENT: Weather sent out as first part
of this part.

Point A, 08-30 N, 134-16 E.
Point B, 10-20 N, 135-20 E.
Point C, 21-15 N, 134-23 E.
Point D, 31-05 N, 134-47 E. *

Arrive Pukakma (?) 1700 July 7.
Seen positions 3rd to 7th July:

July 3, 08-44 N, 134-24 E.
July 4, 14-15 N, 134-56 E.
July 5, 21-15 N, 134-23 E.
July 6, 26-32 N, 134-30 E. *
July 7, 32-1 N, 133-21 E. *

HYPO COMMENT: Time of passing points: Point C
(1200/July 5). Point D (0615/
July 7 approximately). Positions
were slightly garbled but believed
correct as written."

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 3. No. A-1 (Cont.)

(NPM-040402-July)
(Part 2 of 2)

OK COMMENT: Phoned to ComSubPacFor at 0955
(-9) 4th July.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: STURGEON
CINCPAC
ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOR
PREC: OP OP OP

04/0917 July

ULTRA SERIAL 7 BLUE HARBORAL X 1 POPULAR BELIEVED
TO BE IMPORTANT AND POSSIBLY MAKING 18 KNOTS BY
PIT LOG X AT 3 HOURS GOT 6 JULY ECLC 3230 (26-32 N
134-30 E) ALGAROA DEBY 1021 (32-10 N 133-21 E) X
ROUTE BETWEEN 2 POSITIONS GIVEN MAY NOT BE DIRECT
AS THERE ARE INDICATIONS SHE WILL PASS THROUGH
ECLC 0547 (31-05 N 134-47 E) X AREAS 7 AND 8 ARE
VACANT

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Description of Contact

No: 8
Time: 0830
Date: July 5
Position: 32-56N
133-55E
Type: 1 Seguri ID
Remarks: Passed out of range.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case A

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

This is part 1 of Jap 2 parter, 2nd part of which was translated in HYPO 060546.

FROM: _____ 04/1358 July
TO: _____ (4th Fleet)
INFO: _____ (Chichijima Special
Base Force)

1. "Blank 404 Convoy (A vessel, blank maru (YEND), Koyo Maru, blank maru, and blank maru (will depart Saeki at 0700 blank) July date - missing). Passing through Point A (North 31-30, East 134-00).

Point B (North 24-00, East 134-00).
Point C (North 16-00, East 132-00).
Point D (North 10-00, East 132-00).
Point E (North 07-50, East 133-05).

It will arrive Palao at blank July 12. Speed 8 blank knots. Have the blank escort as far as Palao. The blank as far as North 29-00."

GI COMMENT: Received in HEGAT's 071724. HEGAT calls convoy the "G 404 Convoy; and did not mention it's leaving Saeki.

No. A-2

Following is part 1 of despatch reported in HYPO 050546

FROM: _____ (Naval Minister
and Chief Nav.
Gen. Staff) 04/1358 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case A. No. A-2 (Cont.)

TO: (4th Fleet)
INFO: (8th Fleet)
(Saipan DF)
(1st Section Naval
General Staff)
(Yokosuka Naval
District)
(Combined Fleet)
(Chichijima
Special Base Force)

"Convoy O #404. blanks maru
Koyo Maru (blanks) blanks will pass through
the following points.

- A. 31-30 North, 134-00 East.
- B. 24-00 North, 134-00 East.
- C. 16-00 North, 132-00 East.
- D. 10-00 North, 132-00 East.
- E. 07-50 North, 133-15 East.

Arrive PP ? at 1500 ? on the 12th blanks escort."

GI COMMENT: ConsSubPac informed at 0600(-9). HYP0's
060546 gave noon posits for this con-
voy. Area designator PP is Palao.

No. A-3

FROM:
TO:

04/1358 July

INFO:

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case L, No. A-2 (Cont.)

Mayo Maru and others in convoy. Noon positions:

July 5, 30-00 N, 134-00 E.
July 6, 26-35 N, 134-00 E.
July 7, 23-15 N, 133-45 E.
July 8, 19-55 N, 132-55 E.
July 9, 16-35 E, 132-10 E.
July 10, 13-15 N, 132-00 E.
July 11, 9-55 N, 132-05 E.

Arrive Palao blank.

GT COMMENT: ConsSubPac informed 0935 (I)/6th July.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS ON REF FOR
PREC: OP OF

06/0551 July

PECAN AT 3 HOURS OCT 9 JULY AT ENST 35-10 (16-35
NORTH 132-10 EAST) ALGAROBA ENST 15-00 (13-15
NORTH 132-00 EAST) SEWT 55-05 (09-55 NORTH 132-05
EAST) COMSUBPAC SERIAL 11 ULTRA X GURNARD ATTEMPT
INTERCEPTION X MITCO AUTHORIZED TO ASSIST IF ABLE
TO REACH TRACK WITHOUT EXCESSIVE FUEL EXPENDITURE
X WATCH OUT FOR EACH OTHER

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Gurnard

Second War Patrol

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case A (Cont.)

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was satisfactory.
Last serial received was 87
(261021 July '43)

No. C-2

July 9-10 Surface patrol on convoy lanes.

July 11

0251
13-10M
131-553

Sighted four AK's and escort bearing 270°, 4,000 yards on southerly course (Ship Contact #12). (No indications of these ships on SJ Radar. Radar hasn't had a pip since leaving Midway.) Commenced trailing ships preparing to attack. Escort moves back and forth across bow of leading ship. Visibility is variable with cloudy background. Ships of convoy zig both in column movement and by ship turn movements. No results from Radar; training sound head by hand in torpedo room and having range projector in conning tower have not been able to obtain echo range.

0445 (I)

Taking advantage of break of dawn with convoy silhouetted to eastward fired tubes, 1, 2, 3 and 4 at ship #4. No hits observed in spite of spread. Shortly after firing, Radar had a faint pip approximate range 1,500 yards. (Range unit is definitely not working as crystal is grounded.) Decided I had over estimated speed and range and that angle on bow estimate was poor. Swung ship to make stern tubes bear. Meanwhile #4 ship had started blowing her whistle and blinking a signal light. Ships #2 and #3 swung to right and as #3 presented better target at 0451 fired tubes 7, 8, 9 and 10 at #3. Meanwhile ship #2 had maneuvered so as to overlap ahead of #3. One torpedo hit #3 just abaft his bridge, another hit the

11 January 1946

Case No. 4 (Cont.)

D - Verification

No. T-1

From:	(Naru) (C)	
	(Sasebo Defense	26655
	Force Unit) (C)	
	(Caf3 Kure) (B)	
Info:	(Guard Division #43) (B)	
	(Patrol Boat #46) (D)	
	(Det. Civil Eng. Section 4) (C)	

"At 0500 the S3 ship (unident) received a torpedo attack and sank in posit 13-blank E, 132-00 E."

COMMENT: Torpedo attack by Gurnard.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 5

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

06/1700 July

"Schedule changed as follows: at 1200 on 9th, 6-13 North, 145-20 East. At 0000 on 10th, 7-00 North, 146-00 East. At 0400 on 10th, 7-15 North, 148-50 East. At 0800 on 10th, 7-15 North, 149-43 East. At 1200 on 10th, 7-26 North, 150-33 East."

MEGAS COMMENT: Unable to determine what unit this is.

GI COMMENT: Transmitted as TULLA; Treated as COMB; routed to CentThird Fleet. Comdr. Voss had this at 070700 (-9) July. HYPO's version added "at blank pass North Channel."

Identity is not known here either.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

PREC:

COMSUEPAC

MINGO

ALL SUBS HPM FOR

ONEPAC

OP OF OP

07/0911 July

THIS GOES ULTRA TO MINGO X 1 OR MORE POPLARS (MARECHAMIAN TYPE UNKNOWN) 0300 OCT 9 JULY AT 1000 1520 (06-15N 145-20E) POSITION 12 HOURS.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 5, No. B-1 (Cont.)

LATER BJVB (07H 1453) AND 4 HOURS AFTER THAT
BJVB 1550 (08-155 143-103) AND THEY THEN HEAD
FOR EAST I SUGGEST YOU GO AFTER THEM INSTEAD OF
TRYING TO REACH MY SERIAL 11 I CONSIDER NUMBER
16

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Mingo

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete

No. C-2

July 3

Passing through Caroline Islands just
west of McLaughlin Bank at 15 knots.

July 10

1300 (K) Still patrolling south of Satawal Island.
Discontinued patrol north of Ianthe Shoal
and proceeded on course 253 degrees for
our area.
2200 (K) Changed course to 231 degrees.

Case 6

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: BOTA 6 (Unyo)

05/1423 July

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 6, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Unyo, Aikoku Maru and perhaps another ship or two will be in 10-26 N., 150-33 E. at 1800 on the 10th. Will pass through point "T" at 0330 on 11th and arrive North Channel at 0515. Making 17 knots. Requests aerial patrol at entrance. Unyo is carrying 60 shipboard fighters (as cargo) and other items.

No. A-2

FROM:
TO:

(Unyo?)

06/1423 July

(Combined Fleet)
(Yokosuka Naval
District)

INFO:

(2nd Fleet)
(4th Fleet)

(Onchiijima Special
Base Force)
(Saipan Base Force
#5)

1. Unyo
with Aikoku Maru
midant and Ushio/. Will proceed South over a
route lying from 200 to 250 miles to Westward of
island chain. Will pass through 10-26 N., 150-33 E.
at 1800 on 10th and through Point "T" at 0330 the
11th, arriving North Channel at 0515. Speed 17
knots. Request aerial patrol to cover entrance.

Departs Yokosuka blanks 6th July
?? DesDiv 7 /

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 6, No. A-2 (Cont.)

2. Uyo carrying following:
- 650 passengers.
 - 60 fighter shipboard planes (including those for Air Group 201)
 - 80 tons of supplies for blank Naval Stores Section plus about 20 tons of other munitions.
 - Periscope for -unident sub) and other military stores.

NEGAT COMMENT: This is complete version of Negat's 060659.

OK COMMENT: The reference contained nothing besides what appears in the above translation.
Commander Vege (Submarine Liaison) sat this at 070700 (-9) July.

No. A-3

FROM: Blank originator 06/1350 July
TO: _____
INFO: _____

"From Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet.

1. This force will sortie from Inland Sea on 10 July and arrive PT about 1400 on 15th. Request arrangements for anti-submarine patrol from 0700 on 15th. Position at 0400 on 15th will be 10-50 N, 151-30 E. Thence on course 160 degrees speed 24 knots until 1300 when will change course to head for North Channel."

NEGAT COMMENT: Since originator is Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet and he uses expression "Tootai" it is impossible to say for certain what units he has with him. The literal translation of "Tootai" in this spot would be "This fleet" but obviously that phrase would give an incorrect

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 6, No. A-3 (Cont.)

Impression since much of his fleet is already in southern waters. Suspect Cardiv 1 and CruDiv 8 are principal units concerned in this movement. Date of departure from Inland Sea probably 10th or 11th.

GT COMMENT: PT is Truk.

Phoned CincPac 070825 (-9) July

Phoned ComSubPac 070830 (-9) July

Code group July date confirmed as 10 July

by HSS 071401.

Original appears on P. 64 and 65 of Book for July 6, 1943.

No A-4

FROM: Blank Originator.

06/1350 July

TO: _____

INFO: _____

From Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet.

1. This force will sortie from Inland Sea on (July date) and arrive PT about 1400 on 15th. Request arrangements for anti-submarine patrol from 0700 on 15th. Position at 0400 on 15th will be 10-50 N, 151-30 E. Thence on course 120 degrees, speed 24 knots until 1300 when will change course to head for North Channel.

NEGAT COMMENT: Since originator is Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet and he uses expression "Tcotai" it is impossible to say for certain what units he has with him. The literal translation of "Tcotai" in this spot would be "this fleet" but obviously that phrase would give an incorrect

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 6. No. A-4 (Cont.)

impression since much of his fleet
is already in southern waters.
Suspect CarDiv 1 and CruDiv 8 are
principal units concerned in this
movement. Date of departure from
Inland Sea probably 10th or 11th.

CI COMMENT: PT is Truk.

Phoned CcmSubPacFor 070830 (-9) July.

No. A-5

FROM: Blank Originator

05/1032 July

TO:

(garbled)

(Yokosuka

Naval District)

(Air Group #802)

INFO:

*From Captain of Chuyo

This ship is scheduled depart Yokosuka at 0400
on 10th, passing to westward of Oshima?)

and between Unident Island) and

Hachijojima?]. After effecting rendezvous with

blank at 0600 on 11th in 27-40 North, 137-35 East,
will proceed to PT (Truk).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 6, No. B-1 (Cont.)

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING HFM FOX
PREC: OP CP 07/0749 July

SERIAL 14 RED HALLIBUT SEARAVEN STURGEON BLUE
HARVEAL ULTRA X ENEMY TASKFORCE PROBABLY CON-
SISTING 2 CARRIERS SEVERAL CRUISERS AND DESTROY-
ERS WILL DEPART ISLAND SEA ABOUT 10 JULY FOR
TRUK ARRIVING 15TH X STURGEON AND SEARAVEN NOTE
IT IS POSSIBLE THIS IS THE CURTIS 026 PERMIT
HEARS IN POSITION LONG 14038 (27-40 NORTH 137-38
EAST) X WILL GIVE BACT INFO ON THIS TASK FORCE
LATER TO THE BOYS BEAR TRUK X NEUTER 026 PERMIT
PLUS 043 POPCORN AND SEVERAL DESTROYERS DEPARTED
YOKOSUKA 6 JULY MAKING 17 KNOTS X THEY WILL PASS
BETWEEN 200 AND 250 MILES WEST OF MARIANAS ISLANDS
CHAIN AND WILL ARRIVE CCJA 2653 (10-26 NORTH 150-53
EAST) AT 9 HOURS OCT JULY 10 AND NORTH CHANNEL TRUK
11 HOURS LATER X PCGT TAKE STATION IN POSITION
GIVEN X HALLIBUT AND STEELHEAD 5 MILES NORTHWEST
AND SOUTHEAST RESPECTIVELY OF PCGT X REMAIN UN-
DETECTED TO PREVENT DIVERSION OF TARGETS AND MAKE
NO ATTACKS WITHIN 100 MILES OF POSITION EXCEPT ON
MAJOR TARGETS X ATTACK NO OTHER SUBS UNLESS ENEMY
IDENTIFICATION IS POSITIVE X SEARAVEN SEARCH FOR
AND ATTACK THIS GROUP IF POSSIBLE WHILE ENROUTE
TO POSITION FOR FL SERIAL 10

No. B-2

FROM: HALLIBUT
TO: COMSOPAC
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OP CP 11/1000 July

TASK FORCE 90 MINUTES LATE X 2 DD'S NOV KOL X 3
HITS IN AUXILIARY CRUISER X ENROUTE AREA X ONE
HALF OF CREW HAS PTOMARGE POISONING X 18 FISH X
UTIL *X 3762 0670

*UTIL 11-00 NORTH 149-00 EAST

No. B-3

FROM: STEELHEAD 11/1440 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 6, No. B-3 (Cont.)

TO: COMSOPAC
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OP OP

TASK FORCE 86 MINUTES LATE X 2 ESCORTS FLAT TOP
AND DAMAGED X 1 X 5 FISH AT CV 3 PROBABLE HITS X
LAST SEEN BELCHING HUGE COLUMNS OIL SMOKE APPARENT-
LY STOPPED X 19 FISH GROUP (10 H 151 E) PROCEEDING
AREA

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Foxy

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete
and satisfactory.

No. C-2

July 10

	Submerged patrol on Empire-Truk route.
1926 (E)	Surfaced. SJ radar out of commission.
2016 (K)	Sighted three ships to westward about 12000 yards on southerly course.
2019 (K)	Submerged in bright moonlight as des- troyer headed toward us. Radar still out. Heard several distant explosions. Des- troyer closed to about 5000 yards and then opened out.
2130 (K)	Surfaced.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Hot: 2
Description: 3 unidentified ships

ORIGINAL
II January 1946

Case 6, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Time: 2016 (K)
Date: July 10
Position: 10-24 N
150-53 E
Course: South
Speed: 18 knots
Type: 3 Unidentified ships
Remarks: No attack made. Forced down
by escort. Radar out of
commission.

U.S.S. Halibut

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: Radio reception see VII Case
1, C-1.

No. C-5

July 10

0440 (K) Submerged.
2017 (K) Sighted two large ships on starboard bow
(Contact #10). Range 7000 yards, angle
on the bow zero. Light from a half-full
moon with an overcast sky made visibility
fairly good for a submerged approach.
Commenced approach. Formation zigged to
the right putting us in a favorable attack
position. Identified leading ship as a
converted carrier, second ship as aux-
iliary cruiser. Sound picked up screws of
one escorting destroyer on our starboard beam.
Range and angle on the bow was difficult to
estimate but got a quick set-up on the
carrier.
2026 (K) Lost depth control. Believe we took some
water in forward while making tubes ready.
When control was regained a few minutes
later the carrier had gotten by a favorable
firing bearing. Shifted target to the
auxiliary cruiser and at.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 6, No. C-5 (Cont.)

- 2032 (K) Fired six torpedoes at the cruiser. Three hits. Saw the first torpedo hit, raising a large column of smoke and debris from the vicinity of the bridge. Heard but did not see the other two torpedoes hit as was looking for the escort.
- 2034 (K) Made stern tubes ready for possible shot at the escort who had turned in the direction of the cruiser and was crossing our stern. Took another look at the cruiser. It was stopped, down by the stern and red flares were being fired. The carrier was signaling to the cruiser with blinker tube.
- 2035 (K) Heard a series of about six explosions which sounded like internal explosions in the cruiser.
- 2036 (K) Sound reported the noise of a torpedo on our port quarter. Checked the bearing and saw it coincided with the bearing of the destroyer. Went deep. It could have been one of our torpedoes running erratic or one fired down our torpedo track by the destroyer. Did not hear the torpedo again after we started deep. A few minutes later, the sound man reported that all he could hear was one set of heavy screws astern. These slowed down until they were almost stopped and then speeded up again.
- 2114 (K) Four depth charges, not close. The sounds of the depth charges dropped on this attack were different from any previously heard by this vessel. Three distinct noises were heard for each charge. First, there was a low muffled explosion which was followed about two seconds later by the customary click. Four to five seconds after the click, the loud explosion and water noises were heard.
- 2120 (K) Destroyer commenced searching for us using echo ranging on 13 kcs.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1948

Case 8. No. C-5 (Cont.)

2123 (K) Four more depth charges
2143 (K) Pinging became fainter and finally faded
out or stopped
2343 (K) Surfaced.

No. C-5

Description of Contact

No: 10
Time: 2017 (K)
Date: July 10
Position: 10-37 N
150-43 E
Type: One IOT, one IOL
and 2 DD's
Init. Range: 7,000
Course: 180°
Speed: 17 knots
How Contact: P (night)
Remarks: Fired 6 torpedoes at
IOL (AIKOKU MARU class)
- 3 hits.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: No difficulty was experienced
in copying the submarine
schedule. Serial 25 of early
July was missed.

No. C-8

July 10

1900 (L) Latitude 10° - 23' N. Longitude 150° -
57' E.
1913 (L) Surfaced and decided to patrol up and
down noon, five miles on either side of
our --- position. Were heading westward
when at

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 6, No. C-8 (Cont.)

during the morning. Nothing sighted all day, not even a plane. They must have zigged, either away or down.

1910 (L) At Latitude 09° - 43' N. Longitude 151° - 00' E. Surfaced and proceeded towards patrol area.

2300 (L) Sent our 111440 to ComSubPac reporting action. Decided to patrol east of Truk along the Kwajalein route.
(L time in this report is an error for K time, -10 hours. - Editor's Note)

No. C-9

Description of Contact

No: 1
Time: 2016 (L)
Date: July 10
Position: 10-21N
150-49E
Course: 1620°T
ZZ
Speed: 16 knots to
18 knots
Type: Convoy - 1 CV or ACV
1 AP or ACL
2 DD's

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-10

July 11

Patrolling submerged. Have seen nothing since the seventh.

0505 Sighted carrier type zero - 27-44, 137-33.
0603 (I) Sighted one Chitosa class seaplane tender escorted by one destroyer. Commenced approach. At 0625 when we were set for a 90 degree port track stern shot, and range

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 6, No. C-10 (Cont.)

2500 yards, he zigged to the left. We were then 300 yards from the track, too close for a bow shot and too far to cross his bow for a stern shot. Went ahead full on the port screw and swung right. Hoped we might get him with a stern shot. When we had swung half way around he passed over us making 18 knots. When I next looked he had passed too far to shoot. He has a charmed life. This is the second time in two successive patrols I have tried to get him with the same results.

0705

While on course 270 sighted 6 cruisers and two carriers, range about 14,000 yards heading to the southeast and zigging radically. They were making 20 knots and the closest we could get to them was 3500 yards. This formation was well covered by carrier planes. It was very disheartening to just watch those ships go by.

1947 (I)

Surfaced and headed back to Shimo Misaki.

(Bad weather -- Editor's Note)

No. C-11

Description of Contact

No:	11
Time:	0700
Date:	July 11
Position:	27-42N 137-38E
Type:	1 CV - 6 CA
Remarks:	Least range 3500 Many planes

U.S.S. Bearaven

Seventh War Patrol

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

2016 (L)
CONTACT
(1)

Latitude $10^{\circ} - 21^{\circ}$ N. Longitude $150^{\circ} - 49^{\circ}$ E. Sighted two dark objects on the horizon bearing 340° T. distance 9 to 10 miles. Visibility was excellent at the time although rain clouds which were later to prove very useful were already gathering in the east and overhead. Went to Battle stations and commenced trailing from ahead. As contact developed it appeared to consist of one large vessel, an AP or an auxiliary CL and three escorts of varying sizes estimated at the time to be anything from DD's to torpedo boats. Our first plotted speed of the force was 16 knots. At

2040 (L)

Saw an orange flash in the direction of one of the escorts and heard a number of explosions from the bearing of the task force. It appeared from the "niskel seats" that an attack was being made by either the PCGY or the HALLIBUT at this time. When the ensuing miles had cleared a little we continued to trail first from ahead of the convoy and then from the port beam. The ACL now showed a speed of 8 to 9 knots, and was zig zagging radically on a base course of 162° T. She appeared to be damaged. At

July 10

2315 (L)

Latitude $10^{\circ} - 07^{\circ}$ N. Longitude $150^{\circ} - 52^{\circ}$ E. When range to ACL was 9,000 yards discovered vessel which had come from the westward to take position ahead of the ACL was a CV or KCV. Shifted targets and conducted attack on this target. With a range of 2000 yards and an angle on the bow of 95° port at

2348 (L)

Latitude $10^{\circ} - 02^{\circ}$ N. Longitude $150^{\circ} - 46^{\circ}$ E. Fired five torpedoes and turned away. Believe we obtained at least 3 hits. Target turned away, began emitting clouds of black smoke and apparently stopped. Retired at flank speed on the surface and at

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 6, No. C-3 (Cont.)

2356 (L) Heard two loud explosions, probably depth charges, from the direction of the nearest escort, a large DD, which was at that time directly astern of us. We were probably never sighted, as at

July 11

0000 (L) This escort returned to the vicinity of the damaged ACL which she had been guarding closely all evening. As we continued to retire on the surface, heard several res-sultory explosions and as the range opened the target appeared to have a list of about 10°. At

0030 (L) Lost radar contact on ACL at 19,000 yards and contemplated reversing course to see if it could be regained. It was now nearly pitch black dark and raining intermittently. We were in the PCOY's area, with no knowledge of what she or the HALIBUT were doing. With the poor visibility obtaining it was decided that the best procedure would be to run ahead of the task force and attempt to intercept it at dawn. If the carrier were only damaged she would be with it and we could then get in another attack without endangering other subs in this area. A TBS would certainly have proved of great value at this time for if we had known the PCOY and HALIBUT were not in the vicinity, we would have maintained contact for another attack. Plotted in estimated dawn position of convoy and at

July 11

0450 (L) Latitude 09° - 18' N. Longitude 150° - 59' E. Drove five miles south of the plotted position and reversed course heading towards task force, running at periscope depth, visibility excellent. Heard several distant explosions

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 6 (Cont.)

No. C-12

July 11

- 0644 (J) Sighted lone enemy seventeen hundred ton destroyer. A single stacker. Her course 270° , speed about twenty knot. Mistook her at first for a cruiser. She was bearing 030° distant about 10,000 yards. Came to course 000° for ninety track. Figured she was probably part of a screen of a larger force. Planned to let her go by unmolested hoping for bigger game.
- 0655 (J) When at a range of 3500 yards destroyer came to left to course 170° presenting a zero angle on the bow. Eased down to 120 feet while she came down starboard side at 215 RPM. No pinging.
- 0720 (J) Destroyer out of sight bearing 160° (T) had been zig zagging radically. Came to course 090° .
- 0739 Changed course to 130° .
- 0800 Changed course to 140° .
- 0820 Sighted formation of ships and planes bearing 034° distant 20,000 yards. First appeared as four large ships and a number of smaller ones. Angle on bow appeared quite small. Range did not change and bearing hauled rapidly to southward. Came to course 120° .
- 0834 Identified two of ships as aircraft carriers of the Shokaku Class. Masts were rigged on the trailing carrier and lowered on the leading carrier. They were still hull down and masts had given impression of more ships. Islands and foremast had given impression of a small angle on the bow where the angle was now seen to be about eighty, starboard. Our position Lat 27° - $34'$ N Long 137° - $27'$ E.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 6, No. C-12 (Cont.)

0839 Identified leading ship as Chitose Class seaplane tender and trailing ship as Tone Class heavy Cruiser. Could make out tops of what must have been about three destroyers. Two float type planes and two single engine carrier planes provided a close screen.

0925 Formation over horizon. Had checked them on base course 155°, speed of advance fifteen knot. Started back down steamer lanes to area fourteen. See track chart.

2039 Sent SEARAY serial one to ComSubPac. Cleared to Radio New Caledonia after considerable interference from a Jap. Paraphrase of Message: Saw one Tone Class CA two Shokaku Class CV one Chitose Class AV pass Lat 27°-33' N 137°-32' E at twenty three thirty zebra on course 155° speed 15 knot but unable to attack. Number one air bank carried away. Number one engine smokes least, number three most. Indications point toward lube oil being limiting factor. Lasting until nineteenth at one engine speed. Unless otherwise ordered intend return via Marcus for additional survey as other attempt sketchy due to surface and air patrols. Japs had P-38 type plane here and radar near beach on middle east side. Our position Lat 27°-36'N Long 137°-40'E.

No. C-13

Description of Contact

No:	3
Time:	0820 (K)
Date:	July 11
Position:	27-44N 137-30E
Course:	155
Speed:	15 knot

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 6, No. C-13 (Cont.)

Type: Two Shokaku class CV page 25,
one Tena class CA page 41,
one Chitose class AV page 59,
all of ONI 14.
Remarks: Protected by close aircraft
screen, about three destroyers
and a distant screen about 20
miles ahead.

Case 7

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 05/1731 July

TO:

(Base Force #3

Tarawa)

(garble)

INFO:

(Chief Trans-
portation Sec-
tion Tokyo)

(Marcus Island
Force)

(Combined Fleet)

(4th Fleet)

(Air Flotilla

#22)

"#20 Mikage Maru (escorted by (unident ship) departed PT for PQ via NYC at 1630 on the 5th. Will arrive NYC on 0300 on the 10th and depart at 1800 the same day arriving PQ at blanks on the 12th. Noon positions (6th through 12th):

6th, 05-43 North, 154- East.

7th, 03-56 North, 153- East.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 7. No. A-1 (Cont.)

8th, 02-__ North, 161-38 East.
9th, 00-25 North, 165-00 East.
10th, NYC
11th, 02-20 North, 167-02 East.
12th, 06-15 North, 167-30 East.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPac informed at 0445 (-9)
July 8th: PT is Truk, PQ is
Kwajalein, NYC is Nauru. #20
Mikage Maru is a 2718 ton vessel.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPIING INFO
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OP OP

09/1015 July

COMSUBPAC SERIAL 22 X ULTRA X RED PORPOISE MEDIUM
BEECH (FREIGHTER) BLANK BLANK X MINUS 0900 X MINUS
4 X EYE 2012 (2-20 NORTH 167-12 EAST) ALGABA
TYPE 1530 (6-15 N 167-30 E) X S 28 CAN WORK ON
THIS AS PORPOISE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO LEAVE AREA X
FOR INFO HALIBUT PCGY AND STEELHEAD 043 POPCORE
MENTIONED MY SERIAL 14 IS IN AUXILIARY COTTONWOOD
(CRUISER) X FOR GURHARD PECAN MENTIONED MY SERIAL
11 WILL NOT STEER DIRECT ROUTES BETWEEN POSITIONS
GIVEN AS IT IS SCHEDULED PASS THROUGH CGWT (10-N
132 E) AND EJET (7-50 N 133-15 E) X ALL DATES MAY
POSSIBLY BE 1 DAY LATER THAN STATED X FOR CAPTAIN
BROWN ON NAVAL STRONG INDICATIONS YOUR 3 SIDE
KICKS ARE SAFELY INSIDE THEIR ASSIGNED AREA AND
PLENTY ACTIVE X NO EVIDENCE AS YET OF ANY DEFINITE
COUNTER MEASURES X MINCO NOTE MY SERIAL 16 MAY
CONCERN LARGE BARGE (TANKER)

C - Submarine Action Reports

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 7 (Cont.)

U.S.S. S-23

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception extremely poor and usually impossible at night.

No. C-2

July 5

At Sub Base, Dutch Harbor. Fuelled and provisioned. Conducted practice approachas and compensated compass on 9 and 10 July.

July 13

1100 (W)

Departed Dutch Harbor.

U.S.S. S-38

Ninth War Patrol

No. C-3

July 15

0505 (L)

Submerged. Patrolling southern approaches to Kwajalein.

Case 8

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: KITO 8
TO: RME 3
UEO 3

09/1012 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 8. No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: _____

1. Blank convoy, consisting of "A" vessels Ryojo Maru, Shoho Maru (unident army transports), and "B" vessel HOKKAII Maru escorted by Unident ships) departed PP (Palao) at 1000 on 9th. Speed 8.5 knots. Will pass through following points:

7-13 N, 134-30 E. 2-02 S, 143-52 E.
6-14 N, 134-32 E. 2-56 S, 149-36 E.
3-42 N, 136-20 E. 4-03 S, 152-09 E.
0-08 N, 144-93 E.

Will arrive RR (Rabaul) at 1500 16th.

2. Moon positions 10th - 16th:

4-20 N, 135-52 E. 1-00 S, 146-55 E.
2-50 N, 138-32 E. 2-42 S, 149-27 E.
1-38 N, 141-22 E. 4-03 S, 152-11 E.
0-20 N, 144-10 E.

3. Convoy is carrying following material and personnel.

- (a) The Force: 295 men, 10,000 blank of gasoline, 27 automobiles.
- (b) The Ryojo Maru Force: Blanks
- (c) Shoho Maru: 1500 tons of coal

-Subs by phone 1025 (I) 10 July.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: ALL SUBS ON HPH FOX
INFO: CINCPAC - CTF 72
PREC: OP OP OP

10/0840 July

SERIAL 24, ULTRA X 2 LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) 1

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 8, No. B-1 (Cont.)

POPLAR (MERCHANT TYPE UNKNOWN) 149, 235 AND 043
POPCORN BLANK MINUS 1.5 MINUS 900 MINUS 4 REFUK
5030 (2-50N, 138-31E) ALGAROBA CPRO 3822 (1-38 N
141-22 E) REFUK 2610 (0-26 N 144-10 E) X MINCO CAN
WORK ON THIS BUT WATCH OUT FOR OUR SPRUCE (SUB-
MARINES) WHICH MAY POSSIBLY BE PLANTED BY JIMMY
FIVE NEAR EASTERN END OF THE PASTURE X FOR INFO
GURNARD DOPE FOR JULY 11TH IN BY SERIAL 11
POSSIBLY SHOULD BE 7 MILES FARTHER EAST AND THEY
MAY BE ADDING A DASH OF LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Minco

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was satisfactory---
No serials were missed.

No. C-2

July 10

Still patrolling south of Satawal Island.
1300 (K) Discontinued patrol north of Ianthe Shoal
and proceeded on course 258 degrees for
our area.
2200 (K) Changed course to 231 degrees.

July 11

On course 231 degrees at three engine speed;
extremely smooth, calm sea, bright day,
unlimited visibility.
1745 (K) Sighted smoke bearing 187 degrees T. about
25 miles distant moving to the Southeast.
Took a converging course 125 degrees T.
and with two engines made "end run" to gain
position ahead. Bright moonlight and oily
calm seas prevailed.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 3, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 12

- 0000 (K) Cut in ahead of convoy's advance and patrolled back and forth across his track at slow speed.
- 0610 (K) Sighted smoke to north of us; we had made too much ahead and south last night. Headed up to north east, then at-
- 0624 (K) Submerged when high lookout reported seeing ship's masts. Found we were on his southern flank and about parallel to the convoy's course when on normal approach course, so at-
- 0800 (K) Surfaced and commenced "end run" again to gain position ahead for late afternoon attack. Cut in ahead and reached the convoy's track at-
- 1545 (K) When we came to course 293 degrees T., and headed in at full speed.
- 1619 (K) Sighted smoke dead ahead, followed shortly afterwards by masts.
- 1627 (K) Submerged and commenced approach in a glassy smooth sea. Convoy zig-zagging radically in close formation. Four freighters in the convoy were in two, two ship columns about 1000 yards apart. Escorts were outboard of the column about 800 yards.
- The largest ship, identified as a Ryoyo Maru class freighter was leading the left column and was selected as the first target. The right column leader was identified as the Sycho Maru. The second target was a 6000 ton freighter of the same size and identical in appearance to the Ryoyo Maru class ship. The fourth ship was not identified except as usual one stack freighter.
- 1752 (K) Fired three bow torpedoes at largest ship leading port column.....(Attack #1)
Immediately shifted the set-up to the next large ship.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 8. No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1753 (X) Fired next three torpedoes from the bow... Immediately started deep so could not see the results. Heard first distant explosion right after firing sixth torpedo, followed by another five seconds later. 55-62 seconds later, the third and fourth explosions were heard.
- 1757 (X) Pattern of three depth charges. Not too close.
- 1835 (X) Five more depth charges in rapid succession. Lost depth control.
- 2055 (X) Surfaced and sent contact report.
- 2330 (X) Decided further pursuit of this convoy would carry Mingo too far into South West Subs area.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No:	1
Time:	1745 (X)
Date:	July 11
Position:	2-41 E 139-56N
How Contact:	Sighted smoke
Remarks:	Convoy-sighted smoke only until next day
No:	Next day. Same as #1
Time:	1819 (X)
Date:	July 12
Position:	00-56N 143-05E
Type:	4 freighters--2 PC
How Contact:	Sighted
Remarks:	Base course 113 degrees zig-zagging (Attack #1)

Attack Report

Time:	1752 (X)
Date:	July 12

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 8, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Position: 1-00N
142-59E
Description: Convoy-4, freighters and
2 PC escorts. Ryoyo Maru
and similar type. Sighted
smoke. Visibility excellent.
Ship(s) sunk-
Ship(s) Damaged
or probably
sunk----- Two Ryoyo Maru class freight-
ers, 6000 tons each.

Case 9

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

(Chief of
Staff, Yoko-
suka)

09/1701 July

TO:

INFO:

(Marcus Island
Area Force or
Chichijima Ac-
tivity)

Convoy #3709 (blank maru, blank maru, blank maru,
escort ships, blank, blank and Special
SubChaser #13) at 2300 July 9 will depart Yoko-
suka for Truk. Noon positions (10-20):

July 10th, 33-04 North, 139-40 East.

July 11th, 30-00 North, 139-30 East.

July 12th, 27-30 North, 141-30 East.

July 13th, 24-20 North, 140-20 East.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 9, No. A-1 (Cont.)

July 14th, 21-10 North, 140-55 East.
July 15th, blank-00 North, 141-30 East.
July 16th, 14-50 North, 142-00 East.
July 17th, 11-45 North, 143-15 East.
July 18th, 10-00 North, blank - blank east.
"Blanks and more blanks. At 1200 July 20,
scheduled to pass 10 miles to the southward of
Point "T".

BAKER COMMENT: Noon posits for 18, 19 and 20
July missing, but will be fur-
nished promptly when recovered.

GI COMMENT: Phoned Subpac at 2120 (-9) July 10.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSOPAC 10/1725 July
TO: FLYING FISH, SEARAVEN
CINCPAC
ALL SUBS COPYING RPM FCZ
PREC: OP OP OP

THIS ULTRA SERIAL 26A TO FLYING FISH IF FUEL
PERMITS AND SEARAVEN X 3 MAPLES WITH 3 LERONS
COURSE BLANK SPEED BLANK TIME 0300 DATE 12TH
DECE 3030 (27-30 N 141-30 E) ALGAROBA MRRJ
2020 (24-20 N 140-20 E) X VRRJ 1055 (21-10 N
140-55 E) X FLYING FISH BE ON LOOKOUT FOR WHOLE
BAG OF PEANUTS NEXT 24 HOURS

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Sixth War Patrol

11 January 1946

Case 9 (Cont.)No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception of the NPM
fox schedule was complete in
all respects.

No. C-2July 11

- 1530 (I) (Contact No. 17) (Attack No. 3) Easts on
the horizon bearing 202°T., distance 10
miles.
- 1535 (I) Tentatively identified ship as trawler
type on northerly course. Submerged
and commenced approach.
- 1648 (I) Vessel too small for torpedo. A careful
study at close range indicated the pre-
sence of no large caliber guns. There
appeared to be a mount for small caliber
guns forward. Three radio antennas were
between masts. The ship was about 125
feet in length having heavy timber hull
with tall sail-equipped masts, fore and
aft and diesel or gas engine auxiliary
power. The bow was clipper type and the
stern was square resembling that of a
large junk. The center island was composite
and exceedingly high for his length. She
appeared to be new and newly painted and had
a row of Japanese characters painted on
her bow.
- 1655 (I) Battle surfaced and destroyed ship with
gunfire. Enemy first turned away upon
sighting us but, after the tenth shot,
he reversed course and closed rapidly.
Rifle fire from his bow was the only
resistance. A 3" hit in the bow and on
top of pilot house turned him away and
his crew began to abandon ship by
jumping overboard. A few hardy souls
soon climbed back aboard, despite the
raging fire aft, and succeeded in

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 9. No. C-2 (Cont.)

1715 (I)

launching a raft from the forecastle. The crew was surprisingly large. Fifteen men were counted in the water and that many more must have been casualties. Ship on fire from stem to stern. Cleared decks, obtained photographs and resumed course enroute to Bonin Islands.

July 13

0030 (I)

(Contact No. 18) Sighted submarine on port quarter bearing 275[°]T. Placed him dead astern. Coached radar on and obtained range 4700 yards. He was crossing our stern on a southerly course approaching the slick of a setting moon. We circled to the north to bring him into the moon slick. While on a northerly heading with him on the edge of the moon slick, we suddenly and simultaneously lost both sight and radar contact. Concluded that he had sighted us when we presented our broadside to him at 6300 yards range and that he had submerged. I believed it to be the Searaven with whom we had been warned of probable contact. Not desiring to participate in any "unfortunate incident" particularly with Flying Fish in the role of the "unfortunate", we cleared the area to the eastward.

(No entry made in narrative report from July 14-21 inclusive. - Editor's Note)

July 22

Arrived at Midway.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No:
Time:
Date:

17
1530 (I)
July 11

ORIGINAL.
11 January 1946

Case 9, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Position: 24-05N
135-33E
Type: Small auxiliary
sailing cargo vessel
Course: 000°T
Speed: 10 kts. on engine
Remarks: Destroyed by gunfire.
Attack No. 3.

No: 18
Time: 0030 (I)
Date: July 13
Position: 24-43N
140-28E
Type: Submarine
Course: 160°T
Speed: 6 kts.
Remarks: Believed to be
Searaven.

U.S.S. Searaven

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-4

July 12 (Zone Plus 9 1/2 Time)

Heading down best estimated steamer lanes.
2245 SJ Radar Repaired.
2308 SJ Radar broken down.

July 13

SJ Radar back in operation.
0134 Indications of another radar operating in
vicinity
0135 Radar contact bearing 100°T distant 6500
yards. SEARAVEN silhouetted against
moonset. Changed course to 27° while
developing contact. Got one pip on this
course at 6700 yards then contact disappeared.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 9, No. C-4 (Cont.)

0144 Indications of other radar still strong and appeared to be on us constantly. As far as could be judged the frequency was the same as ours.
Came back to course 170°. Other radar getting weaker, still bearing about 100°T. Weather very clear and would have seen ship of any size for at least ten thousand yards. Decided this might be one of our own submarines. Increased speed and moved on down on course 170° Lat 24 - 54 N Long 148 - 13 E
0535 Submerged
1942 Surfaced and continued down lane.

July 14

0610 Weather started acting up with rain squalls and choppy seas from about 120° (T). Took two tremendous seas aboard, one right behind the other. Our position Lat. 23-54N Long. 148-23E. Changed course to 280° to bring seas on quarter.
0742 Had cleared short in pumproom power enough to permit running the hydraulic plant. Submerged and came to course 170°. Spent rest of day until 2200 clearing grounds in battery and pump room power. Weather worked up to pretty heavy seas and almost continuous rain squalls by noon. By 2000 squalls were intermittent but seas were still heavy.
2200 Surfaced with 160 volt ground still on after battery. Came to course 130° for better riding.

July 15

0550 Decided to move over to eastern portion of area. Came to course 060°. Our position Lat. 21°-29N, Long. 140°-55E. 2335 gallons of lube oil remaining on hand. Ground on after battery dropping as well dries out.

11 January 1943

Case 9, No. C-1 (Cont.)

July 16

1417
2200

Sighted Farallon de Pajaros Island bearing 112(T) distant 15 miles. Decided to move on to Eastward. Have 2200 gallons lube oil remaining. Sent Searaven serial two to ComSubPac stating: "Searaven leaving area at Lat 21°N, Long. 152°E and will patrol between Long. 151°E and 152°E, north of Lat. 21°N from the eighteenth through the twenty-first of July". Estimate six hundred gallons reserve lube in excess remain on board.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 10

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: Blank Originator
TO:

11/0400 July

"From Captain of Chuyo

Chuyo and blank left Yokosuka
at 0300 (blank scheduled to head for
Bunge Channel from Point "A").

At 0600 on 11th will join up with
Striking Force at Point "A" (27-40 North,
137-38 East)."

NEGAT COMMENT: The two blanks are the
same unidentified ship.

This rendezvous was also mentioned in
NSS 051725.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 10, No. A-1 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Reference is preliminary schedule for this trip. Departure was set for 0400 10th. "Striking Force", including Kongo, Haruna, Zuikaku, Shookaku, Zuiho, Hayataka, Ryuuhoo, and CruDiv 8, etc, scheduled arrive Truk July 15th. Phoned SubPac at 0115 (-9) July 11th.

No. A-2

FROM: Blank Originator
TO:

06/1350 July

INFO:

From Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet.

1. This force will sortie from Inland Sea on 10 July and arrive PT about 1400 on 15th. Request arrangements for anti-submarine patrol from 0700 on 15th. Position at 0400 on 15th will be 10-50N, 151-30E. Thence on course 180 degrees speed 24 knots until 1300 when will change course to head for North Channel.

NEGAT COMMENT: Since originator is Chief of Staff 3rd Fleet and he uses expression "Tootai" it is impossible to say for certain what units he has with him. The literal translation of "Tootai" in this spot would be "This Fleet" but obviously that phrase would give an incorrect impression since much of his fleet is already in southern waters. Suspect CarDiv 1 and CruDiv 8 are principal units concerned in this movement. Date of departure from Inland Sea probably 10th or 11th.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 10, No. A-2 (Cont.)

CI COMMENT: PT is Truk. Phoned CincPac
070825 (-9) July. Phoned ComSubPac 070830 (-9)
July.
Code group - July date confirmed as 10
July by NSS 071401.
(Original appears on p. 64 & 65 of Book for
July 6, 1943).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 11/0947 July
TO: TINOSA
POGY
STEELHEAD
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X ORDERS FOR TINOSA POGY AND STEELHEAD X

COMSUBPAC SERIAL 28 X ABOUT 3 CRUISERS 2 CARRIERS
1 AUXILIARY CARRIER SEVERAL DESTROYERS X COURSE
180 SPEED 24 KNOTS X 1900 GCT 14TH X 10-50 NORTH
151-30 EAST X

TAKE STATIONS AS FOLLOWS IN TIME TO RENDER
SUITABLE HONORS X TINOSA 10-15 NORTH 151-30 EAST,
POGY 08-40 NORTH 151-30 EAST AND STEELHEAD 08-
30 NORTH 151-30 EAST X

AVOID DETECTION IN VICINITY UNTIL AFTER CONTACT
X DON'T SHOOT EACH OTHER AND WATCH OUT FOR LAND
BASED PLANES COMMENCING BLANK X BLANK X 2200 GCT X
14TH X IF POSSIBLE FIX POSITIONS EXACTLY WITH
LANDMARKS X

IF NO SOAP AFTER WAITING 24 HOURS PROCEED TO
REGULAR AREAS

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 10 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: All consecutive serials were received. Last serial received 040840.

No. C-2

July 7

1300 (Y) Departed Submarine Base, Midway, enroute area, air escort.

July 9-13

Crossed 180th Meridian. Omitted 8 July 1943. Short daily trim dives. Fire control and gun drills conducted on surface. Running at two and three engine speeds to arrive as scheduled. Nothing sighted.

July 14

0712 (K) Arrived on station. Submerged. Calibrated magnetic compasses. Patrolling station.
1953 (K) Surfaced. Continued patrol.

July 15

0441 (K) Submerged. Maintaining periscope watch with short frequent observations.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 10, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0653 (K) Sound picked up fast screws bearing 315 T. Own course 180 T. Battle stations. Nothing in sight.
- 0657 (K) Sighted destroyer, bearing 350 T, angle on bow 10 port range 6000 yards. Visibility spotty. Six foot swells; no chop or white caps. Tracked DD at 23 knots. Changed course to close.
- 0712 (K) Carrier appeared out of haze, bearing 280 T, angle on bow 110 port. Course 210 T. Closing.
- 0714 (K) One heavy cruiser leading two carriers in column, range 9000 yards, now in sight. Speed checking 22 knots; zigzagging radically; never able to obtain closer range. Last seen with angle 180. Continued closing track looking for further contacts.
- 0720 (K) Sighted cruiser similar in appearance to YUBARI, bearing 243 T, course 154, angle on bow 85 port, range 3100 yards. Immediately thereafter target zigged away, angle on bow 170 port.
- 0728 (K) Sighted cruiser leading seaplane tender and auxiliary carrier, one DD screen on port side. Began approach on carrier, last ship, angle on bow 60 port, range 5600 yards, course 170 T.
- 0734 (T) Target zigged to 130 T. Range 3800 yards.
- 0742 (T) Fired four torpedoes. Target sighted wakes and turned away.
- 0747 (T) One very heavy depth charge, followed by several smaller explosions which sounded all around ship, as if from airplane bombs. At this time made careful search for planes. None had been and none were sighted. No other AS measures. Remained at periscope depth and watched ships go off at 180 angle on bow. Four torpedoes were considered

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 10, No. C-2 (Cont.)

ample to allow for possible errors.
With sea conditions and range my
estimate was that target would avoid
and at that range six could be avoided
as easily as four.

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

Contact Number:	1
Time and Date:	0700 (K) July 15
Long. and Lat:	10-20N 151-25E
Types:	2CV, 1ACV, 1AV, 2CA, Several DD
Course:	180
Speed:	24 knots
Remarks:	Formation zigzagging ACV & AV astern

U.S.S. POBY

Second War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio reception: See VII, Case 1, C-4.

No. C-5

July 14 - 15

Surface and submerged patrol between
East Faya and Horn Islands.

July 14

1705 Heard distant echo ranging.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 10, No. C-5 (Cont.)

1805 Sighted patrol vessel to S.E., distant 15,000 yards on northerly course.

July 15

1216 Sighted TF of 2 aircraft carriers, 1 auxiliary carrier CLs and DDs. Unable to close to firing position. Enemy speed about 25 knots. course south-southeast.

No. C-6

Contact Report

Contact Number:	4
Time and Date:	1216 (K) July 15
Long. and Lat.	8-41N 151-33E
Type:	Task Force
Est Course:	150
Initial Range:	12,000
Speed:	25 knots
How Contacted:	P
Remarks:	2CV; 1KCV plus CA's and DD's. No attack. Unable to close to firing position.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 6, C-7.

No. C-8

1000 (L) Latitude 8° - 31' N. Longitude 151° - 31'E. Made 300 foot test dive and found gasket in engine induction line leaking badly. Determined to effect repairs in the evening as they had to be made

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 10, No. C-8 (Cont.)

from the outside. The weather was rainy and overcast now and the visibility had dropped to 5 or 6 miles. At 1251 (L) Latitude 8° - 31' N. Longitude 151° - CONTACT 30' E. Sound heard screws and when (2) periscope was trained on that bearing, made out indistinctly, 2 NOGAMI class cruisers, bearing 040° T. distance six miles, angle on the bow 70° starboard. Targets were zig zagging radically and from the meagre data obtained, appeared to be making 24 knots. Commenced attack but as range was never less than 6500 yards rejected long range shot in the hope of obtaining a better target later on. But at 1310 (L) when sound heard the heavy screws of several ships bearing 270° T. Nothing could be seen in the rain squall to the westward. At 1535 (L) Latitude 8° - 30' N. Longitude 151° - 32' E. Sighted a DD bearing 300° T. distance 6 miles, zig-zagging at high speed to the northward. Could not close. 1855 (L) Latitude 8° - 22' N. 151° - 30' E. Surfaced; proceeded westward. 2100 (L) Received orders changing our area and proceeded towards PULUWAT ISLAND.

Case 11

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Chief of 09/1701 July
Staff Yokosuka)
TO:
INFO: (Marcus Island
Area Force or
Chichijima Activity)

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 11, No. A-1 (Cont.)

"Convoy #3709 (blank Maru, blank Maru, blank Maru, escort ships, blank, blank and Special Subchaser #13) at 2300 July 9 will depart Yokosuka for Truk.

Neon positions (10-20):

July 10th, 33-04 North, 139-40 East.
July 11th, 30-00 North, 139-30 East.
July 12th, 27-30 North, 141-30 East.
July 13th, 24-20 North, 140-20 East.
July 14th, 21-10 North, 140-55 East.
July 15th, blank-00 North, 141-30 East.
July 16th, 14-50 North, 142-00 East.
July 17th, 11-45 North, 143-15 East.
July 18th, 10-00 North, blank - blank East.

Blanks and more blanks. At 1200 July 20, scheduled to pass 10 miles to the southward of Point T."

BAKER COMMENT: Noon posits for 18, 19 and 20 July missing, but will be furnished promptly when recovered.

GI COMMENT: Phoned SubPac at 2120 (-9) July 10.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed 1422 (-9) 10th.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 11 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: (Chichijima 09/1035 July
Special Base Force)
TO:
INFO:

"Blanks force (consisting of blank Maru, #13
Nikyu Maru, #3 blank Maru blanks and #7 blank
Maru) departed NMA (Chichijima) for PS (Saipan)
at 0800 on 9th. Scheduled to arrive at 1600
on 15th. Escorted by blank. Noon Positions
10th to 15th:

25-03 North, 142-44 East.
23-14 North, 143-37 East.
21-23 North, 144-49 East.
19-31 North, 145-49 East.
17-34 North, 145-36 East.
15-32 North, 145-36 East.

No. A-3

FROM: 09/0900 July 43
TO: (4th Fleet)

INFO: (2nd Fleet)
(8th Fleet)
(Yokosuka CoFS)
(DF Station)
(Unit at)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 11, Ho. A-3 (Cont.)

1. Convoy number blank 703 ("A" vessels Nigitsu Maru blanks) and "B" vessel Toa Maru departs Saeki at 1400 on 7th and after passing through the following points blanks on the 13th:-(all North and East):

31-30, 134-00, 15-45, 131, 10-40, 131.

(Toa Maru?) will leave convoy at 0600 on 10th in posit 20-55 N, 134-00 E, and proceed alone, arriving at Truk northeast pass at 1500 on 14th after passing through following posits:

11-35, 142-40, 9-35, 150-15.

Unikaze blanks escort as far as 29N.

2. Noon posits of "A" vessels (8th to 12th):
(All North and East):

- (8) 29-35, 134-00.
- (9) 24-35, 134-00.
- (10) 19-35, 134-00.
- (11) 15-45, 131-00.
- (12) 10-40, 131-00.

"B" vessels (after leaving convoy, from 10th to 14th):

- (10) 19-50, 134-55.
- (11) 16-05, 138-35.
- (12) 12-10, 142-10.
- (13) 10-30, 146-15.
- (14) 10-10, 151-20.

3. Blanks Nigitsu Maru carries ordnance ammunition, and blanks Toa Maru carries blank 0000 tons of heavy oil.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 11, No. A-3 (Cont.)

4. Supply blanks heavy oil: 500 tons, fresh water: 1500 tons.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0255 (I) 11th.

No. A-4

FROM:

TO:

(4th Fleet)

09/0900 July

INFO:

*Including Tooa Maru noon posits 10th to 14th.

10th, 19-50 North, 134-55 East.

11th, blank-05 North, blank - blank East.

12th, 12-10 North, 142-10 East.

13th, 10-30 North, 146-55 East.

14th, 08-10 North, 151-20 East.

GI COMMENT: NSS 101421 reported above posits with variations for 13th and 14th. Above positions are much more likely. Phoned SubPac at 1840 (-9) July 11th.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1945

Case 11 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBSPAC 11/1039 July
TO: ALL SUBS NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOLLOWING ADDITION INFO ON MY 26-A FOR SEARAVEN
AND HADDOCK X WATCH OUT FOR EACH OTHER X

COMSUBSPAC ULTRA SERIAL 27 X PECAN X BLANK X
BLANK X MINUS 900 X MINUS 1 X VRRJ 1055
(21-10N 149-55E) ALGAROBIA PSEQ 0300 (18-00N
141-30E) WZEE 5000 (14-50N 142-00E) UJUF 4515
(11-45N 143-15E) X

FOR GURNARD PECAN X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 X
MINUS 4 FBBA 4500 (15-45N 131-00E) ALGAROBIA
GCCSA 4000 (10-40N 131-00E) THENCE TO THE RAMPARTS
YOU WATCH X

ANOTHER FOR CASSEDY AND DAVENPORT 6 FOPLARS
(MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) 1 LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X
BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 X MINUS 3 X VRPK 2349
(21-23N 144-49E) OFKT 3149 (19-31N 145-49E)
PEKT 3436 (17-34N 145-36E) FEKT 3236 (15-32N
145-36E) X PHIL ROSS CAN HAVE FOLLOWING BUT DO
NOT PURSUE OR ATTACK EAST OF XL EITHER 072 OR 264
POPCORN X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 X MINUS 3 X
LEER 1010 (12-10N 142-10E) ALGAROBIA GCHS 3015
(10-30N 146-15E) GCDU 1021 (10-10N 151-21E)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBSPAC 12/0917 July
TO: ALL SUBS ON
NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 11, No. B-2 (Cont.)

ULTRA TO SUBS CONCERNED SERIAL 32 X PHIL ROSS
CORRECT MY SERIAL 27 TO READ 264 POPCORN BLANK
BLANK MINUS 900 (0300) MINUS 3 (12TH) LRHR 1010
(12-10N 142-10E) ALGAROA GCHS 3055 (10-30N
146-55E) DXDU 1020 (8-10N 151-20E) X

MY NUMBER 28 IS VERY IMPORTANT TO TINOSA POGY
AND STEELHEAD X GO EASY ON YOUR LUBE OIL
CASSEDY X EXPECT WE MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP YOU
BUSY FOR THE REMAINDER YOUR PATROL X NOTE THAT
AREA TO NORTHEAST OF YOU IS BEING ASSIGNED
SPEARFISH X

FOR PORPOISE WE ARE UNABLE DECODE YOUR 101335 X
BLUE SPEARFISH X MINGO WHEN YOU FINISH WITH
OTHER JOBS SERIAL 7 OR 16 HEAD WEST AND TAKE
AREA 10 NORTHWEST WHICH IS NOW VACANT X MORE
DOPE LATER X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Searaven

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 9, C-4.

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-2

Radio Reception: Radio Reception during this
patrol was consistent with that
experienced on previous patrols.
While in the area it was not

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

possible to copy NFM on 16.69 KC.
The higher frequencies came in
well, however, particularly
8230 KC.

No. C-3

July 6

Crossed International Date Line.

July 12

Increased speed to two engines.
Throughout Japanese waters maintained
continuous periscope watch whenever
on the surface.

July 13

Arrived off Pagan Island, Mariana Group,
commenced patrolling the area 6 miles
bearing 215 T from Pagan Island.

July 14

Submerged patrol off Pagan Island, high
periscope observation.

July 15

Submerged patrol off Pagan Island, High
periscope observation.
1900 (X) Surfaced, set course for Palau.
Nothing sighted during the two day
patrol in this area.

U.S.S. Gurnard

Second War Patrol

No. C-4

See VII, Case 4, C-2.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 11 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Halibut

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio reception: See VII, Case 1, C-1.

No. C-6

July 11 - 12

Uneventful. Conducted submerged patrol northwest of Truk. Majority of crew was still feeling effects of food poisoning.

July 13

Surface patrol northwest of Truk.

July 14

Conducted submerged patrol. Upon surfacing, headed north towards new area. The crew was back in normal health with the exception of two men who were still unable to keep any food down.

July 15

0445 (K) Submerged, conducting patrol enroute area.
1940 (K) Surfaced.
2100 (K) Entered area.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 12

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ (Yokosuka Coas) 10/0903 July
TO: _____ (#2 Escort
Unit)
_____ (Comdr,
Cinc or C.O.)
_____ (Comdr Saipan
Activity)
_____ (Comdr Chichijima
Activity)
INFO: _____ (Garble)
_____ (11th Air Fleet)

*Goshu Maru and blank departed NAA (Yokosuka)
0900 on the 10th (many blanks):

32-38 North, 143-22 East.
28-51 North, 145-39 East.
25-29 North, 149-32 East.
22-29 North, 152-53 East.
18-56 North, 155-14 East.

NEGAT COMMENT: Although message appears to be
a two parter last position is only about half way
to Jaluit where assume ships must be bound.
Must be some more somewhere.

GI COMMENT: Phoned Subpac at 1850 (-9) July 11th.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS ON
BFM FOX

11/1954 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 12, No. B-1 (Cont.)

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS MAY INTEREST FRANK WATKINS X ULTRA X SUBPAC
SERIAL 29 B X PECAN INCLUDING 049 POPCORN X
BLANK BLANK MINUS 900 MINUS 3 (COURSE UNKNOWN
SPEED UNKNOWN TIME 0300 DATE 12) QBEK 5139
(28-51N 145-39E) ALGARORA TIME 2932 (25-29N 149-32E)
RCCF 2953 (22-29N 152-53E)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX

12/0833

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUBPAC COMMANDER SENDS ULTRA SERIAL 30 X ORDERS
FOR SPEARFISH 049 POPCORN AND SEVERAL POPLARS
(MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) BLANK (COURSE BLANK
(SPEED) -900 (TIME 0300 GCT) -1 (DATE 14TH) RCCF
(POSIT 22-29 NORTH 152-53 EAST) ALGARORA PSAR
(18-56 NORTH 155-14 EAST) X

RENDER SUITABLE HONORS AND THEN PATROL AREA
BETWEEN PS (18 DEG NORTH) AND KC (23 DEG NORTH)
AND BETWEEN JA (150 DEG EAST) AND AR (155 DEG
EAST) X

OTHER SUBS WILL PASS THROUGH THIS AREA X ATTACK
NO OTHER SUBMARINES UNLESS ENEMY IDENTIFY CERTAIN X
DEPART THIS AREA AT NORTHEAST CORNER NOT LATER THAN
SUNSET 28 JULY AND STEER RHUMB LINE TO MIDWAY

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 12 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 9, C-1 - C-3.

U.S.S. Searfish

Seventh War Patrol
(5 June - 1 August)

No. C-2

Radio Reception: The reception was good at all times.

No. C-3

July 14

Enroute on surface, made dive at dawn
for trim.

July 15

Enroute on surface, made dive at dawn
for trim.

0713 (X) On station, patrolling on surface.

July 16 - 27

Patrolling on surface, made trim dives
at dawn, No Contacts.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 12 (Cont.)

No. C-4

Description of Contact

Number: 9
Date and Time: July 13 - 1635 (L)
Lat. and Long: 11-12N 161-50E
Type: DD
Remarks: Fired 3 torpedoes
No hits.

Case 13

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: Blank Originator 12/1930 July
TO: (Yokosuka Naval
District Commander)

INFO:

(1st Section
N.G.S.)
(Buero)
(Empire Military
Stores Section)

*From Captain of Otaka I will depart
Sasabo at 0800 on 15th with Otaka and
- unident ship}. Scheduled to arrive
- Shibaaura?} at 1200 on 17th.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 13, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Will take following route:

At 1500 in 31-13 N, 130-10 E.
At 2100 in 30-10 N, 130-52 E.
At 1200 on 16th in 30 N, 136 E.
At 0500 on 17th in 34 N, 138-38 E.

Speed about 17 knots. Request anti-submarine sweep be made on the evening of 15th in the Tanegashima Island area and in early morning of 17th to eastward of Zenisu."

NEGAT COMMENT: Tanegashima is southeast of Kyushu. Zenisu is in approximately 33-55 N, 138-50 E.

Phoned to ComSubPacFor at 130830 (-9) July.

GI COMMENT: Negat 102005 version unknown originator 101128 July "Please make arrangements for loading on Otaka about 100 additional personnel for Surabaya at both Kure and Sasebo".

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: STURGEON
POMPAO
SAWFISH
SKIPJACK

13/0739 July

INFO: - - - - -

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 13, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA SERIAL 35F X DON'T SHOOT EACH OTHER X

026 PEANUT AND 1 MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN) X BLANK
(COURSE) X ABOUT PLUS 7 (SPEED 17 KNOTS) X
MINUS 600 (TIME 0600 GCT) X ZERO (JULY 15TH) X
FG YL 13 10 (POSITION 31-13 NORTH 130-10 EAST) X
BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X ZERO (1200 GCT) X
ZERO (JULY 15TH) X DG YL 1052 (POSITION 30-10 NORTH
130-52 EAST) X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X
MINUS 900 (0300 GCT) X PLUS 1 (JULY 16TH) X DG SN
(POSITION 30 NORTH 136 EAST) X BLANK (COURSE) X
BLANK (SPEED) X PLUS 800 (2000 GCT) X PLUS 1
(JULY 16TH) X GS UX 00 38 (POSITION 34-00 NORTH
138-38 EAST) X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio Reception was on the
average good. No serials were
missed.

No. C-2

July 14 - 17

Patrolling to the southward of Kii
Suido and Shiono Misaki, nothing sighted.
From the 15th to the 17th the wind
became increasingly strong from the
southeast.....

U.S.S. Pompano

Sixth War Patrol

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 13 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Radio Reception: NFM reception was good though Subpac serials 15 and 55 were missed. (page 17)

No. C-4

July 15

- 0138 (I) 33-59N, 136-38E, sighted patrol boat on horizon 9,000 yards.
- 0540 (I) 33-59N, 136-42E, sighted smoke and 2 low land planes. Started approach, made out 2 ships under 4,000 tons. Unable to attain attack position.
- 0750 (I) 34-01N, 136-39E, sighted 2 subchasers type patrol boats patrolling down coast. 4 1/2 hours later sighted same boats patrolling in line up coast.
- 1440 (I) 33-50, 136-40E, sighted smoke, closed and identified as 2,000 ton Freighter not worth expenditure of last two torpedoes.
- 1920 (I) 34-01 N, 136-39 E, sighted medium bomber low.
- 2219 (I) Received Comsubpac serial 42 Blue authorizing 5 day extension in area.

July 17

- 2000 (I) 33-03 N, 137-35 E, sighted light, closed and identified a good sized sampan with all lights on tending nets. Made battle surface and destroyed with gunfire. Attack #6.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 13 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Sawfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Last serial received; 41 Able.

No. C-6

July 12

0945 (L) Plane contact by radar at 3 miles in Lat 31° - 20N Long 159-27E. Plane not sighted. Dove to 150 ft. Surfaced at 1103 (L).

July 14

0215 (K) Sighted Sampan in Lat 31-10N Long 147-00E.

July 15

0830 (K) In Lat 30-59N Long 140-24E made radar contact on plane at 10 miles closing. Dove to 100 feet. Checked all torpedoes while submerged. Ran periscope patrol until 1300 (K) when we surfaced.

1310 (K) Plane contact on radar at 20 miles, closed to 16 miles then faded out. Did not dive. Lat 30-56N Long 140-12E.

NOTE: No entries in action report for July 16, 17, 18.

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: Last serial received 69 Tare August. Last serial sent 182101 August. Radio reception throughout the patrol was excellent. 163

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 13 (Cont.)

No. C-8

July 13

2330 (K) Received ComTaskFor 17 Serial 130719 of July modifying operation order. SKIPJACK ordered to new patrol area.

July 14

0000 (K) Departed standard routing; set course for Area 4 at three engine speed.

1119 (K) Submerged upon sighting patrol (Par. G-1). Do not believe we were sighted.

1150 (K) Surfaced; continued at 3 engine speed.

July 16

0440 (I) Sighted two patrol boats 7 miles ahead (Par. F-1). Submerged to avoid detection. Patrol boats not picked up by periscope.

0651 (I) Surfaced. No. 1 engine out of commission due to flooding and subsequent damage.

1203 (I) Entered Area at Lat. 34-00; Long 140-52E.

1405 (I) Submerged. 61 miles bearing 158(T) from NOJIMA SAKI

1829 (I) Sighted MINURA SHIMA bearing 258 (T) - 25 miles.

2017 (I) Surfaced. Very bright moonlight.

2033 (I) Passed a small open boat close aboard Lat. 33-53; Long 140-01. No signs of life aboard. Resembled an ordinary steamer lifeboat.

2325 (I) Sighted ship bearing 233 (T) distance 6 miles on an easterly course (Par. F-2). We had been sighted, as the target, a small tanker with usual escort, changed course to northward to pass west of MINURA SHIMA.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 13, No. C-8 (Cont.)

July 17

In very poor position, astern and up moon, in restricted waters, pursuing target making 12 knots with only three engines available, 15.5 knots. They can see us continuously and change course frequently to keep a 180° track.

- 0040 (I) Range 3300 yards - astern of target. Do not consider torpedo expenditure advisable under such circumstances. With bright moonlight giving almost daylight visibility torpedoes could be sighted and easily avoided. Escort swung around to close but would not leave his convoy very far.
- 0052 (I) Sighted two additional patrol vessels heading down from the direction of MIYAMI SHIMA (Par F-3). Assistance is not long in arriving in this locality.
- 0058 (I) Due to lack of knowledge of targets destination, and general unfavorable conditions, decided to break off and proceed to desired position for daylight submerged patrol. Set southwesterly course and shook off patrol at 15.5 knots.
- 0145 (I) Sighted patrol boat bearing 230 T distance approximately 4 miles (Par. F-4). Maneuvered and passed around him down moon.
- 0225 (I) Sighted another patrol boat bearing 225 T, 4 miles (Par. F-5). Avoided.
- 0334 (I) Submerged south of ZENISU on a westerly course.
- 2020 (I) Surfaced. Fix placed us considerably south of Area.

July 18

Patrolling West of IZU SHOTO.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 13 (Cont.)

No. C-9

Description of Contacts

No: 3
Date and Time: 17 July - 0052 (I)
Lat. and Long: 33-59 - 139-25
Types: 2 Patrol ships
Initial Range: 5 mi. 350 T
Course Speed: 170 Unknown
How Contacted: Lookout
Remarks: Apparently called in to help #2 contact.

No: 4
Date and Time: 17 July - 0145 (I)
Lat. and Long: 33-47 - 139-12
Types: 1 Patrol Boat
Initial Range: 4 miles 230T
Course Speed: Unknown - 10
How Contacted: Lookout
Remarks: Avoided on surface.

No: 5
Date and Time: 17 July - 0223 (I)
Lat. and Long: 33-48 - 139-05
Types: 1 Patrol Boat
Initial Range: 4 miles 225T
Course Speed: Various - 10
How Contacted: Lookout
Remarks: Avoided on surface.

Case 14

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

05/0635 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 14, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: (4th Military
Stores Section) (B)

(Makin Detachment) (B)

(Kwajalein Military
Stores Section) (B)

"This ship's (Honkan) schedule:

1.	PLACE	ARRIVE	DEPART
	Blank	Blank	7th
	Jaluit	8th	Blank
	Makin	Blank	9th
	Tarawa	10th	11th
	Blank	12th	12th (?)
	Blank	13th	13th
	Kwajalein	15th	Blank

2. Noon Positions:
Blank 08-23 North, 177-blank East.
11th 01-10 North, 172-blank East.
Blanks
15th 08-00 North, 167-26 East.

3. Cargo:
Meat blank tons.
Blank 17 tons.
Miscellaneous 24 tons."

GI COMMENT: Given to Subs at 1715 (I) 13th July.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: S-38
INFO: CINCPCAC

13/1037 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 14, No. B-1 (Cont.)

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

DOUG REYNES AND HIS S-38 GETS COMSUBPAC ULTRA
SERIAL 39 FOR PARTING SHOT AND IS AUTHORIZED
DELAY DEPARTURE FROM AREA 1 DAY PROVIDED FUEL
PERMITS X 1 BEECH (FREIGHTER) BLANK BLANK MINUS
90 DKPE 0026 (08-00 NORTH; 167-26 EAST) X

ENROUTE KWAJALEIN ARRIVING THAT DAY

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. S-38

Ninth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was good. Last
SubPac serial received 57.

No. C-2

July 15

- 0505 (L) Submerged. Patrolling Southern approaches
to Kwajalein.....
- 1847 (L) Surfaced and set course to clear area
in accordance with operation order, as
modified by dispatch.
- 2300 (L) Cleared area to South of us after
cutting across Northwest corner. The
dispatch which extended our patrol was
interpreted as allowing this deviation
from our scheduled routing.

July 16

- 0312 (L) Sent dispatch 151222 to ComSubPac
regarding attack on freighter.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 14, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0512 (L) Submerged. About 500 miles to go
to Nauru.
1230 (L) Surfaced.
1811 (L) Made trim dive.

Case 15

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

14/1022 July

TO:

INFO:

(Maru)
(4th Civil
Engineering Section
Chief)

"1. Convoy "FU 406" consisting of "A" vessels
blanks Ryuyo Maru, Umekawa Maru, and Taka Maru
(all bound for Ujina) and B vessel Yamafuku Maru?
bound for - unident place), escorted by
- unident ship) as far as 10 degrees
North, departed at 0830 on 14th. Speed 9 knots.
Will pass through following points and arrive
Hayasui Seto at 1200 on 22nd: Point A. 10 North,
134-10 E.
Point B. 20N, 134-30 E.
Point C. 25N, 134-30 E.
Point D. 30-N, 134 E.

2. Noon positions 15th to 21st:
10-50 N, 134-30 E.
14-05 N, 134-30 E.
17-20 N, 134-30 E.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 15, No. A-1 (Cont.)

20-30 N, 134-25 E.
23-45 N, 133-40 E.
26-02 N, 133-40 E.
30 N, 134 E.

3. Principal cargo: Blanks. 88 passengers.
78 bags of mail."

(MSS-14/1741-July)

No. A-2

FROM:

14/1032 July

TO:

INFO:

"1. FU 406 Convoy: "A" group (all for Ujina)
unident, unident, Ryuyo Maru
, Unakawa Maru, Taka Maru; "B" group
(for blank - _____ as far as the 10 degree
North Latitude line. Departing blank
at 0830 the 14th. Speed 9 knots.
Point A, 10-00 N, 134-10 E.
Point B, 20-00 N, 134-2(30) E.
Point C, 25-00 N, 133-30 E.
Point D, 30-00 N, 134-00 E.

Going by way of these points expect to arrive
Hayasui Seto at 1200 on the 22nd.

2. Heon positions: (15th to 21st);

10-50 N, 134-30 E.
14-05 N, 134-30 E.
17-20 N, 134-30 E.
20-? N, 134-? E.
23-? N, ?-? E.
26-55 N, 133-40 E.
30-00 N, 134-00 E.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15, No. A-2 (Cont.)

3. Principal cargo: The Yamafuku Maru has blank 88 tons of bauxite (bauxite) and 88 passengers. Also 78 bags of mail"

(July 14 '43-DI)

GI COMMENT: Received in Negat 141741 July.
Phoned ComSubPac at 1800 (-9)
15 July.

No. A-3

FROM:
TO:

13/1617 July

(Chichijima
Special Base
Force)
(Yokosuka Naval
District Comdr)
(Yokosuka Defense
Force Unit)

INFO:

(Chief Transportation
Section, Tokyo)
(Yokosuka Local Trans
Section)
(1st Section Nav
Gen Staff)
(2nd Fleet)
(4th Fleet)

"Convoy blanks will arrive NAA at 0600 the
25th. Noon positions 14th through 24th:

08-27 North, 148-22 East.
11-33 North, blanks-30 East.
14-45 North, 145-52 East.
17-17 North, 145-32 East.
18-54 North, 142-04 East.
-10 North, 140-40 East.
23- North, 138-58 East.
26-24 North, 138-58 East.
29-10 North, 138-58 East.
31-56 North, 138-44 East.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15, No. A-3 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0545 (-9)
Posit for 24th missing in text above.
NAA is Yokosuka.

No. A-4

FROM:
TO:
INFO:

15/1330 July

*Blank ship departs Kwajalein at 1200 the 15th,
expects to arrive Yokosuka blank hours the 25th.
Neen positions:

16th - 10-30 North, 164-15 East.
17th - 11-05 North, 160-45 East.
18th - 14-05 North, 158-15 East.
19th - 17-10 North, 155-50 East.
20th - 20-05 North, 153-10 East.
21st - 23-10 North, 150-20 East.
22nd - 26-13 North, 147-43 East.
23rd - 29-52 North, 145-50 East.
24th - 32-08 North, 141-58 East.

HYPO COMMENT: Improved version of message
sent in HYPO 152132 which also had incorrect
originator date time group.

GI COMMENT: Phoned SubPac 1115 (-9) July 17.
CORRECTED COPY - ORIGINAL NOT REMOVED

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15 (Cont.)

No. A-5

FROM:
TO:
INFO:

15/1300 July

*Fragment. These believed to be noon positions
of a convoy:

16th - 10-30 North, 164-15 East.
17th - 11-05 North, 160-45 East.
18th - 14-05 North, 158-15 East.
19th - 17-10 North, 155-50 East.
20th - blank -05 North, 153-10 East.

COMMENT: HYPO continues to work.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0520 (-9).
Plot indicates 20-05 North for posit on 20th.

B - Operational Disatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
INFO: NFM FOX
CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

16/0711 July

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 15, No. B-1 (Cont.)

HERE COMES ULTRA 45 X FOR HADDOCK IF ANYWHERE
CLOSE X PECAN X COURSE BLANK X SPEED BLANK X
TIME MINUS 900 (0300) X DATE PLUS 1 (16TH)
X BFLQ 0530 (14-05 NORTH 134-30 EAST) ALGAROA
JTLQ 2030 (17-20 NORTH 134-30 EAST) X

STURGEON NOTE SAME PECAN X COURSE BLANK X SPEED
BLANK X TIME MINUS 900 (0300) X DATE PLUS 6
(21ST) KCLQ (30 NORTH 134 EAST) X DURING NEXT
FEW DAYS THRESHER HEADING EAST IS SCHEDULED
USE LANE THROUGH AREA 14 X

HADDOCK SPEARFISH AND SEARAVEN MAY SEE HER X
FOR SPEARFISH AND POSSIBLY SEARAVEN X PECAN X
COURSE BLANK X SPEED BLANK X TIME MINUS 900
(300) X DATE PLUS 2 (17TH) WBTU 0545 (11-05
NORTH 160-45 EAST) ALGAROA BFNQ 0515 (14-05
NORTH 158-15 EAST) JTKM 1050 (17-10 NORTH 155-50
EAST) WQZK 0510 (20-05 NORTH 153-10 EAST) X

ANOTHER PECAN FOR SEARAVEN AND HALIBUT X
COURSE BLANK X SPEED BLANK X TIME MINUS 900
(0300) X DATE PLUS 1 (16TH) X BFMQ 4532 (14-45
NORTH 145-32 EAST) JTMQ 1752 (17-17 NORTH
145-52 EAST) UFSD 5404 OR 5440 (18-54 NORTH
142-04 or 142-40 EAST) FLMA 1032 (21-10 NORTH
140-32 EAST)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: CINEPAC
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: - - - - -
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

16/0912 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15. No. B-2 (Cont.)

FOR INFORMATION AND POSSIBLE ACTION KINGFISH
SEARAVEN AND SPEARFISH ULTRA X

PECAN COURSE BLANK SPEED BLANK X 0300 GCT X
18TH ZHQQ 2340 (22-23 N 150-40 E) ALGAROBA
DDVQ 0510 (19-05 N 152-10 E) 0005
(16-00 N 154-05 E) X

ABOVE DATES POSSIBLY 1 DAY WRONG X

IF ROSS AND CASSEY LET IT GET THIS FAR
ANOTHER PECAN FOR SKIPJACK AND MAYBE KINGFISH
IF IN VICINITY X COURSE BLANK SPEED BLANK X
0300 X 20TH X 4558 (23-45 N 138-58 E)
ALGAROBA 2458 (26-24 N 138-58 E) LSHV
1058 (29-10 N 138-58 E) 5644 (31-56 N
138-44 E) X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 46 K

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 11, C-2

No. C-2

July 15

Submerged patrol off Pagan Island,
high periscope observation.
1900 (K) Surfaced, set course for Palau.
Nothing sighted during the two-day patrol
in this area.

July 18

Entered area at Latitude 11°-11'N
Longitude 137°-07'E.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 18 (Cont.)

2000 (I) Set course to patrol north of Palau at Latitude 18° N, Longitude 134° E to cover shipping lanes from Empire.

U.S.S. Sturgen

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Radio Reception was on the average good. No serials were missed.

No. C-4

July 19

We cannot be very far from the center of a typhoon. The seas are mountainous...

July 20-22

Patrolling to southward of our area. Nothing seen.

July 23

Heavy seas and strong winds from the southeast.

U.S.S. Spearfish

Seventh War Patrol
(5 June - 1 August)

No. C-5

See VII, Case 12, C-2 - C-4.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 15 (Cont.)

No. C-6

July 16

2200

Decided to move on to eastward. Have 2200 gallons lube oil remaining. Sent SEARAVEN serial two to ComSubPac stating "SEARAVEN leaving area at Lat. 21 N Long 146 E and will patrol between Long 151 E and 152 E north of Lat 21 N from the eighteenth through the twenty-first of July". Estimate six hundred gallons reserve lube oil in excess remain on board.

July 17

Raining and squally.

July 18

1511

Rainy and squally. Commenced patrolling on course 338 and reverse. Our position Lat. 21-29 N Long. 151-10E.

2043

Visibility much better.

July 19

1940

Patrolling on 338 - 158. Moved over to eastward.

July 20

Patrolled on course 328 and reverse.

U.S.S. Halibut

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 1, C-1.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15 (Cont.)

No. C-8
July 16

0035 Sighted Rota.
0105 Sighted Guam.
0450 Submerged, turned south heading for Port Apra.
1210 Sighted small patrol vessel, patrolling outside of Port Apra (contact #11).
1215 Sighted two large freighters in Port Apra (Contact 12).
1938 Surfaced. Patrolled Empire-Guam track during night.

July 18

0502 Submerged. Weather still stormy.
0935 Within sight of Port Apra. The two freighters were still there. These may have been the same two freighters which the Tunny reported upon leaving this area. Took bearing from different positions to determine their location and found them to be practically on the reef in the far northeast corner of the harbor. Their continued presence in Port Apra may indicate that they are damaged ships which have been beached.
1941 Surfaced. Turned south planning to pass around south end of Guam and then head for our departure point.

July 21

1800 Departed area enroute Midway.

No. C-9

Description of Contact

Number: 11
Date and Time: July 16 - 1210 (K)
Lat. and Long: 13-28N - 144-37E
Type: Small Patrol Vessel

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 15, No. C-9 (Cont.)

Initial Range:	9,000
Est. Course:	Various
Speed:	8 Knots
How Contacted:	P
Remarks:	Patrolling off Port Apra

U.S.S. Kingfish

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-10

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete.

No. C-11

July 20

1300 (K) Submerged for 15 minute trim dive.
Sea condition 3, wind from SE force 3.
Noon Lat. 23-51N, Long. 145-47E. Fuel
used 1661, miles 216.

July 21

Weather rainy and heavy swells from SW.
Noon Lat. 23-19N, Long. 142-02E. Fuel
used 1671, miles 233.

July 22

1440 (I) Submerged for two hours to routine
torpedoes. Held fire control drills.
Weather rainy and heavy swells from SW.
Noon Lat. 21-55N, Long. 138-01E. Fuel
used 1615, miles 240.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Skipjack
Seventh War Patrol

No. C-12

Radio Reception: Last serial received 69
Tare August.
Last serial sent 182101 August.
Radio reception throughout the
patrol was excellent.

No. C-13

July 22

- 0120 (I) Sighted small boat 4 miles NW of
IMABA SHIMA.
- 0612 (I) Sighted first of several patrol boats
or fishing vessels in vicinity of
ZENISU (Par. F-6)
- 2104 (I) Radar contact (Par. F-7) bearing 255 (T)
12,700 yds. Developed into a merchantman
and two escorts astern, zigzagging
radically, approximate base course 030T.
Went to battle stations and maneuvered
for surface attack.
- 2143 (I) Target zigged, presenting zero angle
on the bow, range about 5500 yds. Could
not tell if we were sighted. Headed
directly away to await developments.
- 2150 (I) Target zigged about 90° left, leaving
us rapidly. Headed about to close the
range expecting to fire on next zig.
- 2206.10 Fired first torpedo on 122 track, range
2950 yds.
- .30 Fired second torpedo.
- .41 Fired third torpedo.
- .52 Fired fourth torpedo. Spread used
covered 160% of target length
- 2207 (I) Turned away and hauled clear of
immediate vicinity.
- 2209 (I) Target turning away.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15. No. C-13 (Cont.)

July 22 (Cont.)

- 2209.41 Torpedo explosion. Target sheered back to right presenting approximately 100° starboard angle on bow. This apparently was the left (fourth) torpedo, after a 4200 yard run.
- 2211 (I) Depth charging in target's vicinity. Target and one escort commenced shooting at something - not us.
- 2213 (I) Several more depth charges.
- 2218 (I) Range 9100 yds., slowed to 6 knots to remain in vicinity and observe.
- 2223 (I) One escort sighted bearing 030 T closing at high speed. Went to full power. Although escort closed to 3600 yds and was still closing slowly at
- 2234 (I) He pulled clear to the west and abandoned chase. Slowed and resumed battery charge. This escort dropped about one depth charge every minute during this chase. He may have run out of charges.

July 23

- Patrolled western side of area during day.
- 1005 (I) Sighted plane (Par. G-2) bearing 023 T distance 2 miles.
- 2145 (I) Sighted patrol vessel (Par. F-3) on westerly course bearing 045 T 3 miles. Maneuvered to avoid detection on surface.
- 2204 (I) Lost contact with patrol vessel.

July 24

Standing in direction of O'SHIMA from southwest, proceeding to desired patrol station off TO SHIMA.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15. No. C-13 (Cont.)

July 24 (Cont.)

- 0205 (I) Sighted lights of sampans bearing
060 T (Par F-9).
0238 (I) Submerged to avoid detection.
Continuous periscope observations of
sampans until sunrise.
0440 (I) First of about one dozen distant depth
charges or bombs.
0450 (I) Sighted two (2) float type monoplanes
bearing 068 T, 2 miles, on southwesterly
course and low (Par G-3).
0512 (I) Sighted patrol boat bearing 068 T 4 miles
on southerly course. (Par. F-10)
0520 (I) Patrol boat no longer in sight.
0559 (I) Sighted one plane of type previously
sighted. (Par. G-4).
0605.
0609.
0612- Three more depth bombs becoming
increasingly closer.
0615 (I) Sound reported fast screws coming in
from south. Went deep. There followed
nine (9) depth charges none very close.
0907 (I) Periscope depth. All clear. Sat
course toward O'SHIMA. Sighted a half
dozen sampans in the neighborhood of
O'SHIMA and TO SHIMA during the day,
most of which had a Rising Sun insignia
on their bows.

July 25

Patrolling TRUK-TOKYO traffic routes.
Upon surfacing determined average drift
to be 2.9 knots, setting 055 T, while
submerged during daylight.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 15 (Cont.)

No. C-14

Description of Contacts

Number:	6
Time and Date:	Daylight - July 22
Lat. and Long.	33-52 - 138-45
Types:	3 Patrol boats or fishermen
Initial Range:	4-6 miles
Course and Speed:	Various - 15 knots
How Contacted:	Periscope
Remarks:	One resembled net tender.
Number:	7
Time and Date:	2104 (I) - July 22
Lat. and Long.	34-12 - 138-31
Types:	1 AK 2 escorts
Initial Range:	12,700
Course and Speed:	255 T
How Contacted:	Zig-zag - 050/12 K
Remarks:	ST Radar Attacked with four torpedoes
Number:	8
Time and Date:	2146 (I) - July 23
Lat. and Long.	34-10 - 138-49
Types:	1 Patrol ship
Initial Range:	3 miles 045 T
Course and Speed:	Patrolling/270
How contacted:	Lookout
Remarks:	Avoided on surface

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 15, No. C-14 (Cont.)

Number: 9
Time and Date: 0205 (I) - July 24
Lat. and Long: 34-21 - 138-56
Types: 3 sampans
Initial Range: 4 miles - 055 T
Course and Speed: 050/ 2 knots
How Contacted: Lookout
Remarks: Lighted at Night

Number: 10
Time and Date: 0512 (I) - July 24
Lat. and Long: 34-34 - 139-05
Types: 1 patrol ship
Initial Range: 4 miles - 008T
Course and Speed: 170/10
How Contacted: Periscope
Remarks: - - - - -

Case 16

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 15/2021 July
TO:

(Nauru Air
Base)

INFO:

"Isuzu (- unident ship) blank
will depart Truk at 0700, 16th and arrive at a
point bearing 315 degrees from Nauru Island
distant 60 miles at 0600, 19th and will arrive
Nauru at 0900. Request appropriate anti-
submarine measures be carried out."

GI COMMENT: Phoned to ComSubPacFor at July
161615 (-9).

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 16 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM:

150922 July

TO:

(Wake Air
Base)

(Nauru Air
Base)

INFO: (CofS Yokosuka)

1. The blank KAWA Maru (escorted by unidentified ship) is scheduled to depart from PT at 0800, 15th, and arrive RYC at 1000, 20th. Noon positions (15th through 19th):

15th - 07-43 North, 152-10 East.
16th - 06-10 North, 155-24 East.
17th - 04-21 North, 158-39 East.
18th - 02-32 North, 161-14 East.
19th - 01-12 North, 164-10 East.

2. Entering course: From position 01-12 North, 166-55 East, steer 180°.

NEGAT COMMENT: Not so sure of last two noon positions. Also message says course 18° in Para. 2, but inasmuch as the position given in this paragraph is good and lies due North of Nauru we read "180°".

GI COMMENT: PT is Truk. RYC is Nauru. Informed ComSubPacFor at 1005 (-9).

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 16 (Cont.)

B - Operational Distatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 16/1830 July
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

S 38 GETS THIS ULTRA X 1 POPLAR (MERCHANTMAN
TYPE UNKNOWN) X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED)
X -900 (TIME 0300) X PLUS 3 (DATE 18TH) KFPA
3214 (02-32 NORTH 161-14 EAST) ALGEROBA KFRL
0010 (02-00 NORTH 164-10 EAST) AND THEN 1230
(01-12 NORTH 161-30 EAST) X BLANK (COURSE) X
BLANK (SPEED) X BLANK (TIME) UPON REACHING
WRZD 1255 (01-12 NORTH 166-55 EAST) X

ALSO 046 PEANUT AND 1 HICKORY (MAN OF WAR TYPE
UNKNOWN) (COURSE 135 DEGREES) X PLUS
10 (SPEED 20 KNOTS) X PLUS 900 (TIME 2100) X
PLUS 3 (DATE 18TH) SMZD 1013 (00-10 NORTH
166-13 EAST)

No. B-2

FROM: CTF 72 17/0027 July
TO: COM 3RD FLEET
INFO: RDO NOUMEA TO
CINCPAC FOR INFO
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

HAVE ULTRA INFORMATION INDICATING S 38 CAN BE
USEFULLY EMPLOYED VICINITY NAURU UNTIL JULY 20TH
X REQUEST AUTHORITY DELAY HIS ARRIVAL ESPRITU
2 DAYS IN ORDER SO EMPLOY HIM X THIS MOST SECRET

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 16 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. S-38

Ninth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was good. Two serials from ComTask For 72 were missed as a result of misinterpretation on our part. At 1145 GCT the 17th, we received ComSubPac's 161830. Last SubPac serial received - 57.

No. C-2

July 17

2245 (L) Received ComSubPac 161830 (no serial) authorizing us to spend an extra day or so North of the equator. Changed course to Westward. Present position 1-37N, 166-04E.

No. C-2

July 18

0530 (L) Submerged.

2200 (L)patrolling chosen station.
(Lat. 1-44N, 165-15E).

July 19

0533 (L) Submerged. Nothing sighted all night.
.....

July 20

0533 (L) Submerged, 100 miles northwest of Nauru.

July 21

0045 (L)Now 40 miles from Nauru.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 16, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

- 0145 (L)Inspection revealed that star-board motor will require at least 12 hours for emergency repairs.....
0230 (L) Received CTF 72 dispatch 201203.
.....
2110 (L) Sent dispatch 210938 to CTF 72 telling of having bypassed Nauru due to motor failures.....
2111 (L) Set course for Nauru.

July 22

- 0040 (L) Received CTF 72 21246 (no serial).....
0311 (L) Sighted Nauru bearing 083 degrees T.....
0510 (L) Submerged 12 miles northwest of Nauru.
.....
0655 (L) ...Came to periscope depth and observed one ship standing out slowly from south end of Nauru. Started approach...
0715 (L) Ship turned and headed back into Nauru. Continued closing and observed a second ship apparently anchored or moored. Later observed two patrol craft to seaward of freighters.
.....
0923 (L) Went to battle stations as first freighter started standing out to northwest.....He was a small freighter similar to Yomei Maru (2861 tons).
0948 (L) Broke off approach.....to close the anchored freighter (similar to Samarang Maru - 3802 tons).
.....
1900 (L) Surfaced 16 miles Southwest of Nauru.
.....Set course to head for Espiritu.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 16 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

Date: July 22
Time: 0655
Position: Nauru Island
Type: Freighter
Description: (Yomei Maru)

Date: July 22
Time: 0715
Position: Nauru Island
Type: Freighter
Description: (Samarang Maru)

Case 17

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____
TO: _____ (Guard By 12/1330 July
Truk) (B)
(Combined Fleet
Flagship) (B)
INFO: _____

Following are some of the noon positions in
HUPB 2 message reported by HYPO 150944. BAKER
still working posit for 19 July and missing
numbers in 18.

*Noon positions 14th through 19th July:

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 17. No. A-1 (Cont.)

14th - 00-35 North, 119- East.
15th - 02-20 North, 123-30 East.
16th - 03-00 North, 128-20 East.
17th - 03-30 North, 133-03 East.
18th - -30 North, 138- East.
19th - blanks.

At 1900/20 July position 05-10 North, 149-20 East, thence 170 miles on course 45°, thence to Point "S".

Time of departure Balikpapan was 1600/13 July.

GI COMMENT: Heading supplied by HYPO'S 150944 which also says: "This ship will depart Balikpapan on 13th at blank hours and expects to arrive Truk blank date (14403-21st July?); speed 14 knots. Noon posits 14th to 19th ??."

Add this to BAKER'S 161748 for the windup.

"Scheduled time of arrival Truk is 1400, July 21. Noon position 18th is North blank * degrees 30 Minutes, East 138-40. 19th - 05-10 North, 143-00 East."

NOTE: * - From the Track this should be 4° but we can't budge.

GI COMMENT: BAKER'S 161748 gave noon posits for unident ship departing Balikpapan July 13th for Truk. HYPO'S 150944 contained first part of this message and recovered Truk arrival as probable 21st July (This message was originated by (Unident) at 121330.

ComSubPacFor informed at 0935 (-9), 18th July.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 17, (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: Unknown Originator
TO: (Balikpapan
Area)
INFO:

14/1040 July

"From Chief of Staff 2nd Fleet.

In view of the fuel shortage situation in this area your ship is scheduled to proceed to PT immediately. (Request your inform me of your)* operating schedule."

NSS COMMENT: * Verb garbled followed by desiderative verb ending. Above is guess.

CF COMMENT: NPS 140818 had the same translation. PT is Truk.

No. A-3

FROM:
TO:
INFO:

16/0717 July

(C.E. Det. in
Marshalls) (C)

"Reference your SMS 151 blanks.

Bunder fuel oil at Jaluit is short, etcetera. Supply requested."

HYPO COMMENT: Sketchy.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 17 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 17/0453 July
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: CTF 72
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUBPAC COMMANDER SERIAL 48 LARGE BIRCH X 1215
(COURSE 090) X PLUS 2 (SPEED 12 KNOTS) X -300
(TIME 0900 GCT) X PLUS 4 (DATE 19TH) X HGCT
1000 (5-10N 143-00E) AND 1207.5
(COURSE 045 X PLUS 2 (SPEED 12 KNOTS) X
-200 (TIME 1000 GCT) X PLUS 5 (DATE 20TH X
HGWT 1020 (5-10N 149-20E) X

SLANT EYES NEED THIS ONE VERY BADLY X SO DO WE X

STEELHEAD AND TINOSA WORK ON IT X WATCH OUT
FOR EACH OTHER AND FOR OUR SPRUCES FROM DOWN
UNDER WHO ARE HEREBY INVITED TO ATTEMPT TO
STEAL HER FROM YOU X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 18, C-5 - C-7.

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-2

Radio Reception: All consecutive serials were
received.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 17 (Cont.)

No. C-3

July 17

- Patrolling on surface.
2100 (K) Position Lat. 11-10N, Long. 144-09E.
2245 (K) Changed course to 180 T, proceeding to southern part of area, to route from Borneo to Truk.

July 18

- 0454 (K) Changed course to 085 T.
1845 (K) (Report is illegible here.)

July 19

- 0240 (K) (Illegible)
1350 (K) Sighted red num buoy, Lat. 08-56N, Long. 147-07E.
2057 (K) (Illegible.)

July 20

- 0623 (K) Changed course to 270, surface patrol.
0713 (K) Sighted target through high periscope. Bearing 270 T. (Contact #2, similar to NIPPON MARU). Maneuvered on surface to gain position ahead and at
0726 (K) Submerged. Six foot swells, no chop.
1846 (K) Fired four torpedoes. No hits heard or observed. Target had been carefully tracked and with spread used torpedoes could not have run properly and missed. We were running too deep to observe tracks all the way under sea conditions.
0851 (K) One very loud explosion followed by two weaker ones. Loud one was similar to "block buster" heard after attack on task force. Probably depth charges from tanker.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 17, No. C-3 (Cont.)

July 20 (Cont.)

- 0858 (K) Changed course to 270 to open out on target.
- 0951 (K) Surfaced and began end run keeping masts and stack of target in sight. Visibility spotty, target sometimes out of sight and suddenly popping out disconcertingly close. Conditions similar to those existing during attack on task force. Target opened to north and then returned towards east. Unable to clear contact report to NPM. Broadcast on 450 KC.
- 1526 (K) Obtained position nearly ahead and changed course to 020 to get directly ahead.
- 1534 (K) Sighted two bombers, Type 98, distant five miles, headed for us and low. No radar contact. Submerged to 150 feet. At this time we were directly on targets track. Lat. 6°-05N, Long. 148-51E. Changed course to close target.
- 1602 (K) At earliest possible sight contact came to periscope depth.
- 1634 (K) Sighted one plane in vicinity of spot where we had submerged.
- 1653 (K) Having just completed one sweep with periscope, began second immediately and sighted target, angle on bow 90 port, range 11000 yards, relative bearing 270. Had searched this area one minute before. Paralleled target hoping for zig.
- 1810 (K) Surfaced. Went ahead on four main engines to overtake. Target not visible. Cleared new contact report to NPM.
- 1824 (K) Sunset.

July 21

- 0006 (K) After gaining position ahead without contact turned south to cover other

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 17, No. C-3 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

- courses and picked up target by radar, range 13000 yards, bearing 150 T. Began approach. Intermittent rain squalls and spotty visibility. Obtained position ahead, target zigzagging, base course about 050. Moved to starboard bow to take advantage of light horizon.
- 0037 (K) With target range 4900 yards picked up second target on radar, range 2700 yards, in position on targets starboard bow. Heavy rain squall. Continued tracking and moving over to port side of target.
- 0038 (K) Began slowing down for attack position, target range now 5550 yards, estimated angle on bow 10 port. No visual contacts as yet. A possibility existed that the second contact might be the STEELHEAD. Ran out of rain squall, very dark.
- 0043 (K) Sighted second contact, range 2500 yards. Identified as destroyer, angle on bow about 20 port. Slowed to reduce wake and changed course to port of target. Range to target 5000 yards.
- 0045 (K) Destroyer opened fire. Submerged to 300 feet. Target never sighted but feel sure it was tanker attacked earlier. Speed check 14 knots. Lat. 60-30'N, Long. 1500 30'E.
- 0049 (K) Pattern of five depth charges.
- 0050 (K) Two depth charges.
- 0107 (K) Two depth charges.
- 0111 (K) One depth charge.
- 0225 (K) Two escorts were taking part in hunt.
- 0327 (K) One depth charge.
- 0327 (K) Surfaced. Charging batteries and clearing vicinity.
- 0453 (K) Submerged. Spent day at 150 feet, maintaining listening patrol, resting

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 17. No. C-3 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

crew, and checking torpedoes. All torpedoes were checked during this and next day by Torpedo Officer and his assistant. Exploder mechanisms were not touched.

1846 (K) Surfaced. Returning to area.

No. C-4

Description of Contact

Number:	2
Time and Date:	0713 (K) - July 20
Lat. and Long:	5-10N 147-15E
Type:	Tanker Similar
Description:	NIPPON MARU No. 2
Course:	090
Speed:	13 knots
Remarks:	Loaded Zig-Zagging pg 263 ONI 208-J.

Case 18

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:	blank	16/1714 July
TO:	(vessel)	
INFO:	(4th Mil.	
	Stores Sect.)	
	(Yokosuka Nav.	
	Sta.)	
	(garbled)	
	(unident)	
	(unident)	
	(unident)	
	(unident)	
	(unident)	
	(unident)	

5th Special Base Force blank #234.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 18, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Convoy #3702 Otsu Maru) and 2 other Marus escorted by #12 Special Subchaser, Maru) convoy commander, depart for PT 17th, 12 hours, expect arrive North Channel 21st at 0600. The Kiyo Maru will return after escorting the above convoy as far as 11 North. Convoy will pass through following points (North and East):

18th, 1200: 12-32, 146-18.

19th, 1200: 10-03, 147-42.

19th, 2400: 08-48, 148-22.

20th, 1200: 08-22, 149-45.

No. A-2

FROM:

17/1635 July

TO:

INFO:

(4th Fleet) (B)

(Air Group 902,

Truk) (C)

00 2

"To 902nd Air Group Commander.

#3702 'B' Convoy 1200 position the 18th, 12-32N, 146-18E. Course 168 degrees (morning), 151 degrees (afternoon). Speed blank.

Commander Guam Detachment carry out anti-submarine patrol for above convoy."

GI COMMENT: This info phoned to ComSubPacFor at 2335 (-9) July 17th.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 18 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM:
TO:

18/1919 July

INFO:

(Civ. Eng.
Section #4, Truk) (B)
(Palao) (A)

*DesOPOrd #277.

1. Convoy FU 406 (escorted by Patrol Boat #31) noon positions, 21st, 30-00 North, 134-00 East. Blanks. Noon position, 22nd, North of Hayasui Seto Blanks.
2. Saeki Defense Force with Blanks escort the above convoy from blank to Hayasui Seto.
3. Commander Saeki Air Group utilizing blank will make daily sweep and provide direct escort for the convoy.

GI COMMENT: Hayasui Seto at 33-19 North, 131-59 East. ComSubPacFor informed at 1400 (-9).

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: CINCPAC
ALL SUBS GUARDING
NFM FOX SCHEDULE

17/1745 July

INFO: - - - - -

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA TO TINOSA X PECAN X 1228 (COURSE 168) X
SPEED BLANK (UNKNOWN) X MINUS 900 (TIME 0300) X
PLUS 3 (DATE 18) X REFY 3218 (12-32N 146-18E)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 18 (Cont.)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: CINCPAC
ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX

19/0947 July

INFO: - - - - -

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY.

COMSUBPAC SENDS SERIAL 53 X ULTRA X
TINOSA STERLEAD AND POGY NOTE WITH INTEREST X

3 POPLARS (MERCHANTMEN UNKNOWN) 1 LEMON
(ESCORT VESSEL) X BLANK X BLANK X -900
(TIME 0300 GCT) X PLUS 4 (DATE 19TH) X
WPUF 0342 (10-03N 147-42E) X BLANK X BLANK X

PLUS 300 (1500) X PLUS 4 (19TH) X (08-48 N
148-22E) KLPB 4822 X BLANK X BLANK X
-900 (0300) X PLUS 5 (20TH) KLMZ 2245
(08-22N 149-45E) X

ANOTHER PECAN FOR PIECZENTKOWSKI 1244.4
(COURSE 332.4) ABOUT 0 (10) X MINUS 900
(0300) X PLUS 6 (21ST) X KCLQ (30-00N-
134-00E)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 18 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 17, C-2 - C-4.

U.S.S. Poay

Second War Patrol

No. C-2

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 1, C-4.

No. C-3

July 16 - 19

Surface and submerged patrol west of East Faya Island.

July 20

Surface and submerged patrol southeast of Ulul Island.

1335 (X) Heard distant echo ranging.

1438 (X) Sighted convoy of 4 ships and one destroyer escort. Commenced approach.

1614 (X) Fired four torpedoes at closest ship in convoy. Missed. Target apparently sighted torpedo wakes and successfully maneuvered to avoid.

1619 (X) Started evasive tactics at deep submergence to avoid depth charge attack. Eight depth charges. None close.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 18, No. C-3 (Cont.)

July 20 (Cont.)

1900 (K) Surfaced. Radar and sight contact on escort at 5600 yards. Maneuvered at full speed on surface to avoid.

1942 (K) Sighted flashing light of another escort, apparently signalling. We were between these two ships. Cleared area to northeast.

No. C-4

Description of Contact

Number:	5
Date and Time:	July 20 - 1438 (K)
Lat. and Long:	8-22N 149-44E
Type:	Convoy of 4 Freighters 1 DD escort
Range:	18,000
Speed:	9 Knots
How Contacted:	P
Remarks:	Attacked closest ship. Missed.

U.S.S. Stealhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 6, C-7.

No. C-6

July 18

Went in to within 9 miles of PIIAANU PASSAGE and took pictures of TOL ISLAND. No planes or patrol vessels were sighted during the day.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 18, No. C-6 (Cont.)

July 20

During morning twilight at Latitude 07° - 50'N. Longitude 149° - 55'E., just as the Navigator was taking his sights, the J.C.O.D. sighted a plane gliding in on us barely one-half mile away. It was nip and tuck getting under in time. He dropped two bombs, one of which struck as we passed 60 feet while the second landed as we passed 120 feet. Clocks, manometers, fans and the main motor brushes took a shellacking. It was close. Proceeded submerged towards the northern edge of our area and during the day sighted the following planes which were evidently keeping a sharp look-out for us. At

0950 (L) Latitude 07° - 56'N. Longitude 149° - 56'E. one biplane similar to our early morning friend except that this plane had floats only. At

1518 (L) Latitude 8° - 04'E. Longitude 150° - 08'E. Two MITSUBISHI type torpedo bombers. At

1617 (L) Latitude 08° - 08'N. Longitude 150° - 10'E. Heard the first of 14 depth charges dropped by two PC boats who were evidently operating in conjunction with planes as several bombs were also heard. Went to 250 feet and employed evasive measures until at

1730 (L) Heard the last explosion and at

1946 (L) Latitude 08° - 08'N. Longitude 150° - 12'E. Surfaced in a rain squall. Radar immediately picked up three targets on our port quarter and we commenced tracking from abeam. Nothing could be seen and at first we believed these ships to be the antisubmarine patrol which had worked us over during the afternoon, but at

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 18, No. C-6 (Cont.) -

July 20 (Cont.)

2026 (L)
CONTACT
(5)

Made out a convoy consisting of one large and two small freighters accompanied by a DD or CHIDORI class torpedo boat. The moon had now risen and in spite of the heavy clouds the visibility in some directions was 5 or 6 miles. Sparred around for a favorable firing position until at

2317 (L)
CONTACT
(5A)

Latitude 06° - 05'N. Longitude 150° - 39'E., with a rain squall behind us, went in at standard speed to conduct attack on the largest AK. When range had dropped to 3800 yards and we were getting ready to fire, CONTROL reported SD radar contact 3/4 mile moving in and down we went. Submerged to 100 feet expecting another load but nothing happened. Returned to periscope depth to continue attack but could see nothing. Sound had numerous contacts and from his description it appeared that the convoy had fanned out and were heading away from us. Did not feel that firing into this melee at 4000 yards was warranted. Sound continued to hear light screws apparently searching the area, until at

July 21

0050 (L) Lost contact and at
0105 (L) Surfaced.

No. C-7

Description of Contact

Number:
Date and Time:
Course:
Lat. and Long:

5
July 20 - 1946 (L)
110 T. zig-zagging
8-08 N - 150-12 E

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 18, No. C-7 (Cont.)

Speed:
Remarks:

9-10 Knots
Convoy - 3AK one large
and 1 escort. Probably
a small DD or a CHIDORI
class torpedo boat.

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-8

See VII, Case 15, C-4.

Case 19

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:
INFO:

16/0704 July

(Part 2 of 2)

*21-08 North, and 132-30 East.
18-20 North, and 134-00 East.
15-15 North, and 134-00 East.
12-50 North, and 132-00 East.
10-00 North, and 133-20 East.

FF (Palao).

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 19, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(3) Principal passengers and cargo: 2200 men for blank force, blank ammunition, trucks, Tinsai Maru blank 200 personnel 420.

(4) Replenishment required as follows
200 tons fresh water immediately on arrival blank coal to capacity."

BAKER COMMENT: This is the second part of a Jap two-parter and is our only part.

GI COMMENT: We have both parts, currently being worked on.

No. A-2

FROM:
TO:

16/0704 July

INFO:

(Garbled)
(Saipan Base
Force 5)
(Combined Fleet)
(Chichijima Special
Base Force)

1. O number blank convoy (A ships blank N Maru, Maru), Chinsei Maru, C ships Maru), Maru) depart Saeki on the 15th ?, at blank hours 30 minutes via following points (north and east):

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19, No. A-2 (Cont.) -

30N, 134E.
15-15N, 134E.
12-50N, 132E. and arrive PP (Palau
on 24th at 1200.
Maru) will proceed to RR (Rabaul)
speed 9. Hato Maru) will
escort to PP and #7 Maru) as far as 29N.
Maru) will break off at blank and arrive
Manila? at 1600 on the 18th.

2. Noon positions (16th through 24th): (All
north and east)

30-20, 133-45
27-15, 134
24-05, 134
21-15, 132-30
18-20, 134
15-15, 134
12-50, 132
10-00, 133-20
PP Eastern Entrance.

3. Principal cargo: Maru) blank 2200
blank.

Maru) blank ammunition.
(Chinsei Maru), 2000 tons coal.
(Maru), 420 men.

4. Replenishments: (07695 Maru) 200 tons water
blank.

Maru) 300 tons coal.

GI COMMENT: Sent in NFM 182202 and 182228.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM: (4th Fleet) (B) 16/0704 July
TO:
INFO:

(Comm. Unit
Chichijima) (B)

"Part 1. "O" blank convoy (A ship blank; B ship Chinsei Maru; C ship blank) departs Saeki 0930, passes through points 30-00N, 134-00E, 15-15N, 134-00E, 12-50N, 132-00E, and arrives Palau 24th 1200. Speed 9 knots. blank escort as far as Palau. escorts as far as 29N. Blank leaves convoy 17th for blank arriving 18th 1600.

Part 2. Noon posits: (16th to 24th incl.)

30-20N, 133-45E.
27-02N, 134-00E.
24-04N, 134-10E.

"21-15N, 132-30E (?).
18-20N, 134-00E.
15-15N, 134-00E.
12-50N, 132-00E.
10-00N, 133-20E.
Arrive Palau.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19, No. A-3 (Cont.)

Part 3. 2200 Nationals aboard ; blank
aboard ; 2000 aboard Chinsei Maru, blank
personnel 420.

Part 4. Required supplies:
200 tons of water aboard
300 tons of coal aboard
Blank immediately after arrival."

HYPO COMMENT: This is complete version of
Baker's 162334 with all parts.

GI COMMENT: Baker's was skimpy with much less
detail but no radical differences of 2nd part
only.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS ON
NPM FOX
INFO: - - - - -

18/0742 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR HALIBUT IF FUEL REMAINING PERMITS AND FOR
HADDOCK IF IN POSITION TO USE X COMSUBPAC ULTRA
SERIAL 52 X 2 OR MORE LOADED PEARLS X

COURSE BLANK X SPEED BLANK X TIME -900 (0300) X
DATE PLUS 5 (20TH) X UFLQ 2000 (18-20 N 134-00 E)
ALGAROA TELQ 1500 (15-15 N 134-00 E) X

HADDOCK MIGHT ATTEMPT DOUBLE PLAY WITH THIS
AND MY SERIAL 51 WHICH IS CONSIDERED MORE
IMPORTANT X

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Halibut

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 1, C-1.

No. C-2

July 19, 20

Uneventful, Conducted submerged patrol south and east of Guam.

July 21

0459 (K) Submerged.
1800 (K) Departed area enroute MIDWAY.
1900 (K) Surfaced.

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 11, C-2.

No. C-4

July 18

2000 (I) Entered area at Latitude 11° - 11° N
Longitude 137° - 07° E. Set course to
patrol north of Palau at Latitude 18° N,
Longitude 134° E. to cover shipping
lanes from Empire.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 19

Underway on surface.

July 20

- 1000 (I) Arrived in area, commenced surface patrol. Four days without a fix. Sea has been rough and sky overcast most of the time.
- 1300 (I) Established our position in longitude by several sun sights.

July 21

- 0600 (I) Weather cleared during night; established position by star fix. Sea moderately rough.
- 0815 (I) Sighted tops and smoke of four ship convoy bearing 040 T, on southerly course. Commenced tracking and determined convoy was on course 180 T, making 8 knots. All ships were coal burners with high stacks. Latitude 16° - 48' Longitude 134° - 00E.
- 1044 (I) Having gained a position ahead at approximately 18 miles, submerged to 300 feet to check the trim of the boat in this vicinity. Found that the trim at periscope depth was satisfactory at 300 feet and that density layers existed at 200 feet and 240 feet, with the bathothermograph indicating a 1° change in temperature (lower) at 100 feet and a further drop of 2° beginning at 190 feet and tapering off to 250 feet.
- 1120 (I) Commenced approach. Range 18,000 yards. Ships were in two columns in line and ships in open order. Distance between columns about 600 yards. The ships were given the designation of Nos. 1-2-3-4; 1 and 2 being the west column

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

and 3 and 4 being in the east column. No. 4 was always behind position. The ships were identified as troop transports, and similar to the following:

- #1 HUSIMI MARU (10,800 tons),
- #2 KASIMA MARU (9,875 tons);
- #3 JOHORE MARU (6,182 tons), and
- #4 YOSINO MARU (8,990 tons).

Troops could be seen on the first three ships.

We found ourselves to be exactly on their track and determined that they were making eight knots, and were making 90° zigs from 135°T to 225°T every eight to ten minutes. At 12,000 yards lost the targets in a heavy tropical rain storm, and picked them up again at about 6,000 yards on course 225°T. We then turned to close the target's track. The ships were so disposed that we could fire at #1, #2, and #3 ships as they were almost overlapping bow and stern, (a position exactly like the SILVERSIDES experienced on her fourth patrol. This position provided good firing ranges with zero angles and ninety port tracks. When approximately 2,000 yards from #1 target the ships zigged left to 135°T. We started a turn to the right to bring the bow tubes to bear for an identical setup on this side as we had had on the other, but found for the first time an escorting destroyer of the TOMOZURU Class to the starboard of #2 target. He presented a 10° starboard angle on the bow. We were now in a bad spot, and wished that we were still on the other side of the convoy, however, we later discovered another escort of the same type on the port quarter of #4 target.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

With the targets drawing nearer the firing point, and minutes rushing by like seconds, the escort situation required action. Fortunately the escort took this action and presented a 30° port angle on the bow, and eased around astern of us at about 700 yards. The action of this escort had certainly harassed the "pitcher", what with keeping track of him and four other targets while trying to gain a favorable firing position, and keep our presence unknown at the same time. Until the escort had gone past us firing was out of the question -- he would have been on us within seconds after we had let a single torpedo go. I don't know how we kept from being sighted with the number of observations we had to take to keep track of these maneuvering targets after this last zig--

Their lookouts (and there were plenty of them) were looking past their noses, while we were "underneath" them. When the escort was sufficiently clear, the range to #1 target was 800 yards and the gyro angle was 50° right. The gyro angle for #3 target was worse. #2 target changed his position from astern of #1 to about 30° on his starboard quarter. We had a chance for a "down the throat" at this target but decided to let him go by -- he did at 300 yards. They sure look big at that range (low power). We now swung hard right for a firing setup on #4 target. When his range was about 2,900 yards we noticed that the other targets had zigged back to 225° so we held our fire until he changed course, swinging further to the right

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

to 176°T. The first three targets now presented tracks of approximately 160° starboard at an average range of 2,500 yards. At that range with their slow speed they were like sitting ducks, so we decided to fire first at #4 target and then bring each of these targets under fire.

At 1233-31 fired two torpedoes at target #4, range 3,000 yards, gyro 354°, track 125° starboard, firing interval 11 seconds.

At 1234-17 fired two torpedoes at target #1, range 2,500 yards, gyro angle 027°, track 158° starboard, firing interval 11 seconds. At 1234-50 fired one torpedo at target #2, range 1,600 yards, gyro angle 035½°, track 166° starboard; and at 1235-10 fired one torpedo at target #3, 2,400 yards, gyro angle 012°, track 144° starboard. All torpedoes set at 12 feet.

At 1235-19 while searching heard one torpedo hit. Before periscope was trained on #4 target a second hit was timed 10 seconds later. #4 target was a mass of smoke, but seemed to be riding all right. Another hit was timed at 1236-02 which would have been on target #2, the nearest of the four. At 1236-17 a hit was observed in the stern of target #1 which caused his stern to immediately drop in the water to where he had about 3 feet free board where before he had had some 25 feet. The second torpedo fired at this ship either missed or was a dud as no explosion was heard.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

On this and #4 ship the torpedoes were fired at the fore and mainmasts. It is believed the forward torpedo hit. At 1237-00 the last torpedo was heard to explode, a timed hit on #3 target. No. 2 and 3, like #4 were smoking as if they were on fire, but no flame or visible damage was apparent. Many internal explosions followed the torpedo hits.

It was now a beautiful sight to witness the state of confusion that was thrown into this otherwise peaceful formation of four Jap transports with their load of "slant eyes". This unfavorable firing position now had its advantages. The enemy seemed to have no idea where the attack had come from, and none of the ships had maneuvered during firing or at the time of the torpedo hits. No. 1 target, his rudder and screws apparently out of commission and his stern getting deeper in the water, drifted off to the right, presenting a 90° starboard angle on the bow at 3,000 yards. During this time we swung to port as fast as we could, in order to bring the stern tubes to bear. The escort aft of #4 target came inside him and laid an ineffective smoke screen and proceeded at high speed to a position alongside #1 target, that was now almost dead in the water. The Japs weren't up to form as they still hadn't dropped any random depth charges. Using a target speed of 2 knots, fired two torpedoes at #1 target at 1245-19, eleven second firing interval, torpedoes set at 10 feet. Point of aim fore and mainmasts. Range 3,000 yards,

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

gyro angle 188° , track angle 90° starboard. The first torpedo was seen to hit in the bow and throw up some flame, and the second was heard to hit at the proper interval. It should have hit in the middle of the target. As the other targets seemed to be under control did not fire anymore at these as they were sure to avoid. After this last attack the destroyer escort saw where we were firing from. He laid a smoke screen beside #1 target, and came down our torpedo track with smoke belching from his stack. We had had the pleasure of shooting and seeing the fun for quite awhile, but it was over now, so at 1249 we went deep to avoid and evade at 75 turns. At 1256 first attack began with a total of 22 depth charges. One group of 5 was close, but not bad. Both escorts seemed to be working us over. Random depth charges were then dropped until 1342. A total of 30 depth charges were heard. At 1345 Commanding Officer and personnel of the conning tower and torpedo rooms heard the familiar sounds of a ship breaking up when sinking. This lasted for a period of ten minutes.

- 1359 (I) Started to periscope depth.
- 1415 (I) At periscope depth, both escorts in sight at 8,000 and 9,000 yards. We were surprised to find both escorts still around.
- 1445 (I) One escort disappeared to south. Made reload forward and aft.
- 1530 (I) Second escort disappeared to south.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

1545 (I) Surfaced, closed a rain squall to the east for security and then headed southwest to pass through the firing point. Just at end of twilight passed through four large oil slicks about 500 feet long. Oil was very heavy and seemed to stand well above the surface of the water. It was now too dark to check carefully for debris. Sea was too rough to permit anyone to go on deck to get a sample of oil. Although ship #1 was not seen to sink, it is the Commanding Officer's opinion that it did. The first torpedo which hit in the stern gave indications that his rudder and screws were gone. He was almost dead in the water when he was hit by two more torpedoes, one in the bow and one probably near the middle. When last seen his stern was awash. One hour later unmistakable sounds of a ship breaking up were heard by the Commanding Officer and personnel in the conning tower and torpedo rooms over a period of ten minutes. When passing through the firing point, large oil slicks were discovered. Shortly after surfacing the weather closed down again, making search difficult and recontact practically impossible. In retrospect, it was fortunate we had fired when we did, even with the unfavorable firing position, because we would never have been able to get in another attack the way the weather turned out. The weather seemed to have cleared just long enough for us to have sighted this convoy and make an attack. All warheads were torpex except the two fired at #2 and #3 targets - they had torpex extenders. The explosions were not overly loud.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 21 (Cont.)

2030 (I) Sent out contact report.

July 22

During the night retired at enemy's estimated speed to be on his daylight position circle.

0600 (I) Covered a sector 50 miles wide during the day. Visibility not good, never regained contact.

1900 (I) Set course for area at one engine speed, carrying float.

No. C-5

Description of Contact

Torpedo Attack Report Form

U.S.S. HADDOCK- Torpedo Attack No. 1 -Patrol No. 5

Time - 0333-31 GCT Date - 7-21-43 Lat. 16° -18' N.
Long. 134° - 09' E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Sighted on surface with periscope a convoy of four (4) transports escorted by two (2) destroyers of the TOMOZURU Class. Visibility good to fair. Ships similar to:

#1	HUSIMI MARU	(10,800 tons)
#2	KASIMA MARU	(9,875 tons)
#3	JOHORE MARU	(6,182 tons)
#4	YOSINO MARU	(8,990 tons)

Ships were carrying troops.

Ships Sunk: None.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-5 (Cont.)

Description of Contact (Cont.)

Ships Damaged or

probably sunk - Four (4) #1 HUSIMA MARU { 10,800 tons }
#2 KASIMA MARU { 9,875 tons }
#3 JOHORE MARU { 6,182 tons }
#4 YOSINO MARU { 8,990 tons }

Damage determined by:

Ship #1 - Saw one torpedo hit in stern.
Ship #2 - Heard and timed one torpedo hit.
Ship #3 - Heard and timed one torpedo hit.
Ship #4 - Heard and timed two torpedo hits.

Saw one torpedo hit in the stern of #1 target, stern dropped from 25 feet to 3 feet free board. Rudder and screws apparently damaged as ship drifted out of formation and stopped. Other targets had smoke rolling out of them as if they were on fire, but no other visible damage. Heard many internal explosions. All ships unquestionably damaged.

Target Draft: 28' Course: 225 T. Speed: 8.0 Knots
Range at firing:

(1) 2500
(2) 1600
(3) 2400
(4) 3000

U.S.S. HADDOCK- Torpedo Attack No. 2 -Patrol No. 5

Time - 0345-19 GCT Date-7-21-43 Lat. 16° - 18° N.
Long. 134° - 09° E.

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description: Sighted on surface with periscope a
convoy of four (4) transports escorted
by two (2) destroyers of the TOMOZURU
Class. Ships were similar to:

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 19, No. C-5 (Cont.)

Description of Contact (Cont.)

#1 HUSIMI MARU (10,800 tons)
#2 KASIMA MARU (9,875 tons)
#3 JOHORE MARU (6,182 tons)
#4 YOSINO MARU (8,990 tons)

Ships were carrying troops.

Ships Sunk - One (1) HUSIMI MARU (10,800 tons)
(Same as damage in Attack No. 1)

Ships Damaged or
probably sunk - None.

Damage determined by: On first attack saw one
torpedo hit in stern, stern dropped from
25 feet to 3 feet free board, ship fell
out of formation. On this second attack
saw one torpedo hit in bow throwing up
flame from forecastle, and heard one hit
which should have been in the middle of
target. When last seen the stern was
awash. An hour later Commanding Officer
and personnel in conning tower and torpedo
rooms heard unmistakable sounds of a ship
breaking up over a period of ten minutes.
Passing through firing point at dusk
found four large oil slicks 500 feet long.
it is the Commanding Officer's opinion
that this target sank.

Target Draft: 29' Course 303 T. Speed: 2 knots
Range at Firing: 3000 yards.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 20

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

17/1941 July

TO:

INFO:

(Singapore Area,
Air)
(Niri Guard Force)

(Garble)
(Singapore Comm Unit)

- *1. - Nissho Maru? (Convoy Commander) and
Kenyo Maru departing from Singapore 18th and
expected to arrive Truk at noon 29th. Speed 13 knots.
2. Route through Balabac and Basilan Channels,
North of Neneosa Island, and eastward along the parallel
of 3° North to 146° East. Thence on course 054, head-
ing for South Channel.

Noon positions.

19th - 03-00 North, 108-13 East.
20th - 04-30 North, 112-45 East.
21st - 07-10 North, 116-10 East.
22nd - 07-10 North, 120-30 East.
23rd - 05-05 North, 124-40 East.
24th - 04-25 North, 129-25 East.
25th - 03-00 North, 130-50 East.
26th - 03-00 North, 138-40 East.
27th - 03-00 North, 143-30 East.
28th - 04-35 North, 148-10 East.*

NEGAT COMMENT: Longitude on 25th is patently in error,
but we are unable to budge it.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0130 (-9).
Balabak Channel is at 07-30 North, 117-00 East.
Basilan Channel is at approximately 06-35 North,
122-00 East.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1948

Case 20 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

18/0714 July

SANTA CLAUS ANSWERS YOUR LETTERS X SERIAL 51 FROM
COMSUBPAC X ULTRA X MINGO AND HADDOCK GET THESE WITH
TINOSA PLAYING SAFETY MAN IN CASE THEY GET BY YOU X
LET US KNOW X 262 AND 259 POPCORN POSSIBLY WITHOUT
LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X 1215 (COURSE 080) X BLANK
(SPEED) X -900 (TIME 0300) X PLUS 10 (DATE 25TH) X
RQBT 0050 (03-00 NORTH 133-50 EAST) X ALGARORA

RQHV 0040 (03-00 NORTH 138-40 EAST) RQQT 0030
(03-00 NORTH 143-30 EAST) X AND THEN 1209 (COURSE 054)
X BLANK (SPEED) X BLANK (TIME) X BLANK (DATE) X AT
RQJY (03 NORTH 146 EAST) X AND 1209 (COURSE 054) X
BLANK (SPEED) X -900 (TIME 0300) X PLUS 13 (DATE 28TH)
CXPH 3510 (04-35 NORTH 148-10 EAST)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: HADDOCK
ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

26/1056 July

COMSUBPAC SERIAL 88 ULTRA X DISREGARD MY SERIAL 71
X REMAIN APPROXIMATELY WITHIN 100 MILES OF RQHV
(3 NORTH 138 EAST) X BELIEVE WE WILL BE ABLE TO KEEP
YOU BUSY THAT VICINITY X MINGO REPORTS 1 TANKER 1
FREIGHTER 1 ESCORT AT 2 HOURS GOT 26TH RQIQ 4028
(3-10 NORTH 134-28 EAST) COURSE 090 SPEED 13

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 20 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 24, C-3 - C-4.

U.S.S. Mingo

First War Patrol

No. C-2

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete

No. C-3

July 19

Closing Palau on easterly course. Stormy overcast, strong southwest winds, rough seas.

July 22

1924 (1)

Surfaced and set course 215 degrees true at slow speed to head for new position east of Helen Reef.

July 23

Proceeding on surface, at 6 knots, using auxiliary engine to save fuel, to latitude 3 degrees-00 N. Seas now extremely calm and glassy again.

July 26

Proceeding at slow speed on northwesterly course to head back for our area.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 20, No. C-3 (Cont.)

- 0634 (I) Sighted smoke bearing 211 degrees true and apparently moving eastward. Went ahead on a normal approach course at 19 knots until we could see his masts and stack. It appeared to be a single tanker. Kept masts and stack in sight with periscope as we made "end run." Determined his base course to be 090 degrees true, and plotted his zig-zag plan through two complete cycles. Speed of enemy was 13.5 knots. At 1000 (I) Tanker now bearing 270 degrees true, submerged and commenced another glassy sea approach. He continued to zig-zag according to plan.

Approached to a position 1800 yards 20 degrees on the starboard bow of the target on a 30 degree starboard track, at which time he was about due to zig left to 060 degrees true. Target speed 14 knots.

Attacked.

July 27

Lying to at latitude 3-20 N. longitude 153-40

July 28-30

Enroute Sorol Island on northeasterly course at 6.5 knots using auxiliary engine.

July 31

- 1001 (I) Sighted land in periscope, which was being used to increase surface range of visibility. Headed for the island on course 103 degrees true until it was in sight from the bridge then submerged and approached western end of Bigelimol.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 20, (Cont.)

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 11, C-2.

No. C-5

July 26

Conducting surface patrol.

0729 (I)

Sighted two modern tankers bearing 164 T, distance 12 miles on an easterly course. Latitude 2-52 N, Longitude 137-40 E. Went to four engine speed to gain position ahead. Sea calm, visibility excellent-making 19.5 knots. Targets were making radical zigs on base course 090 T at estimated speed of 14 knots. At one point lost targets for over an hour when they decided to run south for 10 miles.

1219 (I)

Having gained a position ahead at approximately 21 miles submerged to 300 feet to check the trim of the boat in this vicinity. Found the trim at periscope depth to be satisfactory at 300 feet and that a density layer existed at 200 feet. The temperature dropped one degree, between 30 and 150 feet, two degrees between 150 and 230 feet, and then dropped rapidly lower as it went off the card at 250 feet.

1245 (I)

At periscope depth, commenced approach, range about 18,000 yards. The ships were in column. They were identified as the GKNYO HARU (10,020 tons), and the NISSYO HARU (10,526 tons), in position in the order named. Both ships were loaded.

1315 (I)

When the range was 5,800 yards, the angle on the bow was 10° starboard. We were only 970 yards off the tracks. As the targets had

Case 20, No. C-4 (Cont.)

been making about 20° zigs at irregular intervals, and we had not figured out their plan, we thought if they zigged at all before firing, it would be to starboard. We therefore turned left to open the track. No escorts were in sight, but we figured they were still hidden by the targets. One would never expect to find two valuable target like these unescorted.

1318 (I)

Targets unfortunately zigged left. There was not enough time to bring the bow tubes to bear so came to a course for straight stern shots at a range of 3,900 yards, 90° starboard track. We had gotten a good check on their speed at 14 knots and were sure the range was correct or nearly so. The sea was in our favor for numerous white caps had appeared on what had been a calm sea. Under the circumstances it appeared advisable to divide our fire and fire two torpedoes at each target. At 1321-35 fired two torpedoes at the leading target, with a 9 second firing interval. Range 4,280 yards, gyro angle 171°, track 95° starboard. At 1321-53 fired two torpedoes at the second target, with a 7 second firing interval. Range 4,250 yards, gyro angle 170°, track 92° starboard. Point of aim on each target was the bridge and the mainmast. Torpedoes were set at 15 feet. Neither surface or air escort could be seen. The torpedoes were heard to run hot and straight, and a light smoke stream from the first torpedoes could be seen leading the first targets. The targets had not seen our torpedoes and were still steaming on unconcerned.

Heard a torpedo hit at 1324-29 and within a few seconds saw a torpedo hit the second target just forward of his after deck house. No damage could be seen on #1 target, so both hits must have been on the second target

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 20, No. C-4 (Cont.)

Both targets now started to turn to the left and presented a 165° starboard angle on the bow. At 1327-18 and 1327-25 two torpedo explosions were heard at the end of their run.

The second target seemed to be in trouble and dropped well behind the first target. His main deck was now awash. The sea was calm but the wind was blowing up white caps.

We immediately changed course and headed for this target at full speed, but the range opened to 11,000 yards and then remained constant. The first target came back and stood by the damaged ship.

1334 (I) Heard two internal explosions and it looked as if the ship would surely sink, he was barely afloat.

1345 (I) With the range still 11,000 yards targets turned to the right and started off to the east in formation making ten knots. It was hard to see what was keeping this ship afloat and here he was steaming off at ten knots. These modern tankers can really take it.

Why the torpedoes missed that were fired at #1 target is unknown. The targets hadn't maneuvered and the target data was undoubtedly correct since both torpedoes fired at the second target hit. The only conjecture that can be made is that the torpedoes ran deep. Exploders were inactivated. These targets were drawing better than 25 feet -- their loaded draft is listed at 30 feet. This is the first experience we have had with torpedoes exploding at the end of their run. As we couldn't close for another attack let the targets clear and then at

1443 (I) Surfaced, set course to get ahead of the targets while keeping the range opened to about 32,000 yards so that they wouldn't know of our movements. We expected planes to show up at any time to force us down.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 20, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- 1500 (I) Picked up both targets. The target we hit was very low in the water. It was too late to get ahead of them for another daylight attack so the decision was made to trail them for a night attack. One of the disappointing things of the patrol was that our SJ radar was not functioning properly and our radar personnel were doing everything in their power to repair it. A report on the SJ radar follows under marginal heading (M) RADAR.
- 1620 (I) Targets commenced their regular zig zag plan to the east with base course apparently 090°T.
- 1719 (I) Made quick dive to avoid being sighted when targets got too close.
- 1740 (I) Surfaced, targets were on base course 022°T.
- 1820 (I) As it began to get dark put four engines on the line and increased speed to full (19.5 knots). The sea was now perfectly calm. It was a dark night, and it was extremely difficult to see the targets -- the radar would have been a great help. We couldn't tell just how close we were to the targets, and it didn't seem as though we were closing any. We were afraid that if we should stop we'd charge past him before we could ever stop our headway. It was so dark we couldn't judge the range well, especially looking into the stern of the targets.
- 1950 (I) Rang up stop and made the forward tubes ready for firing when the target bearing started to fall off to the left and it looked as though they were changing course. Number 5 tub cutter door could not be opened. The range was closing, but the targets were still very in distinct, estimated range 3,000 yards. Targets were just off the port bow.
- 1951 (I) Our previous concern for the rate of change of range under these conditions of poor visibility without a radar was now justified. The targets now turned to the right and presented a 90° starboard angle on the bow, and the bearing rapidly drew to the right. We started to swing to the right for a quick shot,

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 20, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- but then saw the leading target swing left and at
- 1951-20 He fired two emergency identification signals at us. There had not even been enough time for us to shoot from the "nip" when we were sighted. Firing was now out of the question with the targets maneuvering, so went to emergency speed to clear the area, turning away from the formation. The range was determined to be approximately 1,900 yards; the target covered two-thirds of the field of the 7-50 binoculars when broadside to us. The stern of the damaged target was seen to be awash.
- 1953 (I) We made a quick dive when the second target turned a searchlight on us. He opened fire as we dove and dropped a depth charge. We sustained no damage, but blew a gasket on an outboard engine exhaust valve when it was closed before the engine had stopped running. The inboard valve held and the engine was not flooded.
- 2030 (I) Surfaced and closed the targets to the north. It was too dark for a submerged periscope approach without a radar, so we decided to try a surface approach, firing from about 3,000 yards. We began tracking by estimating the range and angle on the bow and using the T.B.F. for bearings.
- 2138 (I) With the targets on course 075°T, and making 14.0 knots we took a firing position on the second ship. At 2138-33 fired four torpedoes from the bow tubes at the second target; range 3,000 yards, gyro angle 008°, track 95° starboard. Torpedoes were set at 15 feet. A six second firing interval was used. A divergent spread of one degree was applied to the first and fourth torpedoes, while the second and third were fired at the M.O.T.
- 2144-05 Heard three torpedoes explode at the end of their run (about five minutes thirty seconds). The fourth torpedo was not heard to explode. All torpedoes ran straight and normal, and

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 20, No. C-4 (Cont.)

their tracks could be seen passing beneath the target. The targets did not maneuver until the torpedoes exploded at the end of the run. This is decidedly a bad feature because it gives the submarine's presence away.

The targets now again opened fire, but not in our direction. We felt that these torpedoes should have hit, because the data had checked well and the targets didn't maneuver.

2219 (I) Radar picked up target at 7,400 yards, began tracking. Target now making 13.5 knots.

2244 (I) When the range was 4,000 yards and we were presenting a zero angle on the bow, the targets opened fire on us. After a half dozen shells had passed close above our head we dove. They did not use a searchlight, it seemed uncanny that they should have opened up so close to us -- I'm sure they couldn't see us because even they were hard to see.
2300 (I) Surfaced, range 8,600 yards. Commenced tracking again.

July 27

Tracking two targets that are as determined to get away as we are to get them.

0030 (I) Targets opened fire and turned on searchlight in the direction of 045°T while we bore 352°T from them at a distance of 9,000 yards. They fired about thirty rounds, turned their searchlight off, and fired ten more. This gave us good proof that they didn't have a radar, and that they had just happened to fire in our direction at 2244 (I). If it was just "trial and error", or "random shooting" -- it was, nevertheless, uncomfortable to have around. Following the shooting we lost target by sight and radar.

0114 (I) Radar contact on target at 8,250 yards. Commenced tracking with the idea of getting ahead for a submerged radar approach. Moon was to come up at 0130, but the sky was overcast.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 20, No. C-4 (Cont.)

0217 (I)

After midnight the targets started heading in the direction of Palau with their base course 310°T and making 12.5 knots.

Having gained a position directly ahead of the target at 9,020 yards dove and began submerged approach. Target was on course 310°T making 12.5 knots. We placed ourselves on course 050°T with the expectation that the target would zig to the right for he had been on 310° for a long time and was due to change to 330°T. Radar didn't pick up the target after submerging until 6,000 yards. Target still hadn't changed course so we increased speed to full to get off his track. At 4,000 yards picked up targets through #1 periscope. At this time we went to periscope depth to avoid being seen. Out setup was checking beautifully -- sound, periscope, and T.D.C. all agreed. We only had two torpedoes aft, so we planned to fire these at the first target (not yet damaged), then swing to bring the bow tubes to bear on both targets.

At 0240-55 fired two torpedoes on periscope bearings from aft set at 20° feet. Range 1,950 yards, gyro angle 171°, track 82° starboard, 10 second firing interval. Points of aim were bridge and mainmast. Torpedoes were heard to run by sound. Both torpedoes missed and exploded at the end of run (5 minutes - 20 seconds). At this time both targets maneuvered. Up until this time bearing stayed exactly on. If there ever was an ideal set-up, and a correct one this was it. We're sure the torpedoes didn't go around or over so they must have gone under. However, having had such perfect luck with our torpedoes on the convoy, we still wouldn't give up.

After firing the stern tubes, swung hard right to bring the bow tubes to bear. We were on the point of firing with 110° right gyros and

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 20, No. C-4 (Cont.)

a 90° starboard track on the second target when our "friends" the first two torpedoes exploded at the end of their run. This is a decidedly unsatisfactory feature. We continued our swing to reduce the gyro angles to zero and by the time we got around the second target presented a 160° port track at 3,300 yards. No. 1 target was also in line with this, so we still had a good chance of finishing off these targets. At 0248-20 fired four torpedoes from forward, set at 20 feet with a 10 second firing interval. Range 3,370 yards, gyro angle 354°, and track angle 160° port. Two of these were spread 1/2 degree right and left while the other two had no spread. At 0250-49 fired one torpedo from forward, set on 20 feet, range 4,000 yards, gyro angle 534° and track 180°. The second target changed course 20° during the run of the four torpedoes, but did not maneuver during the run of the fifth. The leading target did not maneuver at all. These torpedoes had an excellent chance of hitting one, or both of the targets, however no hits were obtained. All torpedoes exploded at the end of their run. The targets should have come close to being damaged even by these explosions.

0312 (I) Surfaced, targets at 8,000 yards, still very much afloat. With one torpedo remaining, and having gotten only two hits out of fifteen torpedoes, decided to call it a day, thus ending a twenty hour running battle which had resulted in serious damage to one ship. We had chased these ships from Latitude 2°-52'N, Longitude 137°-40'E to Latitude 4°-59'N, Longitude 139°-04'E over a track which amounted to 269 miles. The absence of air and surface screens had made this chase possible -- it is unfortunate that it couldn't have ended more favorably.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 20. No. C-4 (Cont.)

- 0515 (I) Submerged to give the crew a much needed rest after last night's battle. Ran at 100 feet between looks. All attempts to send out contact report before diving were unsuccessful.
- 1840 (I) Surfaced. Nothing sighted during day. Having only one torpedo remaining, and only enough fuel for another week of restricted activity in the area decided to return to base. This would let another boat, that had more fighting power, enter a very productive area. Set course for departure point.

No. C-6

Description of Contact

No: 2
Time: 0729 I
Date: 7-26-43
Latitude: 2-52N
Longitude: 137-40E
Type(s): Two -
AO
Initial: 12 miles
Est. Course
and Speed: 090°
How Cont: SD

Two (2) modern tankers identified as #1 GENYO Maru (10,020 tons) and #2 NISSYO Maru (10,526 tons). No surface or air escort. Attacks 3-4-5-6. Damaged one AO on first attack.

Case 21

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Nauru Comm 19/0735 July
Unit) (A)
TO: (4th Fleet) (B)
(2nd Fleet) (B)

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 21, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Comdr Base
Force #4) (B)

Arrived at Nauru 0630 with (DD) upon completion
of taking on cargo, will depart at 1000; scheduled to
arrive North Channel 0500, 22nd passing through
following positions:

At 0500, 21st: 04-45 N, 157-17 E.
At 1700 same date: 06-47 N, 154-41 E."

GI COMMENT: Phoned Subs 0015/20th (-9).

No. A-2

FROM: (Nauru Comm 19/0733 July
Unit)
TO: (4th Fleet)
(Eastern Force)
(Tarawa Comm Unit)

"From Captain of Urakaze

Arrived Nauru at 0630 with - unident ship).
Will complete unloading and depart at 1000. Will pass
through following points and arrive North Channel
at 0500 on 22nd:

At 0500 on 21st in 04-45 N, 157-17 E.
At 1700 on same date in 06-47 N, 154-51 E.

NEGAT COMMENT: Urakaze is from garbled group and
should be treated with caution.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 21 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
INFO: HFM FCI
CINCPAC

19/1632 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

WALES OF POYT GETS ANOTHER TIP IN COMSUBPAC ULTRA
SERIAL 55 X 1 MAPLE 1 IRONWOOD X ENROUTE NAURU-TRUK X
BLANK X PLUS 800 PLUS 5 X CIGW 4517 (LAT 04-45 NORTH
LONG 157-17 EAST) X MINUS 400 X PLUS 6 X VTNU 4741
(06-47 NORTH 154-41 EAST) X ENTERING NORTH CHANNEL
PLUS 800 PLUS 6

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Porv

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 1, C-4.

No. C-2

July 20

Surfaced and submerged patrol southeast of
Ulul Island.

- 1335 (K) Heard distant echo ranging.
- 1438 (K) Sighted convoy of 4 ships and one destroyer
escort. Commenced approach.
- 1614 (K) Fired four torpedoes at closest ship in convoy
Missed. Target apparently sighted torpedo
wakes and successfully maneuvered to avoid.
- 1619 (K) Started evasive tactics at deep submergence
to avoid depth charge attack. Eight depth
charges. None close.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 21, No. C-2 (Cont.)

1900 (K) Surfaced. Radar and sight contact on escort at 5600 yards. Maneuvered at full speed on surface to avoid.
1942 (K) Sighted flashing light of another escort, apparently signalling. We were between these two ships. Cleared area to northeast.

July 21

Surface and submerged patrol north of Hagur Island.

1900 (K) Set course for area 14 south.

July 22-23

Patrolling Guam-Saipan-Truk route enroute to area 14 south.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

See VII, Case 18, C-4

Case 22

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

11/0846 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 22, No. A-1 (Cont.)

*Combined Fleet Desopord #625.

1. The Ryugo) and Hayataka) less
both their air groups, Uyo) Chuyo)
DesDiv 7 / Ushio) - unident
DD) will proceed from PT to Japan under command of
the Captain of the Hayataka on ()
July date?).

2. The Advance Force Commander will have the Umikaze
and - unident DD) (in DesDiv 17?)
escort the above force under the command of the
Captain of the Hayataka between PT and Japan after
which they will engage in upkeep."

No. A-2

FROM:

11/0846 July

TO:

TUJA 8

*Combined Fleet Desopord 625.

1. Ryugo and Hayataka / both without their aircraft
Uyo, Chuyo, DesDiv 7 / Ushio and Akebano / under
command of Commanding Officer Hayataka blanks Truk and
Empire.

2. Commander Advance Force will have the Umakaze and
carry out protection of the above force
between Truk and the Empire, after which they will carry
out maintenance."

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 22, (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM: No originator
TO:

17/2100 July

*From Hayataka: Hayataka (Radio guard ? ship), Ryuho, Unyo, DesDiv 7 (blank 7, Ushio), Umikaze, Urakaze (?) will leave and enter communication zones as follows: Until 0400 July 20, 4th Comm Zone (Truk Comm Zone) (NA 41). Until 1700 blank (5th Base Force?) Comm Zone (NA 51). Thereafter in Kure Comm Zone. However Unyo (blank blank ship), Chuyo, DesDiv 7 blank blank blank Yokosuka Comm Zone (YO blank). Umikaze blank after 0800 July 24 Sasebo Comm Zone (H78).

Hayataka will guard Tokyo #1 and #2 broadcast (Guard ?) Truk broadcast (until 1200 July 21) Combined Fleet short wave (until same time?) Combined Fleet long wave (until 1800 July 19)."

Baker Comment: Above suggests Hayataka and Ryuho enroute Kure. Unyo and Chuyo plus DesDiv 7 destroyers enroute Yokosuka, and Umikaze enroute Sasebo.

No. A-4

FROM:
TO:

18/1805 July

(Air Arsenal
#2 Yokosuka) (B)

Reference HYPO 190142. NEGAT's copy none too good here but here is translation of first portion.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 22, No. A-4 (Cont.)

Says: "In company with Unyo, Chuyo and DesDiv 7 (Akedono, Ushio) will break off from the group going to Kure at 1430 in position 31-00 North, 136-44 East, and proceed at 12 knots. At 0500 on 24th, bearing 032, distance 10 miles from -garbled but could be Irozaki) etc, blanks."

NEGAT COMMENT: Remainder is the same.

GI COMMENT: Heading supplied from HYPO's 190142 which also had other details regarding the passengers and cargo on board the Unyoo and Chuyoo. The destination of the group breaking off in the above position is Yokosuka.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
INFO: NPM FOX

20/0943 July

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SERIAL 56 UHRA X BAG OF PEANUTS CONTAINING 2 OR 3
ASHES* DIVIDING INTO 2 BUNDLES X BLANK (COURSE UNKNOWN)
PLUS 8 (SPEED 12 KNOTS) X MINUS 630 (TIME 0530) X
PLUS 8 (DATE 23) X MJXX 0144 (31-01 E 136-44 E) X
PIRCZENKOWSKI CONDUCT PEANUT ROAST AND DONT SAVE THE
ASHES X POMPANO NOTE AND BOTH OF YOU SEE MY NEXT
SERIAL

*NOTE: ASH IS A CARRIER

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 22 (Cont.)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
 NPN FOR
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

20/1018 July

UTTRA FROM SUBPAC COMMANDER SERIAL 570 SOUTHWESTERLY
WIND BLOWING SOME ASHES TOWARD RED STONER X MAYBE 1
MAYBE 2 X ABOUT 1205 X PLUS 8 X PLUS 800 X PLUS 8
X SKIPJACK TAKE POSITION JZIH 3007 IN TIME TO RENDER
HONORS X

POMPAHO IF SUFFICIENT FUEL AND TORPEDOES REMAINING
TAKE STATION 6 MILES BEARING 270 FROM SKIPJACK X IF
NO CONTACT AFTER WAITING 14 HOURS BEYOND TIME SET
STONER CONTINUE PATROL AND THOMAS HEAD FOR THE BARN X
PIECZENTKOWSKI IF YOU SLOW ANY OF THESE BABIES DOWN
USE 450 KILOCYCLES TO INFORM RED AND TOM

*(34-30N, 139-07 E)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was on the average
good. No serials were missed.

No. C-2

July 19

We cannot be very far from the center of a
typhoon. The seas are mountainous.....

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 22, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 20-22

Patrolling to southward of our area. Nothing seen.

July 23

1650 (I) Heavy seas and strong winds from the southeast
Sound picked up screws dead ahead.
1653 (I) Saw one destroyer bearing 258 degrees
relative.....The seas were so high could only
see top of his stack and masts at this close
range. Lat. 30-57N, Long. 137E.
1655 (I) Could just see the flight decks of two
carriers down the troughs of the waves.....
At no time could sound pick up the screws
of the carriers. Range of periscope visibility
very low because of high seas.

July 24-25

Heading back to, and in southern part of area.
Departed area for Midway July 25, 1943.

July 27

Patrolled vicinity 33N, 141 E. Nothing sighted

July 28

Surface cruising to Midway.

U.S.S. Pompano

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: HPM reception was good though SubPac
serials 15 and 55 were missed.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 22 (Cont.)

No. C-4

July 22

33-27 N, 142-45 E, submerged on radar contact
5 miles to 3 miles.

0945 (I) Plane sighted through periscope 15 minutes
later.

1145 (I) Surfaced.

July 23

1440 (X) 34-10 N, 148-54 E, submerged for 40 minutes
on radar contact at 3 miles.

1727 (X) 34-06 N, 149-56 E, sank floating mine covered
and barnacled mine with 20 m.m. Result, a
fine explosion 100 to 150 yards from the
ship with bits of mine case dropping around.

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-5

See VII, Case 15, C-12 - C-14.

U.S.S. Lapen

First War Patrol

No. C-6

Radio Reception: The equipment on board is highly
satisfactory.

No. C-7

July 23

0000 (X) Standing to southward to cover lanes
approaching Tokyo from the southeast and east.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 22, No. C-7 (Cont.)

- 0100 (K) Sighted a bright light bearing 214° T. on horizon - could not make out any other details probably a fishing boat or a patrol.
Visibility good - bright moon, clear skies.
- 0442 (K) Star fix shows a 2.3 knot current setting 030° T. This is in general agreement with Pilot Charts but we didn't expect as much set as far off the beach as we are. Position - Lat. 34° - 40 N., Long. 141° - 16E.
- 0454 (K) Submerged. Changed course to 225° T. to hold our own against current and patrol across lanes to Tokyo.
- 1439 (K) Sighted destroyer, bearing 240° T. Range approximately 6000 yards. Battle Stations.
- 1440 (K) Sighted second destroyer and one large aircraft carrier. Range 5000 yards, speed 20, course southeast. Destroyers patrolling.
- 1440-50 (K) One aircraft bomb landed close by.
- 1442 (K) At periscope depth. Second aircraft bomb landed fairly close. Rigged for depth charge.
- 1443 (K) First depth charge landed not very close.
- 1445 (K) Went deep, 250 to 280 feet.
- 1447 (K) Groups of depth charges being dropped - some we guess at 1000 to 1500 yards - others may be a little closer - none closer than the usual 400 yard indoctrination charges.
Started evasive maneuvers. About 20 charges dropped - pinging is heard intermittently.
High speed screws of at least 300 RPM heard.
- 1600 (K) Deep - still hear searching vessels close by.
- 1700 (K) Deep - still hear searching vessels close by.
- 1807 (K) Screws fairly close - pinging on slow scale.
- 1857 (K) About 6 depth charges dropped - appear to be distant - 3000 to 4000 yards.
- 2005 (K) Came to periscope depth. Nothing sighted. Visibility hazy.
- 2045 (K) Surfaced. Sighted destroyer distant about 4000 yards, bearing 165° T. Another destroyer or patrol bearing 180° T. at about same distance. Changed course to 330° T. Cut in all engines and cleared area to northward. Heard heavy explosion from astern, source unknown.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 22, No. C-7 (Cont.)

- 2143 (X) Sighted two yellow flares on port beam -
apparently from patrol craft.
2150 (X) Changed course to 0900 - Believe we have
shaken patrol craft. Made decision to stand
to eastward in view of being unable to reach
assigned position and to cover alternate
track assigned by Comsubpac dispatch.

July 24

- 0115 (X) Sent contact report regarding aircraft
carrier to Comsubpac.

No. C-8

Description of Contact

Hor: 3
Date: July 23
Time: 1440 (X)
Latitude: 34-28N
Longitude: 140-58E
Type: 1 CV
Initial Range: 5000 yards
Est. Course
and Speed: S.E. 20 kts.
How Cont.: Periscope

Case 23

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

21/1235 July

(Yokosuka Naval
Munitions Section)
(Garble)
(Kiska Comm Unit)

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 23, No. A-1 (Cont.)

"From Captain - Derin Maru?).
(1) This ship escorted by the Hamikaze departs Paramushiro Island at 1600, 21st July, and is scheduled to pass through following points at times indicated:
22nd, 1100, 47 North, 157 East.
24th, 0100, 40 North, 152 East.
25th, 1800, 35 North, 144 East.
26th, 1700, arrive Yokosuka Speed 12.5 knots.
(2) Upon arrival Yokosuka, desire to load 10,000 tons light oil, 1,000 tons of #1 heavy oil for use of this ship, and blank heavy oil for boiler use. Also 500 tons of fresh water. For use of (- unident DD) and - unident DD) request 300 tons heavy oil for boiler use and 15 tons of fresh water."

REGAT COMMENT: is Maru whose call is JWLQ.

GI COMMENT: Phoned Subpac at 0230 (-9) July 22.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: COMSOPAC
INFO:

21/1827 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

1. HARU WITH 1 DESTROYER ESCORT DEPARTED PARAMUSHIRU
210700 ENROUTE YOKOSUKA X ULTRA X AT 220200 IN 157
EAST 47 NORTH X PASS 40 NORTH 152 EAST AT 231600 X
AT 250900 POSIT 144 EAST 35 NORTH X TIMES AND DATES
ARE GCT X

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: HARTHAL (SS167)
SALMON (SS182)
INFO: CINCPAC

22/0847 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 23, No. B-2 (Cont.)

ULTRA X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 61 Q X 1 LARGE BIRCH X BLANK
PLUS 2.5 X MINUS 1000 X PLUS 7 DGGW (PLUS 7 47
DEG NORTH 157 DEG WEST) X BLANK X BLANK X PLUS 400 X
PLUS 8 OSVQ (PLUS 8 40 DEG NORTH 152 DEG EAST) X
BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 300 X PLUS 10 PRBP (PLUS 10
35 DEG NORTH 144 DEG EAST) X WATCHOUT FOR EACH OTHER
AND FOR S BOATS TO NORTHWARD OF YOU WHO MAY TRY TO
STEAL THIS ONE FROM YOU X FIRST POSITION MAY POSSIBLY
BE DGZX (47 DEG NORTH 153 DEG EAST) X RED SEA DRAGON

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Narwhal

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: All serials received were complete;
reception was only fair.

No. C-2

July 21

0013 (K) Completed transmission of NARWHAL "CAST".
1330 (K) Departed from Area 1 Able, heading southeast
through special area of patrol boat contacts.
Steering sixty percent zigzag to cover wide
area.

July 23

0133 (K) Running in and out search along possible enemy
tracks.

July 24

0900 (K) No. 4 main engine out of commission with two
broken cylinder head belts.
1600 (K) No. 4 main engine in commission.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 25

- C800 (K) Having exhausted all possible enemy tracks with no contacts, again set course through area of patrol boat contacts.
2130 (K) Received ComSubPac's Serial 76.
2217 (K) Altered course to search patrol boat contacts.

July 26

- C800 (K) Lat. 36-35 N; Long. 152-34 E. barometer falling, heavy swells, wind building up to force 6.
1122 (K) Lat. 36-15; Long. 152-45, plane contact on SD radar, 9 miles, closing. Dived. Unable to maintain periscope depth at 70 feet in heavy swells. Plane not sighted, at this point we were 540 miles from HONSHU and 600 miles from MARCUS. Stayed down for lunch.
1323 (K) Surfaced.
Continued on surface, cruising over a 92% zigzag plan superimposed on four hour legs 200 to right and left of base course between possible contact points to cover maximum area.

U.S.S. Salmon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete.

No. C-4

July 17

1300 H Departed Submarine Base Midway for area with surface escort until dark.
Made trim dive.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 23, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 17-24

Enroute patrol area. Made daily training dives held daily fire control drills, and conducted general indoctrination and instruction of the crew.

During the training dive on July 21, the operating gear for negative flood valve became inoperative (see section under major defects for full description of casualty). During the night, with the ship lying to with all floods closed, Lieutenant L. P. Davis, Jr., U.S.N. and Ensign J. P. Woodling, U.S.N. entered negative tank through number two main ballast tank, removed a broken section of negative flood valve linkage, and brought it into the boat where it was straightened and reenforced, and then reinstalled it. This was a job well done under difficult conditions and gave us the use of negative tank during the patrol.

July 25-31

Entered the area on July 25. We had expected to find fog in this area from reading available meteorological data but nothing like the actuality. The fog was dense and persistent, visibility ranging from zero to 1000 yards. We cruised around waiting for it to clear until we were hopelessly lost. In view of the prevailing southeasterly winds decided our only hope was to go thru one of the passes into the sea of Okhotsk to the lee of the Kuriles chain. On 29 July commenced return along our track to break thru the fog.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 24

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Vessel tanker
in Balikpapan Zone)
(B)

22/1136 July

TO: (4th Fleet) (C)

*From Comdr #3 Tonan Maru

In 21 July 1900 posit (03-26 N, 138-00 E) will change course.

At 0330 on July 23 pass 25 miles south of Satawal Island proceed via blank of Enderby Island on blank July at 0600 arrive South Channel."

GI COMMENT: Given to SubPac by phone at 1830 (I)
22 July.

No. A-2

FROM: (#3 Tonan Maru)
TO:

22/1136 July

*From Commander of #3 Tonan Maru

At 1900 on (82944 - 22nd July?) in position 0-26 N, 138 E, will change course and proceed to Truk passing through a point 25 miles South of blank ON Island at 0330 on (33312 - 24th July?)."

HEGAT COMMENT: In Hecat's 221622 we guessed as 23rd July, but in view of distance involved in above message, believe that 25th July is better, although this is based on value of 22nd July for which previously has been guessed as 21st July. However, since this message was originated at 1136 on 22nd, believe 22nd July is more probable for this group.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 24, No. A-2 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Hypo 221706 version is quoted:

"From Comdr #3 Tonan Maru
In 21 July 1900 posit (03-26 N, 138 E) will change
course. At 0330 on July 23 pass 25 miles south of
Satawal Island proceed via blank of Enderby Island on
blank July at 0600 arrive South Channel."

Hypo version given to SubPac by phone at 1830 (I)
22 July.

No. A-3

FROM: (2nd Fleet 23/1105 July
Tanker)

TO:

INFO:

From: Captain #3 Tonan Maru.

In accordance with #2 Sea Escort Force # blank
paragraph 3 change the rendezvous point for
and #3 Tonan Maru to 07-04 N, 148-24 E at 0930 24 July.

GI COMMENT: HSS 230929 has posit at 140-24 E. Hypo's
148-plots much better and is good value.

Phoned to SubPac at 1850 (I) 23rd.

No. A-4

FROM: (#3 Tonan 23/1105 July
Maru)

TO:

INFO: (Garbled)

"From Commander #3 Tonan Maru.

In accordance with para 3 of #2 Surface Escort Unit

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 24, No. A-4 (Cont.)

SMS #50 the time and place of rendezvous for _____
and #3 Tonan Maru is changed to 0930 the blank (*) at
07-04 N, 140-24 E.

Negat Note: (*) Date blank may be 24 July.

NEGAT COMMENT: _____ is unrecovered group, but
judging from its position in message, assume it is a
ship. See Negat's 1802 of 22nd.

GI COMMENT: Hypo has already notified subs (1850 (I)
23). Hypo's (local) version posit of 148-24 E is clear
and plots best. Negat's 221802:
"From Commander of #3 Tonan Maru
At 1900 on (_____, 22nd July?) in position 0-26 N,
138 E, will change course and proceed to Truk passing
through a point 25 miles south of blank ON Island at
0330 on _____ (- 24th July?) and along Northern edge
of blank arriving South Channel at 0600 on (04041 -
25th July?)."

NEGAT COMMENT: In Negat's 221642 we guessed _____ as
23rd July, but in view of distance involved in above
message, believe that 25th July is better, although this
is based on value of 22nd July for _____ which
previously has been guessed as 21st July. However
since this message was originated at 1156 on 22nd,
believe 22nd July is more probable for this group.

GI COMMENT: Hypo 221706 version is quoted:
"From Comdr #5 Tonan Maru

In 21 July 1900 posit (03-26 N, 138 E) will change
course.

At 0330 on July 23 pass 25 miles south of Sataval
Island proceed via blank of Enderby Island on blank
July at 0600 arrive South Channel."

Hypo version given to SubPac by phone at 1830 (I)
22 July."

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 24 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: TINOSA STEELHEAD
ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

22/1207 July

ULTRA FOR POSSIBLE USE TINOSA AND STEELHEAD X 280
POPCORN X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 200 X PLUS 6 RQHV
2600 (03-26 NORTH 138-00 EAST) X BLANK X BLANK X PLUS
630 X PLUS 7 X CDUT 0005 (07-00 NORTH 147-05 EAST)
X THEN VIA PULWAT ENTERING SOUTH CHANNEL TRUK PLUS
900 PLUS 8 X SERIAL 63

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: CINCPAC
ALL SUBS GUARDING
NPM FOX
INFO:

23/0911 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 68 X BLUE SEA DRAGON X DATES
GIVEN IN MY SERIAL 63 SHOULD BE ONE DAY LATER AND
CHANGE QUOTE VIA PULWAT UNQUOTE TO READ NORTH OF
PULWAT X FOR TINOSA AND STEELHEAD

No. B-3

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: TINOSA STEELHEAD
ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX
INFO:

23/1755 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR TINOSA AND STEELHEAD X 280 POPCORN X COURSE

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 24, No. B-3 (Cont.)

BLANK X SPEED BLANK X TIME -1130 (-0030) X DATE -/
9 (24TH) CDPH 0424 (7-04 N 148-24 E) X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 6, C-7.

No. C-2

July 22

- 0423 (L) Was proceeding to north of area when at Latitude 07-30N Long. 150-30 E. Made morning dive and at
- 0432 (L) Fire was reported in the Maneuvering Room. Lost propulsion until at
- 0445 (L) When fire was extinguished and propulsion was resumed on the port shaft only. While investigating the cause of the fire sound made contact on bearing 020°, light fast screws. Made periscope observation, but could see nothing in the rain squall prevailing. At
- 0500 (L) Lost contact. Fire was caused by a burnt-out starting resistance in the starboard motor. Replaced damaged resistor and at
- 0857 (L) Both shafts were in normal operation, until at
- 1108 (L) A loud click developed in the starboard shaft while running at dead slow, 42 RPM. Went ahead on port shaft for the remainder of the day investigating the cause of the knock. During the morning heard three or four depth charges, all distant. By
- 1800 (L) Had determined source of noise to be in the coupling of #1 motor. Decided to get well

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 24, No. C-2 (Cont.)

clear of TRUK and try to effect repairs. Broke coupling and ran all night on three motors towards northern boundary of area.

July 23

0428 (L)

At Lat 09-50N, Long. 151-30E. Dove and continued investigating possible remedies for starboard shaft. As we had no spare coupling to install in place of the damaged one, decided to continue patrol as long as possible with damaged parts. We could run at 80 RPM on the port shaft only for silent running and if we had to have more speed, we could still use the starboard shaft, noise and all, in a pinch. Reconnected the coupling to run on all 4 motors. With those operating limitations it was decided to keep well clear of the patrol boat areas where a prolonged depth charging might prove embarrassing.

July 23
to
July 30

Continued patrolling area using a high periscope wherever conditions permitted. No contacts were made, but on surfacing on 29 July, found antenna trunk flooded. Could not locate source of leak, but antenna operated satisfactorily after trunk was drained. This condition continued for the remainder of the patrol.

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: All consecutive serials were received.

No. C-4

July 22

2326 (K) Changed course to 180°T to patrol Borneo-Truk route.

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

July 23

Surface patrol, nothing sighted. Position in vicinity Lat. 7-00N, Long 140-00E.

July 24

- 0442 (K) Changed course to 070° T to investigate possible contact.
- 0555 (K) Sighted target through high periscope bearing 162° T, angle on bow 90 port, range about 35000 yards. Began end run. Target similar to TOHAN MARU No. 2.
- 0809 (K) Obtained position ahead, angle on bow zero. Submerged.
- 0823 (K) Sighted target. Angle on bow 35 port. Took normal approach course, high speed.
- 0928 (K) Fired four torpedoes. At least two hits.
- 0932 (K) Four depth charges dropped by target, one large.
- 0934 (K) Target had turned away, angle on bow 150 port, range 1700 yards. Tracked and at
- 0938 (K) Fired two torpedoes; two hits. Two explosions heard by personnel in submarine. Second hit in port quarter made much smoke and target stopped, took port list and settled by stern almost immediately.
- 0940 (K) Four depth charges.
- 1009 (K) Having observed target carefully and found no evidence of sinking, approached and fired one torpedo at starboard side. Hit, heard by sound to stop at same time I observed large splash. No apparent effect. Target had corrected list and was firing at periscope and at torpedo wakes with machine guns and four inch.
- 1011 (K) Fired eighth torpedo. Hit. No apparent effect.
- 1014 (K) Fired ninth torpedo. Hit. No apparent effect. Target firing at periscope, when exposed, and at wakes when torpedoes were running. Crossed track to observe for nets; none rigged.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- 1039 (K) Fired tenth torpedo. Hit. No apparent effect.
- 1048 (K) Fired eleventh torpedo. Hit. No effect. This torpedo hit well aft on the port side, made a splash at the side of the ship, and was then observed to have taken a right turn and to jump clear of the water about one hundred feet from the stern of the tanker. I find it hard to convince myself that I saw this.
- 1050 (K) Fired twelfth torpedo. Hit. No effect.
- 1100 (K) Fired thirteenth torpedo. Hit. No effect. Circled again to fire at other side.
- 1122 (K) Picked up high speed screws.
- 1125 (K) Sighted DD approaching from east. Angle on bow zero.
- 1131 (K) Fired fourteenth torpedo. Hit. No effect.
- 1132 (K) Fired fifteenth torpedo. Started deep. DD range 1000 yards. Torpedo heard to hit tanker and stop running by sound. Periscope had gone under by this time. No explosion. Had already decided to retain one torpedo for examination by base.
- 1142 (K) After search, first pattern of three depth charges. Close but to port. Negative temperature gradient began at 190 feet.
- 1147 (K) Destroyer passed directly overhead from starboard bow to port quarter. Screws could be heard clearly through hull at 310 feet.
- 1148 (K) He didn't know it.
- 1156 (K) Pattern of four depth charges. Close. All sounded as if set deep. Lockers jarred open but no other damage. Search continued but gradually getting more distant.
- 1357 (K) Periscope depth. Tanker still afloat, down by stern and with port list. DD about 6000 yards away. Maintained periscope watch, DD gradually searching to other side of tanker. We were to east, watching for any additional escorts.
- 1800 (K) Lost sight of tanker in haze and twilight, range about six miles.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

1937 (K) Surfaced. Sent report to ComSubPac via Australia. Repeated one group for station in vicinity. Believe STEELHEAD. To insure reception broadcast twice on 450 KC's. Started charge, began run to west of target to be ready to pick up target again if necessary to guide STEELHEAD. Moon rise was due about midnight.

2220 (K) Received orders to return to Pearl.

No. C-5

Description of Contacts

No: 4
Time: 0555 (K)
Date: July 24
Latitude: 6-55N
Longitude: 147-10E
Type: Tanker
Description: TONAN MARU
Course: 073
Speed: 13
Remarks: Loaded

No: 5
Time: 1120 (K)
Date: July 24
Type: Destroyer
Course: 265
Speed: —
Remarks: High speed
Latitude: 6-57N
Longitude: 148-00E

D - Verification

No. D-1

FROM: (Concealed
identity)
TO: (#3 Tonan Maru)
INFO:

24/1620 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 24. No. D-1 (Cont.)

"From Captain of - Isuzu?).

- Isuzu?) and Asanagi) are scheduled
to arrive on scene at 0530 on 25th blanks."

GI COMMENT: Previously sent in HYP0's 241702. #3
Tonan Maru was torpedoed in 06-56 North, 147-52 East,
on 24th July and unable to make way.

No. D-2

FROM:

24/1620 July

TO:

(#3 Tonan Maru)
(1)

INFO:

"From Commanding Officer Isuzu with
and Asanagi expect arrive at scene 0530, tomorrow
25th July."

HYP0 COMMENT: DI under TI label.

GI COMMENT: (Refers #3 Tonan disaster).

Phoned to SubPac Duty Officer 250015 (-9).

Case 25

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

(Yokosuka
Naval Station)

19/1001 July

TO:

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 25, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO:

(Base Force #4)

(Marcus Island Force)
(Chichi-jima Base Force)

(11th Air Fleet)

"Convoy 3719 [Asakaze Maru (and about
5 other Marus)] departed NAA (Yokosuka) for PT (Truk)
at 1000, 19th.
Noon positions 20th - 29th:
20th, 32-27 N, 139-40 E.
21st, 29-26 N, 140-20 E.
22nd, 26-28 N, 140-44-467 E.
23rd, 23-30 N, 141-30 E.
24th, 20-47 N, 142-52 E.
25th, 18-05 N, 144-18 E.
26th, 15-30 N, 145-53 E.
27th, 15-blank N, 1477-40 E.
28th, 10-40 N, 149-35 E.
29th, 08-00 N, 151-blank E.

At 0800 29th scheduled to pass 20 miles northeast of
Point "T".

NEGAT COMMENT: Latitude for 27th obviously in error
but unable to change.

GI COMMENT: CcmSubPac notified at 1525 (I).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

23/0823 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 25, No. B-1 (Cont.)

COMSUBPAC SENDS ULTRA SERIAL 64 X 075 POPCORN AND 5
POPIARS (MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) X BLANK X BLANK X MINOR
900 PLUS 11 TBMQ 3053 (15-30 NORTH 145-53 EAST)
ALGAROA QST 0540 (15-05 NORTH 147-40 EAST) WFWZ 4033
(10-40 NORTH 149-35 EAST) X TINOSA HANDLER THIS X HAVE
ANOTHER JOB FOR POGY AND STEELHEAD X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Tinosa

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

July 24

2220 (K) Received orders to return to Pearl.

July 25

0128 (K) Sighted Pikelot Island. Running on surface.
1737 (K) Sighted merchantman, angle on bow 70 port,
bearing 080 relative.
Own course 010°T. Lat. 11-44N, Long. 148-12E.
Put on four main engines. Stationed gun
crew.
1755 (K) Secured. Identified as hospital ship,
very similar to BAIKAL MARU. Changed course
to 200°T to mislead Japs. Sure enough, after
we opened out, he changed course to pass
astern of us and get our course. No radio
transmissions heard.
1831 (K) Out of sight through high periscope. Took
easterly course to great circle track.

July 26 -
August 4

Enroute Pearl. Daily Dives and drills.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 26

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

22/1703 July

INFO:

(Garble)
(Garble)
(Garble)

"From Captain of Awata Maru

Departed Paramushiru Strait for Yokosuka at 1700.
Will arrive at a point 5 miles south of blank at
0600 on 27th after passing through following points:
46-00 North, 156-25 East.
34-00 North, 146-00 East.
Scheduled to arrive at 1000? on 27th. Can carry about
2200 tons of cargo and about blank passengers."

NEGAT COMMENT: Arrival time is garbled and may be
"1430." The last sentence refers to the load he can
take back with him.

GI COMMENT: Hypo's translation (NFM 221706) varies
in its positions which were impossible to recover
accurately.
The essential material was phoned to SubPac at 0445
(-9) July 23.

No. A-2

FROM:
TO:

22/1703 July

(Defense Force
Unit Yokosuka) (C)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 26, No. A-2 (Cont.)

INFO:

(WX Station Marcus) (B)

"From Captain Awata Maru.

Departed Paramushiro Strait for Yokosuka at 1700. Passing through posits 46-15(?) N, 156-25 E and 34-40 N, 14 blank-00 E will be 15 miles south of Nojima Saki at 0600 July 27th. At 1000 same day am scheduled to arrive. Loaded with about 2200 (tons?) of supplies and about 400 persons."

GI COMMENT:

Not phoned to subs. No sub available to meet first posit. Blank longitude in second posit makes it too indefinite. Arrival date can wait for Comdr Voge.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX
NARWHAL
SALMON
SKIPJACK

23/0833 July

INFO:

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUBPAC SERIAL 65 S X ANOTHER ULTRA FOR NARWHAL
SALMON AND SKIPJACK X 069 POPCORN AND 1 POPLAR X
BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 700 X PLUS 8 SPEK 1525
(46-15 NORTH 156-25 EAST) X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 1100
PLUS 11 X JZJY 4000 (34-40 NORTH 146-00 EAST) BLANK
BLANK X PLUS 900 X PLUS 11 JZLH 3953 (34-39 NORTH
139-53 EAST) X IAPON CAN WORK ON THIS ONE ALSO IF STILL
IN VICINITY X TIMES GIVEN ARE ONLY APPROXIMATE

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 25 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Marwal

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 23, C-2.

U.S.S. Salmon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-2

See VII, Case 23, C-4.

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 15, C-12.

No. C-4

July 26

- 0040 (I) Sighted convoy of three vessels bearing 195T. Convoy consisted of two escorts and one large ship headed on course about 350 T bound for Tokyo Bay. While maneuvering to track the convoy range decreased to about 6000 yards on nearest vessel.
- 0049 (I) Being up moon from convoy, dived to avoid detection and upon returning to 35 feet was unable to find targets either by periscope or radar observations. We probably had been sighted and convoy turned away.
- 0116 (I) Surfaced and conducted search to northeastward at four engine speed for about one hour until proximity of HOJIMA SAKI made further attempt

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 26, No. C-4 (Cont.)

to close useless. Contact was never regained.

July 27

Patrolling eastern approaches to Tokyo Bay. SJ Radar out of commission. This is quite a blow as all traffic seems to move at night in this area.

No. C-5

Description of Contact

No:	11
Time:	0040 (I)
Date:	July 26
Latitude:	34-17 N
Longitude:	140-29 E
Type(s):	1 large ship 2 escorts
Initial Range:	6 mi. 195(T)
Course & Speed:	340 Unknown
How Contacted:	Lookout
Remarks:	

U.S.S. Lapen

First War Patrol

No. C-6

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 22, C-6.

No. C-7

July 24

0115 (K) Sent contact report regarding aircraft carrier to ComSubPac.
0149 (K) Sighted patrol craft, possibly small destroyer, bearing 082 T. distant 6000 yards. Changed course and evaded.
0215 (K) Radar reports contact - small "pip" on starboard bow. Range 6000 yards. Changed course and evaded.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 26. No. G-7 (Cont.)

- 0230 (K) Back on 090T., having evaded both patrols. We believe the Jap's DP'd our transmissions. They seemed to be headed for us when sighted.
- 0450 (K) Submerged.
- 0608 (K) Sighted type 97 heavy bomber, on parallel course on starboard beam, 2000-3000 feet high. Patrolled all day on course east.....print illegible...Weather clear.
- 2000 (K) Surfaced - weather clear - took star sights.
- 2119 (K) Changed course to 070T. to close estimated track of convoy.

July 23

- 0430 (K) Morning twilight - partially overcast, - star sights.
- 0535 (K) Submerged. Altered course to patrol on track of convoy.
- 0900 (K) Sighted type 97 heavy bomber, bearing 045 T., about 4000 feet, on estimated course 210 T. This is same type as sighted yesterday.
- 1924 (K) Surfaced - horizon clear, sky partially clear.
- 1947 (K) Sighted type 97 heavy bomber, 330 T., about 10 miles, on slightly converging course. Submerged. Consider plane may not have seen us. Surprised to find a patrol this far out at this late hour.
- 2017 (K) Surfaced.
- 2030 (K) Patrolling a line 8 miles long, on courses 305 and 125 T. Patrolling at 12 knots.

July 28

- 0437 (K) Submerged. Disappointed on fruitlessness of patrol.
- 1922 (K) Surfaced. Took up great circle course for Midway.

Case 27

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

(The heading of this dispatch is not available-Ed. note)

"From Commanding Officer Otaka."

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 27, No. A-1 (Cont.)

1. Otaka will depart Yokosuka with Maikaze at 0800 on the 23rd. Expect arrive PT 1430 on the 28th.

2. Will pass through following points:

23rd, 1030(?) - 34-52 North, 139-46 East.
23rd, 2115 - 33-15 North, 143-32 East.
24th, 0905 - 31-10 North, 145-40 East.
27th, 0510 - 14-33 North, 154-00 East.
27th, 1200 - 12-40 North, 154-00 East.
28th, 0800 - 07-blank North, 154-00 East.

GI COMMENT: PT - Truk (CD).

Gave to ComSubPac (Commander Voge) July 231400 (-9).

28th, 1500 - 07-06 North, 152-00 East.

Transit PT South Channel 1350, speed 18 to 20 knots.

3. Since this ship has only 1 screening vessel please make special arrangements for additional screen and anti-submarine patrol planes from 1200 on the 27th in position 12-40 North, 154-00 East."

NEGAT COMMENT: This is part 1 of 2 part message. Part 2 concerns cargo and passengers and will be sent as soon as finished (so the lads will know what went down when they sink her).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
HFM FOX

23/0942 July

INFO:

PREC: ROUTINE

UTTRA X 026 PEANUT WITH ONLY 1 DD X BLANK X PLUS 8-13
X -1155 X PLUS 9 X 31-10 NORTH 145-40 EAST X BLANK X
PLUS 815 X PLUS 11 X 150-33 NORTH 154-00 EAST X BLANK
X BLANK X -900 X PLUS 12 X 12-40 NORTH 154-00 EAST X
BLANK X BLANK X PLUS 900 X -12 7-00 NORTH

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 27, No. B-1 (Cont.)

154-00 EAST X MINUTES OF LATITUDE FOR LAST POSITION
UNKNOWN X SPEARFISH AND POGY WORK THIS ONE NORTH AND
SOUTH RESPECTIVELY OF 14-50 NORTH 154-00 EAST X
STEELHEAD ANYWHERE BETWEEN 8 DEGREES NORTH AND 12
DEGREES NORTH X TRANSPORTS WILL BE PRESENT AFTER BLANK
BLANK 900 PLUS 12 X IF ANYONE SLOWS HIM DOWN LET US
KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THOSE FARTHER SOUTH
CAN FINISH HIM OFF

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Spearfish

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception was good at all times.

No. C-2

July 16 to
July 27

Patrolling on surface, made trim dives at
dawn. No contacts.

July 28

Patrolling on surface on course 350° T.
0120 (K) Set course for eastern edge of area at three
engine speed.
0452 (K) Submerged.
0532 (K) Surfaced.
1730 (K) Departed area, set course for Midway.

July 29 to
July 31

Enroute to Midway, made trim dives at dawn.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case B7, (Cont.)

U.S.S. Fox

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 1, C-4.

No. C-4

July 22-23

Patrolling Guam-Saipan-Truk route enroute to area 14 south.

July 24

Submerged patrol, reconnoitering east coast of Guam. No signs of building or other activity.

July 25-26

En route assigned area, patrolling across Empire-Truk routes.

July 27-30

Surface and submerged patrol, in assigned areas, on Empire-Truk routes.

July 28

1400 (K)

Sighted a floating mine, Lat. 14-35N Long. 152-38E. Unsuccessfully attempted to sink with 20mm. and rifle fire.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 6, C-7.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 27, (Cont.)

July 23

0428 (L)

At Latitude 09° - 50'E. Longitude 151° - 31'E. Dove and continued investigating possible remedies for starboard shaft. As we had no spare coupling to install in place of the damaged one, decided to continue patrol as long as possible with damaged parts. We could run at 80 RPM on the port shaft only for silent running and if we had to have more speed, we could still use the starboard shaft, noise and all, in a pinch. Reconnected the coupling to run on all 4 motors. With these operating limitations it was decided to keep well clear of the patrol boat areas where a prolonged depth charging might prove embarrassing.

July 23
to July 30

Continued patrolling area using a high periscope wherever conditions permitted. No contacts were made, but on surfacing on 29 July, found antenna trunk flooded. Could not locate source of leak, but antenna operated satisfactorily after trunk was drained. This condition continued for the remainder of the patrol.

Case 28

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

(#1 Escort
Force)

21/1400 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 28, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: _____

(Palao Comm. Unit)

(3rd SoEx Fleet)
(Takao Comm. Unit)

(Tarakan Trans. Office)

A Palao bound convoy of 6 vessels (including 2 ships for Ambon and 1 for Davao) escorted by Fuyo will depart Tarakan at 0700 on the 22nd. Speed 9 knots. Scheduled to arrive at 1800 on 27th. Ships bound for Palao are "A" vessels blanks and Shinyu Maru (JNPD) and "B" vessel Ten Blank Maru (JYWR).

Noon positions:

For Palao group - 22, 3-38 N, 118-08 E.
23, 3-19 N, 120-35 E.
24, 2-32 N, 125-08 E.
25, 3-50 N, 128-18 E.
26, 6-04 N, 131-01 E.
27, 7-40 N, 134-05 E.

For Ambon group - 25th, 00N, 126-06 E.
26th, 3-26S, 127-53 E.

For Davao-bound vessel - 23rd, 3-44N, 120-45 E.
24th, 5-02N, 125-16 E.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOR

24/0711 July

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 28, No. B-1 (Cont.)

SERIAL 71 FROM SUBPAC COMMANDER X ULTRA X PECAN X BLANK
X BLANK X MINUS 900 (TIME 0300 GCT) X PLUS 10 (DATE
25TH X RQAS 5018 (LAT 03-50 NORTH LONG 128-13 EAST)
ALGARCEA VTCD 0401 (LAT 06-04 NORTH LONG 131-01
EAST) CDIQ 4005 (LAT 07-40 NORTH LONG 134-05 EAST) X
MINGO AND HADDOCK GIVE THIS THE PROPER ATTENTION
PROVIDED IT DOESN'T INTERFERE WITH PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS
X RED SEADRAGON

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 20, B-2 and C-4 - C-6.

U.S.S. Mingo

First War Patrol

No. C-2

See VII, Case 20, C-2 - C-3.

Case 29

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 19/0820 July
TO: (Naval Trans.
Section Tokyo) (B)
INFO: (Military Stores Section
Tokyo (B)
(Naval District Comdrs
Yokosuka (B)
(Defense Force Empire) (C)
(Local Trans. Section
Yokosuka) (C)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 29, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Base Force 6) (C)

(Civ. Eng. Det. in Marshalls) (C)

(Trans. Section Kwajalein) (C)

There is a shortage of aviation gasoline at the Wake airbase (short enough for about 200 land-based attack plane patrols). Since there is no ship available now for supplying Wake with gasoline, the #20 Hikage Maru which was assigned that task at direction of the 11th Air Fleet having run into disaster, in accordance with your SMS # blank request you arrange to have the Jootoo Maru proceed from Kwajalein to Wake and unload gasoline there.

Furthermore, in accordance with your SMS #08-812, request the blank () also proceed from Kwajalein to Tarca and blank.

No. A-3

FROM: (Kwajalein Transportation Office) 23/1909 July
TO:
INFO: (2nd Section NGS)

(Wake Detachment)

"Kwajalein July 23 departures:

Blank AN Maru for Wake. Scheduled to arrive at 0500, July 27."

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 29. (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM: (TPN Section 23/1909 July
Kwajalein) (C)
TO:
INFO: (2nd Section
Naval General Staff) (B)

Enciphered Wake Detachment

"Blank An Maru depart Kwajalein 23 July. Scheduled
arrive Wake 0500 July 27."

GI COMMENT: Message from KIWIRI (Kwajalein Base Force
8) on July 211655 said: "The blank AN Maru (carrying
2, 20 centimeter guns; 4, 15 centimeter guns; and
184 Army troops for #3 Garrison at Wake) will operate
in accordance with this Unit's OpOrd #54 (not available
in our files). Request special provisions for anti-
sub patrols subsequent to date).

ComSubPacFor informed at 0540 (-9), 24th.

No. A-4

FROM: (Base 22/1137 July
Force 6) (B)
TO:

INFO: (Nauru) (B)
(Seaplane Base at
Truk) (B)
(Air Flot 22) (B)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 29, No. A-4 (Cont.)

Schedule of operations of blank revised as follows:

Depart Kwajalein 23rd.
Depart Rucette 25th.
Depart Wake 29th.
Depart Wotje August 1st.
Depart Tarca August 4th.
Depart Mille August 7th.
Depart Tarava August ?
Depart Nauru August 14th.
Return to Kwajalein.

GI COMMENT: NSS 221712 has departure from Mille on 6th? and Tarava on 10th. Also originator date is 221101

No. A-5

FROM: _____
TO: _____ (Base Force
#6, Kwajalein)(C)
INFO: _____

25/1130 July

*Five B24's at 0844 and 3 B24 at 0930 raided us, flying over at an altitude of about 6000 meters, dropping bombs in the vicinity of the landing field. Some blank (possibly dropped 38 bombs). Fired 230 rounds of blank with no effect. Investigating damages (54417) (or possibly no damage)."

HYPO COMMENT: Broadcast from Guard Div. #65, Wake Island.

GI COMMENT: Wake raid.

No. A-6

FROM: _____ (Guard
by Truk)
TO: _____ (Surface Escort
Unit 2) (B)
(Civil Eng. Section
4 Brown Island) (B)
(Base Force 6) (B)

27/1325 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 29, No. A-6 (Cont.)

INFO: (Wake Guard Force) (B)

Blank An Maru arrived Wake 1300.

No. A-7

FROM:

27/2210 July

TO:

INFO:

(Kwajalein Base
Force #6)

"Inform me immediately the extent of damage to the Kanan Maru and if you expect to complete cargo handling. Request you do all possible in carrying out screening."

GI COMMENT: Hypo 280156 version gives D/T group at 272220 July. Believe this Maru bringing gas supply to Wake arriving 1300, July 27th.

No. A-8

FROM:

(Unidentified
ship)

28/0600 July

TO:

(Unident en-
ciphered address)

INFO:

(M.B.I. Address, carried
CofS)

Enciphered address
Military Stores)

(Tarakan BR 102

0200 28th.

Went aground on "Aru Bank". All efforts to refloat ship with own power have proved to no avail. Request tug be sent at once. Draft forward 6 feet, Draft amidships 7 feet. Draft aft 24 feet.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 29, No. A-8 (Cont.)

01 COMMENT: SCRE 7 at 281730 reported a possible running aground. Although calls give no clue timing of messages makes this a probable prelude to reference above.

No. A-9

FROM:

29/1352 July

TO:

(Base Force
#6)
(Kawakaze (DD)
(Commander?))

INFO:

*(Part 1). The blank AN Maru (escorted by SubChaser #33, #3 Shonan Maru and #11 Kyo Maru) will depart AA at 0600 on July 30 and arrive PT at 0930 (?) on August 5th. Speed 10 knots. Course and points at which course changes are made: (all North and East). Bearing blank degrees from AA (207-20, 165-blank) course 240. From 19-44N, 164-38 East, course 180. From 19-00 North, 164-38 East, course 210. From 18-18 North, 164-15 East, course 180. From 16-54 North, 164-15 East, course blank. From 14-28 North, 162-51 East, course 227. From 9-48 North, 157-37 East, course 235. From 7-50 North, 154-46 East, course 256. After that pass through Points "K" and "S".
Home posits: (north and East).

30th, 19-42 North, 165-44 East.

31st, 17-38 North, 164-15 East.

1st, 14-28 North, 162-51 East.

2nd, 12-08 North, 160-14 East.

3rd, 09-48 North, 157-37 East.

4th, 07-50 North, 154-46 East.

(Part 2). #3 Kyo Maru will leave the convoy at blank hours on the 31st and proceed to PQ.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 29, No. A-9 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Phoned ComSubPacFor at 0920 (-9) July 30.
Correction from "Escorting" to "escorted
by" supplied by NSS 292102.
AA is Wake (CD)
PQ is Kwajalein (CD).

No. A-10

FROM: _____ 29/1923 July
TO: _____ (Base Force
#6) _____
_____ (Air Flot #22)

(garbled)

"Moon posits (all North and East)
30th, 19-42 North, 165-44 East.
31st, 17-38 North, 164-15 East.
1st, 14-10 North, 164-15 East.
2nd, 10-blank North, 164-15 East.
3rd, 09-00 North, 167-20 East."

NEGAT COMMENT: This is part 2 of a 2-part message.
We have not received part one there-
fore unable to determine whose posits
the above will be.

GI COMMENT: HYPO has both parts and is currently
working on the first. Phoned this info
to SubPacFor at 0630 (-9) July 30.

No. A-11

FROM: _____ (Guard by _____ 29/1923 July
Truk)
TO: _____

INFO: _____

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 29, No. A-11 (Cont.)

*(Kan?) an Maru [escorted by - Subchaser #33],
#3 Kyoo Maru and #11 Kyoo Maru will depart Wake at
0600, July 30 and arrive Kwajalein at 1500, August 3.
Speed 10 knots. Route [points for changing course]

POSITION

COURSE THEREAFTER

From Wake	300 degrees
From 20-00N, 165-14 E.	240 degrees
From 19-44N, 164-38 E.	180 degrees
From 19-00N, 164-38 E.	210 degrees
From 18-18N, 164-15 E.	180 degrees
From 18-43N, 164-15 E.	120 degrees
From 09-17N, 166-48 E.	Proceed into shore toward blank channel.

HYPOTHESE: This is Part 1 of Jap 2-partar.
Negat's 291921 gave Part 2, with which
Hypo agrees entirely. Suggest
comparison with despatch reported in
Negat's 291931 and 291947.

GI COMMENT: Above information phoned to ComSubPacFor
at 1130 (-9) July 30.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS. GUARDING
INFO: CINCPAC

24/0817 July

PRIORITY: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ADDITIONAL ORDERS FOR SEADRAGON X ULTRA SERIAL 72
BLUE SEADRAGON X 1 POPLAR (MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN)
X BLANK (COURSE UNKNOWN) X BLANK (SPEED UNKNOWN) X
BLANK (TIME UNKNOWN) X PLUS 8 (DATE 23 JULY) X KIVE
5540 (08-55 N 167-40 E) AND AT BLANK (COURSE UNKNOWN)
X BLANK (SPEED UNKNOWN) X PLUS 800 (TIME 2000) X PLUS
11 (TIME 26 JULY) REACHES CENTER AREA 27 X EXACT ROUTE
UNKNOWN POSSIBLY SMALL BUT HAS VERY IMPORTANT CARGO X

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 29, No. B-1 (Cont.)

YOUR PRIMARY MISSION IS TO GET THIS BABY EVEN IF IT PREVENTS YOU FROM BEING IN POSITION FOR ANY PHASE SCHEDULED THAT DATE X IF UNABLE TO GET HIM GOING IN ATTEMPT ATTACK AT ANCHORAGE X GOOD POSSIBILITY DURING RAID WHEN LIBERATORS WILL BE AFTER HIM ALSO ANY DISTRACTING ANTISUB PATROLS

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FCI
INFO:

27/1932 July

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR SEA DRAGON X ULTRA X ARRIVAL POPLAR MENTIONED BY SERIAL 72 PROBABLY DELAYED BY BOMBING RAIDS X HE WAS NOT SIGHTED BY PLANES X IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY GOT HIM REMAIN UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS PATROLLING SOUTHERN APPROACHES X VERY IMPORTANT THAT THIS POPLAR BE POPPED X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 94 X INFORM US WHEN YOU GET HIM

* INTERCEPT *

No. B-3

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: SEADRAGON
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FCI
INFO: CINCPAC

28/1904 July

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

BELIEVE POPLAR (MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) MENTIONED BY SERIAL 72 EITHER HAS ANCHORED OR STRANDED IN CENTER AREA 27 X MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO FINISH HER OFF BEFORE SHE CAN BE UNLOADED X THIS IS ULTRA

No. B-4

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FCI
SEADRAGON
INFO: CINCPAC

30/0307 July

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 29. No. B-4 (Cont.)

CCMSUBPAC SENDS ULTRA SERIAL 4 TO SEADRAGON ONLY X
BELIEVE THIS IS MERCHANTMAN (TYPE UNKNOWN) YOU HAVE
BEEN LOOKING FOR X COURSE 180 X BLANK X 1100 GCT X 30
JULY 19-44 NORTH 164-38 EAST AND 6 HOURS LATER 19-00
NORTH 164-38 EAST AND 5 HOURS AFTER THAT 18-18 NORTH
164-15 EAST X BLANK X BLANK X 0300 GCT X 31 JULY 17-38
NORTH 164-15 EAST X 5 HOURS LATER 16-54 NORTH 164-15
EAST

X BLANK X BLANK X 0300 X 1 AUGUST 14-28 NORTH 162-51
EAST ALGAROBIA 12-08 NORTH 160-14 EAST X IF YOU GET
HIM OR IF NO CONTACT BY LAST TIME GIVEN PROCEED TO
MARSHALLS AND CARRY OUT ORIGINAL ORDERS X AS SOON AS
CONVENIENCE ACKNOWLEDGE THIS AND REPORT WHETHER SHIP
WAS ABLE TO UNLOAD AT WAKE

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Seadragon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Good and complete in all areas.

No. C-2

July 27

0100 (L) Commenced patrolling South of WAKE.
0510 (L) Dived, closing WAKE.
0829 (L) Sighted patrol boat dead ahead, maneuvered
to clear.
0910 (L) Sighted ship with bow on beach East of
Attack #1 channel to lagoon, no other ship in sight.
Contact #1
1110 (L) Decided to fire two torpedoes at grounded
freighter. It was a MPV coal burner of about
5,000 tons. Had a fresh coat of paint, one
barge alongside port quarter, considerable
activity on board. Bow was about 14 feet out
of water, otherwise appeared to be in good
shape.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 29, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1136 (L) Fired two torpedoes from bow tubes, 0° gyro angle, 110° track, range 2200 yards. Torpedoes observed running straight, leaving quite a trail of smoke. Sea glassy smooth.
- 1137-30 (L) Heard a thump, first torpedo must have been a dud.
- 1137-38 (L) One explosion at port quarter of ship. After smoke had cleared away barge had disappeared, ship was down by the stern with water clear up to the after deckhouse. Don't know whether torpedo hit the barge or the ship. Decided not to waste any more torpedoes and what further influenced my decision was the fact that the Jap shore batteries were firing at the periscope every time it was put up and there were two PC boats and one trawler standing out from the channel to the lagoon, headed in our direction.
- 1145 (L) Went to deep submergence to get under density layer we had previously found at 140 feet. All three patrol boats were pinging.
- 1158 (L) Three depth charges.
- 1220 (L) Two depth charges.
- 1231 (L) Two depth charges.
- 1535 (L) As pinging seemed to be not too close, came to periscope depth for observation. Sighted six Mitsubishi 96 bombers circling around in our vicinity.
- 1538 (L) Three bombs, too close. Thru the periscope looked as if the whole ocean had exploded. Went deep. Between 1538 and 1626 came to periscope depth seven times, and within three minutes after each time the periscope was run up, we would be greeted with a salvo of bombs.
- 1912 (L) Surfaced. Last periscope observation at 1810 showed no other ships at WAKE. Decided to patrol to South and Southwest of WAKE, until 2400.

July 28

- 0000 (L) Headed for station for days operations.
- 0533 (L) Arrived on station.
- 1930 (L) Headed for area South of WAKE.
- 2003 (L) Searchlight beam on WAKE trained in our

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 29, No. C-2 (Cont.)

direction, changed course to open out from island.

2208 (L) Searchlight trained again in our direction.

July 29

0446 (L) Dived to close WAKZ.

0647 (L) Sighted four planes in the direction of WAKE, too far away to identify.

1220 (L) Heard several distant explosions. Must have been way out of position when we dived as we should have picked up the island by 0600.

1550 (L) Sighted water towers.

1720 (L) Sighted masts of ship moored at WILKES ISLAND.

Contact #2

1759 (L) Made out ship to be a small freighter of about 3,000 tons, a MPM coal burner. There were four patrol boats patrolling about eight thousand yards out from ship with three smaller craft close in, two appeared to stay in one position. There were three Mitsubishi 96 bombers patrolling over and to the South of the ship.

1835 (L) Decided to head out and come in next morning for an attack as it was getting too dark for an attack unless we fired long range shots.

1930 (L) Surfaced.

July 30

0439 (L) Dived.

0517 (L) Sighted masts of our target.

0520 (L) Heard numerous explosions, sounded like bombs.

0620 (L) Target underway. Changed course to left and went to full speed.

1703 (L) Target stood off to Northwest of WAKE with two surface and two air escorts. Headed away from island so we could surface and chase the freighter.

1105 (L) Surfaced. Commenced searching to the South and Southwest as we believed that the freighter would head for KWAJALEIN.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 29, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 31

Searching to the Southwest of Wake.

- 1133 (L) Sighted smoke bearing 010° T. Made out the
Attack tops of one ship on course 195° T. Dived.
#2
Contact #3
1203 (L) Ship was small freighter sighted at WAKE, 29
July, accompanied by two escorts and one
Mitsubishi 96 bomber.
1249 (L) Fired three torpedoes from after tubes,
range 2,000 yards, track 105° S.
1250-30 (L) One hit aft, low order explosion.
1252 (L) Target completely obscured by heavy black smoke
1255 (L) Trailing escort dropped one depth charge.
1256 (L) Target still obscured by smoke appeared to
have pulled out to Southeast and stopped.
Second depth charge.
1257 (L) Went deep as the PC escort was close, heading
right at us.
Between 1259 and 1319 six more depth charges
were dropped. None very close.
1320 (L) Electrical fire in after torpedo room.
1325 (L) Fire put out.
1336 (L) Came to periscope depth for observation.
Target appeared to have got underway but still
smoking very heavily. Had to go deep again,
escorts apparently had picked us up as they
were heading for us again.
1355 (L) Came to periscope depth for another look.
Target much further away, evidently underway
but still obscured by heavy black smoke. Had
to go deep again. Plane is evidently spotting
us for the escorts as the sea is glassy
smooth.
1405 (L) Came to periscope depth. Target evidently
stopped about 9,000 yards away still smoking
heavily. Again had to go deep on account of
escorts. This time they stayed over the top
of us for about two hours, but evidently
couldn't make contact.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 29, No. C-2 (Cont.)

1608 (L) Came to periscope depth, nothing in sight except plane and escorts, still searching for us.
1746 (L) Surfaced. Nothing in sight. Put all four main engines on propulsion and commenced searching to the South and Southwest for our target.

August 1

Still searching for freighter.

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

No:	2
Time:	1250
Date:	July 31
Latitude:	17-40N
Longitude:	163-58E
Description:	Sighted smoke from bridge. MFM coal burning freighter of about 3,000 tons. Two escorts; one trawler, one PC boat. Visibility excellent.
Ship(s) sunk:	(Nothing reported. Ed. note)
Ship(s) damaged:	One MFM 3,000 ton Freighter.
Damage Determined by:	Heard hit. Large column of black smoke came up from after part of ship
Target Drafter:	15
Course:	188
Speed:	11.5
Range:	2000 (at firing)

(The data above is given in the Seadragnet's Patrol Report under the title Torpedo Attack No. Two - Editor's Note).

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 30

A - Source of Intelligence

(The Japanese source message for ComSubPac's dispatch of 24-0931 is unavailable. Ed. Note.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

24/0931 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUBPAC SENDS ULTRA SERIAL NUMBER 73 TO TULLIBEE X 1 - POPLAR (MERCHANTMAN TYPE UNKNOWN) ARRIVING WRFZ 2556 (01-25 NORTH 172-56 EAST) AT UNKNOWN TIME JULY 28 EAST LONGITUDE DATE X POSSIBLY ABOUT DAWN AND PROBABLY COMING FROM NORTHWEST X POSSIBLY SMALL BUT IMPORTANT X AFTER YOU GET HIM OR IF HE GETS IN SAFELY OR AT SUNSET 29 JULY IF NO CONTACT PROCEED TO YOUR AREA PASSING THROUGH WBQM (11-00 NORTH 155-00 EAST) AND WBQQ (11-00 NORTH 150-00 EAST) MARSHALL AREAS VACANT OF OUR SUBS AT PRESENT X RED SEADRAGON

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tullibee

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Satisfactory. All serials were received with the exception of 73 W.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 30, (Cont.)

No. C-2

July 27

2240 (M) Passed Maraki (Matthew) Island about 7 miles abeam to port. Noted numerous lights plus flashes from arc welding on this island.

July 28

0535 (M) Submerged an estimated 10 miles NW of entrance to Tarawa Island lagoon.
0629 (M) Sighted Tarawa bearing 072⁰T, distant 11 miles.
0630 (M) Sighted a 5,000 ton AK with a PC type escort and a plane flying overhead, commenced approach. Abandoned approach at
0756 (M) When angle on the bow was 180⁰ and range 10,000 yards with target heading for lagoon entrance. With one exception, when for a short period at a range of 12,000 yds. the target zigged 105⁰ towards and presented a 5⁰ starboard angle on the bow. The least angle on the bow was 75⁰ port. Nearest range was 3,750 yds. with an unfavorable track and a 4,100 yd. torpedo run. The escort ran a zig-zag patrol about 1,000 to 1,500 yds. in the wake of the AK and was pinging on 19 KC's.
1903 (M) Surfaced and headed for assigned area.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 30, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 29

1315 (M) Periscope sighted by OOD.,
lookout and periscope watch
1,500 yds. on port beam. Put
it on tail and went ahead flank.
1345 (M) Resumed course and speed.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No:	1	2
Time:	0630 (M)	1315 (M)
Date:	23 July	29 July
Lat., Long:	2-31N, 172-38E	3-08N, 169-15E
Types:	AK and PC	SS
Init Range:	14,000	1,500
Est. Cr. Spd:	135°, 9 K.	?
How Contacted:	P	SD and P
Remarks:	AK similar to CHI 208J page 50.	Periscope sighted by OOD, Lookout & Periscope Watch.

Case 31

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

23/1245 July 43

TO:

INFO:

(CinC China Fleet)(B)
(CinC South China Fleet)(B)

(In Southwest Area)(7/10)

(Garble)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 31. No. A-1 (Cont.)

"Special Convoy L 2 composed of 2 ships,
Kiyokawa Maru and blank escorted
by (destroyer) at 1200 July 23 depart
blank (Takao?).

Noon posits:

26-35 North, 121-45 East.

29-37 North, 125-44 East.

At 0630 July 26 separate in Posit 31-53
North, 128-50 East. Kiyokawa (?) arrive
Sasebo at 1500 and blank hugging the
coast arrive blank at 1300 July 26."

GI COMMENT: Phoned to Comdr. Voge at
1200 (I) July 24.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
SAWFISH
INFO:

24/1007 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR SAWFISH X SERIAL 75 V BLUE TULLIBEE
FROM SUBPACOM X 063 PEANUT PLUS 1 UNKNOWN AND
1 DESTROYER X BLANK X BLANK X 0300 GCT X 24TH
X 26-35 NORTH 121-45 EAST ALGAROA 29-37 NORTH
125-44 EAST X BLANK X BLANK X 2330 GCT X 28TH
31-53 NORTH 128-50 EAST X THEY SEPARATE AT
LAST POINT WITH 063 PEANUT GOING TO 33-07 NORTH
129-44 EAST

ORIGINAL
11 January 1948

Case 31. (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sawfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Last serial received: 41 Able.

No. C-2

23 July

0436 (I) Submerged in Lat. 31-13N Long. 126-17W
and ran eastward all day. On surfacing
set course to eastward.

24 July

0440 (I) Submerged 40 miles west of KOSHIKI
REITO and patrolled north and south.
2017 (I) Surfaced and set course to south
and west.

25 July

0450 (I) Submerged in lat. 31-02N Long. 128-
16E and patrolled to westward.
2021 (I) Surfaced and started surface patrol
at 5 knots.
2225 (I) Made radar contact in Lat. 31-00N
Long. 127-30E at 19,000 yds. on two
targets. Commenced tracking. As
range closed, radar indicated an
escort.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 31, No. C-2 (Cont.)

26 July

0058 (I) (Attack #5) Fired four torpedoes from stern tubes at larger of two targets. A 11 missed. Destroyer commenced closing range and prevented my bringing bow tubes to bear. Retired towards stern of formation. Do not believe we were seen by either ship or destroyer and the closing range was incidental to his patrolling. After torpedoes crossed track, whole formation speeded up and were tracked out at 18 knots. Did not attempt chase since there was only three hours of darkness left and I saw no chance of overhauling before dawn and planes arrived. Therefore set course to western portion of area.

No. C-3

Attack #5

On making radar contact tracking was started immediately. Night was dark but clear. Surface of water was flat and slick. Base course was determined to be 050, speed 14 knots, targets zig zagging at 8-12 minutes. Commenced approach from western (left flank) side of formation, the side opposite from the escort. The large ship was leading the formation, the smaller one astern of him at about 1000 yards ahead of the larger ship. When range was reduced to 7000 yards the ships shifted positions in the formation. The large ship dropped astern, and the escort shifted to

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 31, No. C-3 (Cont.)

the other flank, putting him between me and the target. I speeded up and crossed ahead of the formation and took up position for a stern shot, range 3000 yards. The destroyer then moved over to my flank again. The formation zigged away when range was 5500 yards so I shifted to low power and fired four torpedoes from stern tubes in low power at range of 6400 yards, 105 starboard track, firing interval 12 seconds, depth setting 14 feet, longitudinal spread with first torpedo fired $\frac{1}{2}$ length ahead of target. All missed, though I don't believe target group knew they were on the way until they passed near the target track. I started swinging to bring bow tubes to bear when radar reported the destroyer closing the range. I don't believe he saw us but he kept me from firing the bow tubes by this maneuver, which may have been fortunate for us since the others missed. I retired toward the target stern after firing. Two explosions were felt 10 minutes 55 seconds after firing and were probably depth charges. Target group was tracked out on original base course at 18 knots. I'm convinced that either the large ship or the destroyer had radar equipment, for the escort persisted in keeping him self between me and his formation. Summing up - I'm not proud of this one.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 32

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

24/0915 July 43

FROM:

TO:

(All Ships Truk Area)

INFO:

"At 0800, July 24, torpedo attack in position
06-56 N, 147-52 E. Reliability excellent."

GI COMMENT: G2 comment on Hypo translation of
above message is "position of #3
Tonan Maru".
Tinosa reports 12 positive hits on
this vessel with 1 explosion at 0133
on 24th July in same position.

No. A-2

FROM:

TO:

24/0915 July 43

"Torpedo attack at 0800, July 24, in position
06-56 North, 147-52 East. Grading excellent."

GI COMMENT: This is in regard to torpedoing
of #3 Tonan Maru.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 52, (Cont.)

No. A-3

24/1536 July 43

FROM: (Combined Fleet)
TO: (3rd Fleet)
INFO: (#3 Tonan Maru)

"Combined Fleet Desopord

Commander Striking Force detail suitable ships
to tow #3 Tonan Maru to PT."

GI COMMENT: PT - Truk (CD).

No. A-4

24/1536 July 43

FROM:
TO: (2nd Fleet tanker)
INFO:

"Combined Fleet Desopord # blank, officer
concerned. Striking Force, utilizing suitable
ships, have #3 Tonan Maru towed to Truk."

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0400 (-9)
25th. Tinosa reports 12 positive
hits on this vessel with one
explosion at 1033 (-9) 24th position
06-56 North, 147-52 East.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 32. (Cont.)

No. A-5

FROM:

TO:

(Maru)

24/1600 July 43

INFO:

(Vessel)

"The #3 Tonan Maru escorted by blank received torpedo attack in 06-56 North. 147-52 East and is unable to make way. The Isuzu?), Asanagi (unident ship), Hoko Maru?) and #2 Chonan Maru are proceeding to the scene. Special Subchasers #5 and #12 get underway immediately and proceed to the scene to assist in escort blanks.

GE COMMENT: Previously reported in HYPO's 24/1516.

No. A-6

FROM:

TO:

(Maru) (C)

24/1600 July 43

INFO:

(Guard By Truk) (C)

(Vessel) (B)

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 32, No. A-6 (Cont.)

1. The #3 Toran Maru escorted by Blank DD was attacked with torpedoes in position 6-56N, 147-52E and is unable to proceed. Blank Asanagi, blank, Hookoo Maru and #2 Chooan Maru () are enroute to the scene.
2. #5 and #12 Special Subchaser under tactical command of Commanding Officer , sortie at once, proceed directly to the scene and assist in escorting the above. Blank under direction Commanding Officer Isuzu? ."

GI COMMENT: ISU Ø of 24/0915 July is quoted for info:

"At 0800, July 24, torpedo attack in position 06-56N, 147-52E. Reliability excellent."

Tinosa reports 12 positive hits on this vessel with 1 explosion at 0133 on 24th July in same position.

Phones to SubPac D/O 25/0010 (-9)

B/- Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CONSUBPAC
TO: STEELHEAD (SS-280)
ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

24/1530 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MAD AS HORNETS X ULTRA FOR STEELHEAD X TOTAL OF ABOUT 7 LEMONS (ESCORT VESSELS) AND IRONWOODS (DESTROYERS) GOING TO ASSISTANCE TINOSA TARGET X WATCH YOURSELF X DAISY CHAINS X

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 32. (Cont.)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: STEELHEAD
ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

24/1753 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X POSITION OF TANKER AT 20 HOURS CCT
24TH VTUT 5154 (6-51 NORTH 147-54 EAST) X
WE NEED HIM BADLY

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

July 22

Was proceeding to north of area when at
0423 (L) Latitude 07°-30' N. Longitude 150°-30' E.
Made morning dive and at
0432 (L) Fire was reported in the Maneuvering
Room. Lost propulsion until at
0445 (L) When fire was extinguished and propulsion
was resumed on the port shaft only. While
investigating the cause of the fire sound
made contact on bearing 020°, light fast
screws. Made periscope observation, but
could see nothing in the rain squall
prevailing. At
0500 (L) Lost contact. Fire was caused by a burnt
out starting resistance in the starboard
motor. Replaced damaged resistor and at

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 32, No. C-1 (Cont.)

- 0857 (L) Both shafts were in normal operation, until at
- 1108 (L) A loud click developed in the starboard shaft while running at dead slow, 42, RPM. Went ahead on port shaft for the remainder of day investigating the cause of the knock. During the morning heard three or four depth charges, all distant. By
- 1800 (L) Had determined source of noise to be in the coupling of #1 motor. Decided to get well clear of TRUK and try to effect repairs. Broke coupling and ran all night on three motors towards northern boundary of area.

July 23

At

- 1428 (L) Latitude 09-50 N. Longitude 151-30 E. Dove and continued investigating possible remedies for starboard shaft. As we had no spare coupling to install in place of the damaged one, decided to continue patrol as long as possible with damaged parts. We could run at 80 RPM on the port shaft only for silent running and if we had to have more speed, we could still use the starboard shaft, noise and all, in a pinch. Reconnected the coupling to run on all 4 motors. With these operating limitations it was decided to keep well clear of the patrol boat areas where a prolonged depth charging might prove embarrassing.

July 23 to
30

Continued patrolling area using a high periscope wherever conditions permitted. No contacts were made, but on surfacing on 29 July, found antenna trunk flooded. Could not locate source of leak, but antenna operated satisfactorily after trunk was drained. This condition continued for the remainder of the patrol.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 33

A - Source of Intelligence

(The Japanese source message for ComSubPac's dispatch of 25-0733 is unavailable.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS CARRYING NPM FOX
INFO:

25/0733 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR MARSHAL X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 76 X TO
POLISH OFF THE MAMOGONY (PATROL BOAT) LOCK
AROUND AT THE FOLLOWING QBEK 5143 (30-51
NORTH 153-43 EAST) X Q378 0130 (33-01 NORTH
87-30 EAST) TEP 4008 (32-40 NORTH 156-08
EAST) X KCCU 2030 (30-20 NORTH 154-30 EAST)
X KCCQ 4000 (30-40 NORTH 150-00 EAST) X GZEX
3214 (27-32 NORTH 153-14 EAST) X PBEM 3050
(25-30 NORTH 155-50 EAST)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Marshal

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

25 July

0800 (K) Having exhausted all possible enemy tracks
with no contacts, again set course through
area of patrol boat contacts.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 33, No. C-1 (Cont.)

2130 (K) Received Comsubpac's Serial 76.
2217 (K) Altered course to search patrol
boat contacts.

26 July

0800 (K) Lat. 36-35N, Long. 152-34E.
Barometer falling, heavy swells,
wind building up to force 6.
1122 (K) Lat. 36-15, Long. 152-45, plane
contact on SD radar, 9 miles closing.
Dived. Unable to maintain periscope
depth at 70 feet in heavy swells.
Plane not sighted, at this point we
were 540 miles from HONSHU and 600
miles from MARCUS. Stayed down for
lunch.
1323 (K) Surfaced. Continued on surface,
cruising over a 92% zigzag plan
superimposed on four hour legs
20° to right and left of bare course
between possible contact points to
cover maximum area.

27-29 July

Uneventful, conducted daily dives
and drills.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 54

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:
INFO:

23/1445 July

(Garbled)

(1st Section Naval
General Staff)

(CofS Sasebo)
(CofS Kure)
(Jap Weather Station)
(Takao Guard District)

(R.N.O. Keelung)

(Truk Army Address)

1. Convoy #179 (?) consisting of 6 ships blanks.
2. Blank Maru blanks.
Blank Maru carrying 6000 cubic meters?
munitions.
Dover Maru Carrying 2700 tons of
petroleum products.
Rakuto Maru carrying 106 passengers
and 1800 tons of munitions, bombs.
Matsura Maru carrying 1800 tons of blank
and 2000 tons of blank.
Nichiro Maru blanks.
3. (Badly garbled, gives route points).
4. (Noon positions:

ORIGINAL
11 January 1948 -

Case 34, No. A-1 (Cont.)

24th - 32-53 North, 127-50 East.
25th - 31-06 North, 124-37 East.
26th - 28-37 North, 122-28 East.
27th - 25-50 North, 120-45 East.
28th - 22-55 North, 120-04 East.
5. 28th. 1430 arrive blank."

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed about
0700 (-9) 25th.

(NSS 24/2152 changes "Nichiro Maru" to
Hora Maru in the 2nd para.; DTB 25 July
Page 175-176 makes this correction).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOR
INFO: CINCPAC

25/0912 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR SAWFISH X ULTRA X 6 POPLAES (MERCHANTMAN
TYPE UNKNOWN) X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED)
X - 900 (TIME 0300) X PLUS 10 DATE 25TH) X
MJD 0637 (31-06 NORTH 124-37 EAST) ALGAROSA
DRUG 3428 (28-34 NORTH 122-28 EAST) PEYA 5045
(25-50 NORTH 120-45 EAST) X YOU ARE ONLY SUB
IN CHINA SEA AT PRESENT TIME X COMSUBPAC
NUMBER 60 Z

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sawfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 31, C-1-C-3.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 35

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Resident Naval Officer 25/1145 July
Keelung) (B)

TO:

INFO:

(Oshima Defense Force) (B)
(Surface Unit) (C)
(Has a Detachment at Okinawa) (A)
(Coast Kure Naval District) (C)
(Surface Escort Force 1) (B)

"Unknown composition.

Part 3: Noon positions: 26th, 28-42N, 122-24 E.
27th, 31-02N, 125-28 E.
28th, 33-15N, 128-08 E.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING NEW FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

26/0943 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM GENE SANDS IF ANY FISH REMAINING X ULTRA X
SERIAL 85 B FROM COMSUEPAC X 1 OR MORE POPLARS
(MERCHANTMAN) X BLANK (COUSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X
MINUS 900 (0300GCT) X PLUS 11 (26th) X DRUQ 4224
(28-42 N 122-24 E) ALGAROBIA MJCA 0228 (31-02N
125-28 E) CBAS 1508 (33-15 N 128-08 E)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 35. (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sawfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Last serial received: 41 Able.

No. C-2

July 26

- 1906 (I) Sighted convoy of 4 small AK's and 1 DD escort in Lat. 32-32N Long. 127-20 E on base course 050 speed 12 knots. Was unable to close to firing range though we got in to 2500 yds. on the escort.
- 2044 (U) Surfaced and commenced chase on course 050 T.
- 2237 (I) Abandoned chase when we reached point where we should have over-hauled them. Evidently they made a radical course change to about 120 T and passed south of Fukae Shima to Nagasaki. Set course for Korean coast in northwest part of area.

July 27

- 0105 (I) Made radar contact at 2100 yds. on starboard bow in Lat. 33-09N, Long. 127-50E. Turned and put contact astern and increased speed to flank. Drew away slowly at 20 knots. When range opened to about 5500 yds. patrol boat opened fire with a small caliber deck gun but ceased fire after five shots. Not even close.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 35. No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0435 (I) Submerged 45 miles bearing about 080° T from Fukae Shima.
- 1135 (I) Sighted smoke of convoy in Lat. 32-32N Long. 127-41E. Commenced approach. Convoy consisted of 1 AK of about 7000 tons and 4 AK of from 2000 to 4000 tons and one DD escort, who was pinging. Picked out large AK as target but as we approached the firing point the target zigged away. The destroyer, however, held his course, presenting a small port angle. As I had been presenting a small angle to him, decided to shoot at him instead of at the AK which was at range of 2500 yds. Shifted set up and fired four torpedoes down throat of the destroyer at range of 750 yds. and immediately started deep in case we missed. We didn't! torpedo hit 25 seconds after first one was fired with tremendous explosion. Thinking it may have been a premature I continued on to 300 feet and rigged for depth charge. Seven charges were dropped during next hour from the AK's. I came to periscope depth after one hour and the convoy had passed out of sight except for mast tops. Destroyer had not completely sunk. His stern was still out of water. Took pictures. At 1454 I stern of destroyer sunk.
- 1619 (I) Sighted Kawanishi 94 plane to northward.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 55, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1940 (I) Heard echo ranging to eastward. While searching for source, heard one aircraft bomb, close enough to shake us up but to do no material damage. Went to 100 feet and changed course.
- 1953 (I) Four more bombs - pinging stopped.
- 2022 (I) Sixth and last bomb.
- 2015 (I) Came to periscope depth - nothing in sight.
- 2050 (I) Surfaced and set course to southward.

July 28

With only two torpedoes left remaining and the performance of one of them doubtful decided to depart area.
Sent message.

July 29

Departed area.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 36

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: Unknown originator

23/1145 July 43

TO:

INFO:

"From Cinc 2nd Fleet.

The schedule of the 2nd Fleet (Atago _____, Takao (____), Nagara _____ and Suzukaze _____) bound for Yokosuka) being as here-in-after stated we will (meet up with ?) your force the night of the 24th. At 1930 in 15-15 North, 151-40 East, course about 340, speed 20. At 1400, on 25th, in 32-55 North, 140-30 East."

GI COMMENT: Phoned to ComSubPacTor at 25/0225 (-9). Plot indicates position on 25th to be 21-25 North, 149-20 East, following course 340 at 20 knots, provided position for 24th is correct.

Following for NEGAT.

Your 24/1606. Even if 1930 is taken for 23rd July, it would require a sustained speed approximately 30 knots for this unit to cover the distance between these positions. Request verification of dates and positions.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 36, No. A-1

GI COMMENT: Reference is quoted.

"From Cinc 2nd Fleet. The schedule of the 2nd Fleet (Atago Takao Nagara and Suzukaze bound for Yokosuka) being as here-in-after stated we will (meet up with?) your force the night of the 24th. At 1930 in 15-15 N, 151-40 E, course about 340, speed 20. At 1400, on 25th, in 32-55 N, 140-30 E."

Correction concerning NEGAT's 24/1606 and answering BAKER's 25/0225. Last part of message should read "at 1930 on 22nd in 15-15 North, etc."

GI COMMENT: Text of NEGAT's 23/1606 is quoted: "From Cinc 2nd Fleet. The schedule of the 2nd Fleet (Atago Takao Nagara) and Suzukaze bound for Yokosuka) being as here-in-after stated we will (meet up with?) your force the night of the 24th. At 1930 in 15-15 North, 151-40 East, course about 340, speed 20. At 1400, on 25th, in 32-55 North, 140-30 East."

BAKER's 25/0225 is quoted in part: "Your 24/1606. Even if 1930 is taken for 23rd July, it would require a sustained speed of 30 knots for this unit to cover the distance between these posits. Request verification of dates and positions."

ORIGINAL
11 January 1936

Case 36, (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
INFO:
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

25/1011 July

THIS ULTRA FOR SKIPJACK AND STURGEON IF
PASSING THROUGH VICINITY X 1 IRONWOOD
(DESTROYER) X 047 PEANUT AND 2 EDITIONS
037 PEANUT X BLANK X PLUS 10 X MINUS 130
X PLUS 9 X TSED 1540 (15-15 NORTH 151-40
EAST) AND BLANK X PLUS 10 S MINUS 700
X PLUS 12 X TEMA 5530 (32-55 NORTH 140-30
EAST) X SERIAL 81 FROM COMSUBPAC

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 15, C-12.

No. C-2

27 July

Patrolling eastern approaches to Tokyo
Bay. SJ Radar out of commission. This
is quite a blow as all traffic seems to
move at night in this area.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 36, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0109 (I) Sighted ship smoking heavily on westerly course bearing 085T approximately 8 miles (Par F-12). Commenced tracking and maneuvered to keep up moon.
- 0202 (I) Target turned out to be moderate sized patrol vessel, course 260, speed 9 knots. Hauled clear to the south after getting too close.
- 0258 (I) Sighted a second patrol vessel bearing 110T, 2½ miles. (Par. F-13) Attempted to clear to southwest but he kept forcing us west. His speed approximately 18 knots. Making full power, 17½ knots.
- 0303 (I) Beginning of morning twilight.
- 0338 (I) Getting light. Submerged to periscope depth and turned south.
- 0355 (I) Went deep, rigged for silent running.
- 0423 (I) Lost contact. Retired to eastward.
- 0718 (I) Periscope observation. Sighted mast of small ship (Patrol boat) on a northwesterly course bearing 228T distance about 10 miles. (Par. F-14). Came to bearing of ship.
- 0745 (I) Only smoke in sight. This was first of the pair encountered during night.
- 0800 (I) Lost contact. Commenced submerged patrol off southeastern approaches to Tokyo Bay.

No. C-3 Description of Contact

No. 13
Date 27 July
Time 0258 (I)
Lat. 34-32N
Long. 140-49E
Type 1 patrol ship
Initial
Range 5000 yds. 110T
Speed 18 knots
Contact Lookout
Remarks Pursued us at 18 knots.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 38. (Cont.)

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: On the average, good. No serials were missed.

No. C-5

July 24-25

Heading back to, and in southern part of area. Departed area for Midway 25 July, 1943.

July 27

Patrolled vicinity 33 N, 141 E. Nothing sighted.

July 28

Surface cruising to Midway.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 37

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Yokosuka Chief of Staff) 24/1320 July
TO:
INFO: (Commander Chichijima Activity)

*Convoy #3724 (consisting of Kogami-gawa Maru
- Yamagiri Maru?) Seiko Maru
escorted by the Fukue departed NAA for PT at
1300 on 24th. Noon positions:
25th, 33-15 North, 143-30 East.
26th, 29-30 North, 145-35 East.
27th, 25-25 North, 147-20 East.
28th, 21-20 North, 149-00 East.
29th, 17-20 North, 150-40 East.
30th, 13-15 North, 152-15 East.
31st, 09-10 North, 153-20 East.
Will pass through point "A" at 0300 on 1 August.

NEGAT COMMENT: Ship translated as "Fukue" is
made of characters Fuku Saiwai
and E Koo River. May be that
"Fukkoo" is correct reading.

CI COMMENT: NAA is Yokosuka (CD).
PT is Truk (CD).
Phoned to Subs 1620 (I) July 25th.

No. A-2

FROM: (Yokosuka Chief of Staff) 24/1320 July

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 37. No. A-2 (Cont.)

TO:

INFO:

(Commander Chichijima
Activity)

*Convoy #3724 (Consisting of Kogamigawa
Maru - Yamagiri Maru?)
Seiko Maru escorted by the Fukue departed
NAA for PT at 1300 on 24th, Noon positions:
25th, 33-15 North, 143-30 East.
26th, 29-30 North, 145-35 East.
27th, 25-25 North, 147-20 East.
28th, 21-20 North, 149-00 East.
29th, 17-20 North, 150-40 East.
30th, 13-15 North, 152-15 East.
31st, 09-10 North, 153-20 East.
Will pass through point "A" at 0300 on
1 August.

NEGAT COMMENT: Ship translated as "Fukue" is made
of characters Fuku Saiwai and E Koo
River. May be that "Fukkoo" is
correct reading.

GI COMMENT: NAA is Yokosuka (CD)
PT is Truk (CD)
Phones to Subs 1620 (I) July 25th.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COLSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING RPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

25/1817 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 37, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA X 089 AND 076 POPCORN 1 POPLAR
1 LEMON (ESCORT VESSEL) X BLANK (COURSE
UNKNOWN) X BLANK (SPEED UNKNOWN) X MINUS
900 (TIME 0300) X PLUS 11 (DATE 26) X LSMQ
3033 (29-30 N 145-35 E) ALGAROA PBUT 2520
(25-25 N 147-20 EAST) FLWZ 2000 (21-20 N
149-00 E)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING HPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

27/0817 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

POGY AND STEELHEAD GET THIS ULTRA X 063 PEANUT
X 076 POPCORN X 1 POPLAR (MERCHANTSHIP TYPE
UNKNOWN) X 1 LEMON (ESCORT) X BLANK (COURSE
UNKNOWN) X BLANK (SPEED UNKNOWN) X MINUS 900
(TIME 0300) X PLUS 13 (DATE 28 JULY) X FLWZ
2000 (21-20 N 149-00E) ALGAROA JTQC 2040
(17-20 N 150-40 E) X QBVQ 1515 (15-15 N
152-15 E) TRZK 1020 (09-10 N 153-20 E)
TONY DROPP MAY BE WORKING ON THIS CRACKERJACK
FARTHER NORTH X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 91

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete.

Case 37. (Cont.)

No. C-2

- July 31 Surface patrol, to north of assigned area, on Empire-Truk routes.
- 0418 (K) Radar and sight contact on four ships to northeast, distance 10,000 yards. Started tracking on surface.
- 0530 (K) With enemy masts just visible on eastern horizon from top of our periscope sheers, enemy apparently sighted us at range of about 25,000 yards, and challenged with searchlight. Opened out on surface and started end around chase.
- 1235 (K) Reached position 30,000 yards ahead of convoy.
- 1321 (K) Submerged on estimated track of convoy.
- 1348 (K) Sighted smoke of convoy. Commenced approach. Convoy apparently changed base course. Unable to close to firing range. Observed three ships with one destroyer escort. Ships were:
- (1) KANSAI MARU (XAV) OR KINUGASA MARU (XAV)
 - (2) KAMOGAMA MARU (XAV)
 - (3) Unidentified 5000 ton coal burning freighter.
- 1805 (K) Surfaced in pursuit of convoy.
- 1900 (K) Sent contact report
- 2120 (K) Radar and sight contact on convoy at 14,000 yards.
- 2335 (K) In position 4000 yards off the track range 10,000 yards. Submerged to 40 feet and commenced approach.
- 2350 (K) Went to 55 feet and used generated ranges, sound and periscope bearings. Visibility good, clear, starlight night, no moon.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 37, No. C-2 (Cont.)

August 1

- 0002 (K) Fired four torpedoes. Two hits (Torpedex) in largest ship. Target screws stopped. Went deep to avoid escort. Gunfire until -
- 0012 (K) When escort dropped two depth charges near firing point, then started supersonic search. Series of sharp explosions followed by very loud rumblings heard throughout the ship and lasted over 10 minutes. Noise sounded like an earthquake. This was terminated
- 0038 (K) by a loud but dull, heavy explosion, as target presumably blew up and sank. It is believed that this target sank although sight evidence is lacking. Target was IAT KANSAI MARU or KANUCASA MARU.
- 0048 (K) Escort's screws stopped but echo ranging continued. Heard very light fast screws as of a motorboat in vicinity of escort.
- 0150 (K) Stuck conning tower out of water and went to bridge for a look. Escort was lying to, 4,000 yards astern, echo ranging, and apparently picking up survivors. Thought he sighted us, so went deep again.
- 0208 (K) Escort's screws started up. He dropped one depth charge, not close, and then opened out to southward.
- 0300 (K) Surfaced and cleared immediate area as escort was in sight on horizon about 10,000 yards.
- 0309 (K) Submerged. During forenoon, area was searched by echo ranging and several distant depth charges were heard. Remained submerged during day. Patrolled Empire-Truk routes.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1948

Case 37, No. C-2 (Cont.)

August 2 Surface patrol on Empire-Truck routes.

1200 (K) Set course for ULUL Island.
1303 (K) Sighted floating mine Lat. 12-25N
Long. 151-46 E.
2033 (K) Due to fuel situation set course for
Johnston Island. Sent dispatch
to ComSubPac.

No. C-3 Description of Contact

U.S.S. Foxt

Second War Patrol

No. 6
Time 0418 (K)
Date July 31
Lat. 13-56 N
Long. 152-00 E
Types Convoy of 3 ships
1 DD escort
Initial
Range 10,000 yds.
Est. Course 155
Speed 9 kts.
Contacted SN R
Remarks Attacked largest ship IAV.
Two hits. Probably sunk.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 8, C-7.

(L time in this report is an error for
K time, - 10 hours., Editors note)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 37, (Cont.)

No. C-5

July 31

2000 (L) Lat. 10-14 N. Long. 152-50 E received Pogy's contact report, and altered course to intercept convoy. As dawn was breaking at

August 1

0500 (L) Lat. 11-20N Long. 153-30E. Sighted one AK with PC boat bearing 330° distance about 7 miles. Dove and conducted attack. As we went in it was evident freighter was stopped and PC boat was patrolling around it alternately pinging and listening. The target was smoking heavily and may have been damaged at

0704 (L) Sound heard the target screws turning over and the next periscope observation confirmed the fact that the target was underway, angle on the bow 80° port. The escort was now dead ahead of her. Swung to port and at

0706 (L) Heard one depth charge. At

0707 (L) Fired four torpedoes at a range of 1500 yds. 125° port track. At

0708 (L) Heard two explosions corresponding to the second and third shots. Could not observe target as we were below periscope depth and going down. The screws stopped, however, and were not heard again. Started down, rigged for depth charge and at

0711 (L) Received the first of a series of 10 depth charges, none of which were too close. We were heavy and had to run at 65 to 70 RPM to maintain our depth and it was evident that the PC boat had no trouble maintaining contact with us at this speed. To help matters the starboard shaft, which had been running fairly quiet for the last few days, started clicking again. At

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 37, No. C-5 (Cont.)

0750 (L) Sound reported loud crackling and
crunching noises from the direction
of the target and at
0802 (L) The noises ceased. At
0805 (L) Received the last salvo of depth
charges. We are convinced that the
target sank at 0802, for although
we were not contacted again during
the remainder of the day, the escort
remained in the vicinity and desultory
depth charging was heard to the west
of us as late as five o'clock in
the afternoon. Desired to come up
at this time, but as we were very
heavy and could not make it at
85 RPM, stayed deep as we were not
sure that the escort had departed.

No. C-6

Description of Contact.

No. 6
Date 1 August
Time 0500 (L)
Lat. 11-20N
Long. 153-30E
Course 240°T
Speed 0 to 10 Kts.
Type Taisyo Maru and PC boat freshly
painted gray, goal posts buff,
masts white.

D - Confirmation

No. D-1

FROM:

(Mogami-gawa Maru)

01/1037 Aug.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 37, D-1 (Cont.)

FROM: (unident ship)
TO:
INFO: (unident ship)

Mogamigawa Maru while proceeding in
convoy was torpedoed by enemy submarine in
position 153-183, 11-08N at 2310 on the 31st
and sank in 10 minutes. Saiko Maru blanks
crew of above vessel and at 0600 while heading
for Truk blanks. At 0610 she was struck in
#4 hold by a torpedo and although flooding is
(able to make EM) 11 knots.

NEGAT COMMENT: Above message is badly drafted.
Message start was apparently left
out and last portion is somewhat
vague. However the important
points involved are plain enough.

GI COMMENT: Mogamigawa Maru is a 7996 ton
Saiko Maru is 4365 tons.

No. D-2

FROM: (Yokosuka Guard For. 02/0850 Aux.
or CoFS.)
TO: (Truk Base For 4)
(Truk Harbor Affairs
Sec. 4)
(Mortlock Comm. Unit)
(Truk 4th Mil. stores Sect.)
(Guard Div. 42)
INFO: (4th Fleet)

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 37, No. D-2 (Cont.)

From Captain of Mogamigawa Maru.

Please make arrangements (blanks) clothing, hospitalization (blank) survivors now being taken aboard the Fukue.

Unit	Officers	Men	Requiring Hospitaliza- tion
Mogamigawa			
Maru	11	137	11
552nd A.G.	4	165	9
802nd A.G.	0	45	??
Others	12	212	0
	27	519??	

Remainder of the message badly garbled but appears to explain need for clothing by reason of sudden sinking.

GI COMMENT: Total of men should read 559 if figures for individual units are correct.

No. D-3

FROM: (Guard Force or 02/0840 Aug. 43
Yokosuka CoRS) (C)

TO: (Base Force 4, Truk) (C)
(Harbor Affairs Section
4, Truk) (B)
(Combatant Ship) (B)
(Guard Division 41) (C)
(In Rabaul 2 one July 7) (?)

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 37, No. D-3 (Cont.)

INFO: (Military Stores Section 4) (A)
(4th Fleet) (B)
(Combined Fleet) (B)

*Originator Captain Mogamigawa Maru
Report of survivors that have been rescued
and on board the Fukue: request that
arrangements be made take care of patients
requiring hospitalization.

(Orderst: (a) Unit.
(b) Above rank warrant officer.
(c) Ratings.
(d) Persons requiring hospitalization.)

Unit	Above rank Warrant Officers	Ratings	Persons requirin hospitalization
Mogamigawa			
Maru	11	137	11
552 Air Group	4	165	9
802 Air Group	0	45	2
Other units	12	212	0

Total: Officers, 27.
Men 417.

GI COMMENT: Mogamigawa Maru torpedoed in position
11-08N, 153-18E at 2310 on 31st July
and sank in 10 minutes.

No. D-4

FROM:
TO:

01/1615 Aug. 43

*Submarine warning.

At 2300, July 31 torpedo attack position 11-08N,
153-18E. Certain.

GI COMMENT: At 1800, July 31, the Pogy sighted
3 freighters with 1 escort vessel
on course 150 degrees in position
12-14N, 152-55E.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 38

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

23/1530 July 43

TO:

(Makassar Local
Transportation Section)

INFO:

(In Balikpapan Area)

(Combined Fleet)

(Chief of Staff Kure)
(Balikpapan Fuel Depot #102)

"Noon positions 25th to 29th:

06-20 North, 142-20 East.

04-15 North, 137-30 East.

03-20 North, 132-15 East.

03-20 North, 126-45 East.

03-20 North, 121-30 East.

Arrive Tarakan at 1000 on 30th."

NEGAT COMMENT: First part of this is unreadable but deals with movements of fairly large convoy which arrives Saipan on 28th. Noon positions given above are for the Nichiei Maru and perhaps one other vessel which was to break off from convoy at 1000 on 24th, in position 7 degrees North, 148-15 East and proceed to Tarakan.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 1130 (-9) 28th.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 38. (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM-FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL DISPATCH
26/0825 July

ULTRA X FOR HADDOCK OR MINCO IF STILL IN
VICINITY X PAIR OF BIRCHES (TANKERS) TRAVELLING
LIGHT X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X
MINUS 900 (0300 GCT) X PLUS 11 (26th) X
CITEU 1530 (4 DEG NORTH 15 MIN 137 DEG 30 MIN
EAST) ALGAROSA RCM 2015 (3 DEG 20 MIN NORTH
132 DEG 15 MIN EAST) RCM 2045 (3 DEG 20 MIN
NORTH 128 DEG 45 MIN EAST) X COMSUBPAC SERIAL
84 X BLUE TULLIBEE

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock
Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 20, C-1-C-8.

U.S.S. Minzo
First War Patrol

No. C-2

See VII, Case 20, B-2 and C-2-C-3.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 39

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

DI under II heading.

FROM: Blank originator
TO:

25/0734 July 43

INFO: (Kure CofS)

From Captain of Irako
Chief of Staff.

Info

Schedule of Irako , Aoba
Amatsukaze () and Urakaze
as follows:

1615, 25th, depart Truk for Kure.
1745, 25th, sortie via North Channel, course
320 degrees.
2300, 25th, 08-35 North, 151-00 East.
0300, 25th, 09-33 North, 151-00 East.
0300, 27th, 12-15 North, 146-10 East.
2000, 27th, 12-15 North, 142-30 East.
1300, 28th, 15-00 North, 140-05 East.
1930, 29th, 21-26 North, 138-25 East.
0530, 1st, arrive (via #2 Channel).*

GI COMMENT: Phoned subs 1840 (-9) 25th.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 39, (Cont.)

No. A-2

"From Commanding Officer of
Irako (?)

Movements of Irako (?), Aoba,
Amatsukaze, and Urakaze are as follows;
1615 July 25 depart Truk for Kure.
1745 July 25 sortie by North Channel, course 320°.
2300 July 25 08-35 North, 151-00 East.
0300 July 26, 09-blank North, 151-00 East.
0300 July 27, 12-15 North, 146-10 East.
2000 July 27, 12-15 North, 142(?) -30 East.
1300 July 28, 15-00 North, 140-05 East.
1930 July 29, 21-26 North, 138-25 East.
0530 1st (?) arrive blank (via
#2 Channel).

Info Chief of Staff (?)."

GI COMMENT: Heading is completely lacking and
makes no mention of another part.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

26/1017 July 43

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TONY ROPP GETS ANOTHER ULTRA X NUMBER 86 C
X 2 IRONWOOD (DESTROYERS) 1 BIRCH (TANKER)
AND 033 PEANUT BADLY CRIPPLED X BLANK X
MINUS 800 X PLUS 13 TBMA (15 DEG NORTH 140

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 39, No. B-1 (Cont.)

DEG EAST) X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 150 X
PLUS 14 FLIV 2625 (21-26 DEG NORTH 138-25
DEG EAST) THEN THROUGH AREA 7 AND AT PLUS
830 X PLUS 18 X JZJH (1433 (34-14 DEG
NORTH 152-33 DEG EAST) X LOOKS JUICY BUT
NOW SC89 POPCORN IN MY LAST MESSAGE TO YOU
MORE IMPORTANT X IT IS A BIG APPLE (SEAPLANE
TENDER) X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Saurv

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete insofar as is known.
All schedules were copied.

No. C-2

July 30

2225 (I) Made radar contact of three ships at
19000 yds. Sighted 2 large ships at
11000 yds. and DD escort at 10000 yds.
Tracked on surface and determined base
course to be 338° T, speed 13.2 knots,
with 15° to 20° zigs on either side.
Formation consisted of what appeared
to be an AO with a CA about 1000 yds.
astern. The DD was about 10°, 2000
yds. on the starboard bow of the tanker.
With the visibility conditions existing,
a radar-periscope attack appeared
feasible and at

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 39, No. C-2 (Cont.)

July 31

- 0303 (I) Submerged to conduct attack with target at 11600 yds. At
- 0325 (I) with target about 4000 yds. distant, started to come to course 250°T for 90° starboard track with distance to track about 1700 yds. Lost depth control once during turn and put rudder amidships to regain it, resumed turn and lost control again. At
- 0331 (I) Changed course to 250°T. Before periscope was out, sound reports showed targets passed firing bearing. Periscope out at
- 0334 (I) and at
- 0338 (I) Sound reported bearing 180° relative. Through the periscope on the port quarter appeared a DD with a 0° angle on the bow. We were rammed a very few seconds after the sound report. Two distinct jars were felt after the order to go deep and rig for depth charge attack. Retired to the east. No depth charges were heard. The known damages sustained at this time were: 1. Both periscopes out of commission. 2. Leaks around packing gland to #2 periscope. 3. Both radars out of commission. Remained at 175 feet to 200 feet all day and at
- 2020 (I) Surfaced. Noted periscope shears bent 30° from vertical to starboard with all equipment mounted thereon damaged. Decided to maintain patrol for the night and then return to base.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 30, No. C-2 (Cont.)

August 1

0403 (I) Set course for return track.

August 2

0902 (H) Sighted patrol boat on southerly course. Avoided by altering course to north.

No. C-3 - Description of Contact

Contact	1
Date	7-30-43
Time	0225 (I)
Lat.	26-00N
Long.	135-56E
Course	338 zigzagging 15° rt and left of base crs. 13° to 25°
Speed	13.2 kts.
Description	1 AO, 1 CA and 1 DD. AO & CA in column about 1000 yds. apart, CA astern, DD screening 2200 on stbd. bow of AO. Rammed by DD, Lat 27-03N Long. 135-27E.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 40

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Cinc
Combined Fleet)

25/2341 July

TO:

INFO:

"Combined Fleet Desopord # blank.

1. As of 30th July the - Yamato?) is assigned to main force and Unyo (Sazanami) are assigned to main body.
2. The main body will depart Western Inland Sea at 31st July and proceed to PT (the Unyo and Sazanami) under command of Captain of Unyo, will join up at Point B (30-00 N, 136-00 E) at 0600 on August 1. Scheduled to arrive PT on 5th August. Operations schedule and employment enroute are as given in separate message addressed only to units concerned."

GI COMMENT: PT - Truk (CD).
CcmSubPacFor informed at 0212 (-9) 29th.
Another message from CcmDesRom 2 said
"Unyo would depart Yokosuka early morning of 31st."

No. A-2

FROM:
TO:

25/2342 July

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 40, No. A-2 (Cont.)

INFO:

*Reference Combined Fleet SMS 252341.

1. Operation schedule for main body.

- (a) Route #1: [In absence of special orders to contrary route #1 (* will be used)] sortie from (19644 Naikai?) at 1500 July 31 Course 165. (* Pass through following points taking courses from each point as indicated)
(Positions are north and east).

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>POINT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>COURSE / From Point</u>
31st	2000	A	31-32, 132-56	120 degrees
1 August	0600	B	30-00, 136-00	160 degrees
2 August	0800	C	22-40, 138-56	Not given
3 August	2100	D	12-15, 142-52	110 degrees
4 August	1500	E	10-15, 147-57	140
5 August	0000	F	20 miles south of Ulul Island.	
5 August	0700		blank Arrive North Channel.	

- (b) Route 2. From Point C, course 120 degrees.

3 August	0600	G	19-20, 145-00	110 degrees
3 August	1700	H	18-12, 148-14	165 degrees
5 August	0130	I	30 miles west of Lutke(?) Island, blank, arrive blank channel.	

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 40: No. A-2 (Cont.)

(c) Route 3. From Point H, course 155 degrees.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>POINT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>COURSE /From Point/</u>
5 August	0500	J	Bearing 52 degrees	Not given
			80 miles from Shiko Island	
5 August	1000		Arrive North Channel	

2. Each blank force will conduct air combat exercises as follows using main body as target - /In order, exercise number, time of execution, participating units/

<u>EXERCISE NO.</u>	<u>EXECUTE TIME</u>	<u>PARTICIPATING UNIT</u>
(a) 1	0130 to 1500 1 Aug	Air Flots 50 and 51.
(b) 5	1200 2 Aug to 1200	
	3 August	Air Flot 21.
(c) 7	0130 to 1500 4 Aug	Not given.
(d)	Aircraft operating (* in these exercises) during daylight hours will cease their antisubmarine patrol of route.	
(e)	Each tactical commander will promulgate a summarized plan (including frequencies to be used).	

NEGAT COMMENT: Note that date for departure is now 31 July. Negat 261404 and paragraph 2 of Negat 202059 should be amended accordingly.

Naikai so frequently referred to in traffic may be the place of that name on western end of Shikoku at inner end Bungo Straits as well as Inland Sea. In this case if Naikai is correct for the group in question it must be the place and not the sea.

Other messages related this operation are being worked particularly Combined Fleet SMS 252341. *Asterisk in parens indicates translators insertion for clarity.

GI COMMENT: Essentially same as Hypo's version in 211612, 261624, 261638 and 262226.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 40, (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM:

25/2342 July

TO:

(Radio
Intelligence) (C)

(Air Base Saipan Area)

(Associated Northern Forces)

INFO:

*Ref: Combined Fleet SMS #252341.

(Part 1). Main body movements.

(Para 2) Route #1. (To be used if no blank).
Sortie from (unident place) (Maikai-Ed.) at
1500 July 31 on course 165 to Point "A" at
2000. (31-32 North, 132-56 East). Course 120 until
0600 August 1 in Point "B" (30-00 North,
136-00 East) thence on course 160 until 0800 August 2
in Point "C" (22-40 North, 138-56 East). At
2100 August 3 Point ("D7") (blank blank
North blank - 52 East).)Comment: Estimated by
plot 12-10 North, 142-52 East). Then course 110
until 1500 August 4 Point "E" (10-25 North,
147-57 East). Then course 140 until 0000 August 5 (?)
in Point "F" 20 miles south of (Ulul Island?).
Arrive North entrance 0700."

ORIGINAL

11 January 1948

Case 40, No. A-3 (Cont.)

(Para b). Route #2.

From Point "G" course 120 until 0600 August 3
in Point "G" (19-20 North, 145-00 East)
then course blank until 1700 August 3 in Point "H"
(19-59 North, 148-14 East). Then course 165 until
0130 August 5 in Point "I" - 30 miles
west of Rukutei Island.
Blank North Channel."

HYPO COMMENT: NEGAT has value 2 August for group
In this message data for Point "H" is
written August 3.ichi and group necessarily
becomes 1 August. Request check. Other dates
recovered in this message based on this 3 August
date. This 1st part of 2.
HYPO working on 2nd part.

"HA Route 3.

From Point H course 155 degrees August 5?
0500 Point I (52 degrees 80 miles from Kajima (?))
1000 North Channel.

Part 2. Each force carry out air battle exercises
using main body as target group (in order of operation
number, date, units participating).

1. Operation #1.

2 August (0130?) until 1500 Air Plot 50 and Air
Plot 21.

RO Operation #5.

From noon August 2 until noon August 3.
Blank (unit) and 21st Air Plot.

HA Operation 7.

4 August (from 0130 to 1500 blank unit.

HI Planes participating in daylight operations
(will carry?) out anti-sub patrols enroute.

HO Blank make advance report of details of plan
on blank frequency."

ORIGINAL
11 January 1948

Case 40. No. A-3 (Cont.)

HYPG COMMENT: This is second part first part of which reported in Hypo's 261612, 261624, 261638.

According to message translated in NEGAT 221522 date of Chuyo departure from Yokosuka is represented by code group . Message given in BAKER 241509 say's Chuyo leaves Yokosuka on 30th. Therefore, unless there has been change in schedule (is 30 July. This is the date of departure of "Main Body less Yamato" from Inland Sea for Truk. See paragraph 2 of NEGAT 202059.

GI COMMENT: Para 2 of NEGAT's 202059 is quoted: "Main Body less Yamato?) will depart Western Inland Sea for PT (Truk) on - date)."

CORRECTION: NSS 261941, NSS 261952, NSS 262005, and NSS 262019, gave a message from KAE 6 July 252342, which said: "Main Body would sortie from (19644 - Naikai?) at 1500 July 31
NEGAT requested COMB addressees to change NSS 261404 and NSS 202059."

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 27/0042 July
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING
HFM FOX
SAURY, PADDLE, CINCPAC

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

UTTRA X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 89D X SACK OF PEANUTS CONTAIN-
ING SEVERAL BATTLESHIPS X 1100 OCT X 31 JULY x 31-32

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 40, No. B-1 (Cont.)

NORTH 132-56 EAST X 2100 GCT X 31 JULY X 30-00 NORTH
136-00 EAST X 2300 GCT X 1 AUGUST X 22-40 NORTH
138-56 EAST X SAURY AND PADDLE PICK YOUR OWN SPOTS
NORTH AND SOUTH RESPECTIVELY OF DR

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING
- HPM FOX
CINCPAC

27/0848 July

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MORE ORDERS FOR FULLIBEE X ULTRA X SERIAL 90 X IT
IS NECESSARY FOR YOU TO REACH AREA 15 A NOT LATER
THAN DAWN AUGUST 4TH X IF YOU MISS CONTACT ON YOUR
PRESENT MISSION YOU ARE AUTHORIZED DEPART THAT
VICINITY SUNSET 28 JULY X TAKE A LOOK AT MY SERIAL
89 D X MORE DOPE ON THIS OUTFIT LATER FOR YOU

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Saury

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 39, C-2.

U.S.S. Paddle

First War Patrol

No. C-2

Radio Reception: Generally good and complete.

No. C-3

July 31

1036 (K) Position 24-02-00N 144-37-00E. Sighted

ORIGINAL
II January 1946

Case 40, No. C-3 (Cont.)

deck house of small craft bearing 260°T. Contact made by #1 periscope watch. It was a small trawler. Avoided detection by a detour to the south.

1321 (K) Submerged to routine all torpedoes.
1931 (K) Surfaced. Obtained good navigational fix. Position 23-27N 144-55-30E.

August 1

0300 (K) Changed course to west. No morning stars. Sky heavily overcast.
0950 (K) Obtained sun-sight.
1000 (K) Submerged.
1900 (I) Surfaced. No star sights possible.

August 2

0005 (I) At D.R. position 22-40N 138-56 E. Commenced one engine patrol of triangular area about desired 0800 position. Sky overcast. Occasional showers, clearing just before dawn and in time to obtain star sights.
0500 (I) Obtained a good fix showing us to be 18 miles due south of desired 0800 position. Had experienced unusual set to south.
0502 (I) Changed course to 010°T at 15 knots to close 0800 position.
0522 (I) Changed course to 090°T at 15 knots.
0613 (I) Submerged for periscope patrol, assuming that further search was impracticable in view of expected air patrol and low clouds.
0830 (I) Heavy rain to southwest. Sky generally overcast. Light choppy swell. Numerous white caps. Occasional showers throughout the morning. Visibility variable from poor to good.
0840 (I) Changed course to 330°T.
1155 (I) Sighted land or carrier based plane bearing 121°-30°T on horizon.
1156 (I) Plane lost in clouds.
1157 (I) Changed course to 090°T.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 40, No. C-3 (Cont.)

- 1202 (I) Sighted bomber bearing 044° T distant 6 miles. Both planes on a southerly course.
1300 (I) Occasional showers throughout afternoon. Heavy rain at 1515 I visibility variable.
1858 (I) Surfaced on course 090° T and commenced one engine (10 knots) patrol to eastward.

August 3

- 1205 (I) Position 22-20-30N 142-07-00E. Changed course to 021° T.

U.S.S. Tullibee

First War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 30, C-1.

No. C-5

August 4

Made daily training dives in period July 29 and August 4. Submerged half a day August 2 and all day August 3. Noted S.J. radar interference at 0150 (L) on August 3. S.J. contacts were reported several times during night periods. These looked like real contacts but faded and usually the G.O.D. could see a rain squall in the direction of the contact.

Case 41

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____
TO: _____

26/2205 July

(Saipan Seaplane
Base) (C)

ORIGINAL
11 January 1943

Case 41, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO:

"Blanks."

1. (72813-July 27(?) at 1800 Bungo Channel blank. Thersafter course change point and noon positions as follows:

1200 - 28th - 29-10 North, 135-15 East.
1200 - 29th - 24-15 North, 138-30 East.
0230 - 30th - 22-40 North, 140-00 East.
0130 - 31st - 22- North, 147-00 East.
1930 - 31st - 19-40 North, -00 East.
1200 - 1st - 16-10 North, 151-00 East.
2230 - 2nd - 09-25 North, 152-40 East.
0800 - 3rd - at entrance to North Channel.

2. Turns for 16 knots making good 13. blank knots (?).
3. Ushio will require 450 tons fuel blanks.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacPer at 1710 (-9) 27th.
Hypo copy garbled.
Ushio (DD) in accordance with Combined
Fleet DesOpOrd # (was assigned
as an escort ship on July 25th.
Arrived Empire 7/24 in company with Unyo
and Chuyo."

No. A-2

FROM:
TO:

(Surface Escort
Unit #2)

26/1406 July

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 41, No. A-2 (Cont.)

"Schedule is changed as follows: Noon positions:

27th, 05-52 North, 138-44 East.

28th, 09-03 North, 142-32 East.

29th, 09-33 North, 147-18 East.

At 1730 on 29th in 09-33 North, 148-20 change course to 134.

At 0130 on 30th, southwest of - Olol Island?).

At 13 blank blank pass through point "T".

At 1500, enter North Channel. Speed 12 knots."

NEGAT COMMENT: Something must be wrong with the noon position on 27th since it is impossible for him to reach the 28th noon position from 27th, position at 12 knots. Believe we have read text correctly however.

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 1300 (-9) 27th. HYPO 262132 reported same message.

No. A-3

FROM:

26/1406 July

TO:

(Surface
Escort Unit #1)

"(Movement schedule amended as follows). Noon positions

27th, 05-52 North, 138-44 East.

28th, 09-03 North, 142-32 East.

29th, 09-33 North, 147-19*

At 1730 July 29 blanks (?). At 0130 July 30, 13 miles southwest of blank. 1500 North Channel. Speed 12 knots."

* BAKER working on this.

GI COMMENT: HYPO 262125 and NEGAT 261605 reported this same message.

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 41, (Cont.)

No. A-4

FROM:
TO:

26/1408 July

Surface Escort
Unit 2) (C)

"Schedule changed as follows: Noon posits:

27 July 05-52 N, 138(?) -44 E.

28 July 09-03 N, 142-32 E.

29 July 09-33 N, 147-18 E.

At 1730 29 July from posit blank -33 N, blank-20
blanks. At 0150 July 30 posit 13 miles southwest of
blank pass through point "T" and arrive North Entrance
1500. Speed 12 knots."

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

28/0402 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR SAGRY BUT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH MORE
IMPORTANT JOBS X 045 POPCORN X BLANK X PLUS 6 PIT
X MINUS 900 X PLUS 13 X LSNE 1015 (29-10 NORTH 135-15
EAST) ALGAROBA HIGH 1530 (24-15 NORTH 138-30 EAST)
X SERIAL 85 G

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
STEREHEAD
PGY
INFO: CINCPAC

28/0743 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 41, No. B-2 (Cont.)

STEELHEAD AND POGY GET THIS HONEY X ULTRA X 043
POPCORN X SPEED THROUGH WATER 16 X 0300 GCT X 1ST
X 16-10 N 151-00 E X SPEED THROUGH WATER 16 X 1530
GCT = 2ND X 9-25 N 152-40 E X THEN HEADS FOR NORTH
GATE X FOLLOWING FOR STEELHEAD ONLY X 1 OR MORE
MERCHANTMAN (TYPE UNKNOWN) X COURSE 133.8 DEGREES
X SPEED 12 X 0800 X 29TH X AND 8 HOURS LATER PASSES
SOUTHWEST OF ULUL ISLAND X SERIAL 96 FROM COMSUBPAC

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Saury

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 39, C-1 - C-3.

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

No. C-2

See VII, Case 37, C-1 - C-3.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

See VII, Case 24, C-1 - C-2.

No. C-4

See VII, Case 37, C-4 - C-5.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 42

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Choun Maru) 28/1305 July
TO:
INFO: (Davao Comm Unit)

"We shall depart Palao West Channel at 1500, 28th
on course 256, speed 9.5. 1200, 29th arrive position
08-15 N, 131-37 E."

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 28/0751 July
TO: ALL SUBS GUARDING
HPN FOX
MINGO
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUBPAC SENDS ULTRA TO MINGO X SERIAL 97 FROM
COMSUBPAC X I MERCHANTMAN (TYPE UNKNOWN) WHICH IS
POSSIBLY 162 POPCORN X COURSE 75 X SPEED 9 X 0300
GCT X 29TH X 6-45 NORTH 131-37 E X REACHES THE GATE
YOU GUARD 21 HOURS LATER X ALSO NOTE HADDOCK REPORTS
2 LARGE TANKERS ONE OF WHICH HE DAMAGED HEADING YOUR
WAY FROM HOLH (05-00N 139-00 E) AT 1600 GCT 26TH
COURSE 310 SPEED 12

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Mingo

First War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 20, C-2.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 43

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 25/1650 July
TO:
INFO: (4th Fleet) (B)
(Naval District CofS Kure) (B)

*Convoy FU #blank.

Group "A". Matsue Maru Hibi Maru, unident
Maru, unident Maru, unident Maru

Group "B" unident Maru. Escort ship
as far as the 10 degree North latitude line. Course
for entering Hayasui Seto, "A-2". Depart the Western
entrance at 1530 the 25th.

Point A, 14-00, 136-00.

Point B, 21-30, 138-00.

Point C, 25-00, 138-00.

Point D, 28-00, 137-00.

Point E, 31-30, 134-00.

(No latitude or longitude given, but assumes to be North
and East). By way of above points, arrive Fukushima
at 1030, -27 July).

Noon positions 26th to blank (2 August).

10-10, 134-35.

13-10, 135-40.

16-15, 136-00.

19-77, 136-45.

22-10, 138-00.

25-20, 137-55.

28-20, 136-40.

30-50, 134-35.

A group for Ujima - B Group for Yokosuka, both without
blank (possibly escort).

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 43, No. A-1 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Received in NSS 262250, which had latitude on 29th as 19-15. ComSubPacFor informed at 0735 (-9) 27th.

No. A-2

FROM:

25/1650 July

TO:

INFO:

(4th Fleet)
(CofS Kure)
(Patrol Boat #46)

"FU Convoy "A" ships:

Matsue Maru, Hibi Maru (HI, NIGHI AND BI,
UTSUKUSHI) Koya Maru } -unident ship)
(Kofuku Maru?)

"B" Ship -unident) escorted by as far as 10°. Will depart West Channel at 1530, 25th, course A2 entering Hayasui Seto.

Point A-14-00, 138-00. Point B 21-30, 138-00.

Point C 25-00, 138-00. D 28-00, 137-00. E 31-30, 134-00. Arrive blank Island blank date.

Noon positions 26th - 2nd August:

10-10, 134-35.

13-10, 135-40.

16-15, 136-00.

19-15, 136-45.

22-10, 138-00.

25-20, 137-55.

28-20, 136-40.

30-50, 134-35.

Neither "A" ships going to Ujina nor -unident ship) going to blanks."

GI COMMENT: HYP0 had a similar translation of this, which had previously been reported to ComSubPacFor at 0735 (-9), 27th. Latitude on 29th was 19- in HYP0's copy. ComSubPacFor informed at 1150 (-9) of NEGAT's posit of 19-15 for the 29th.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 43 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

28/0758 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MORE WORK FOR TONY DROPP X ULTRA FROM COMSUBPAC
NUMBER 98 H X ABOUT 6 MERCHANTMEN (TYPE UNKNOWN)
INCLUDING 229 POPCORN X UNKNOWN SPEED X UNKNOWN
COURSE X TIME 0300 X DATE 31 JULY 25-20 N, 137-55 E
POSITIONS AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAY ARE AS
FOLLOWING: 28-20 N 136-40 E, 30-50 N, 134-55 X
POSSIBLY NO ESCORT

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Saury

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 39, C-1 - C-3.

Case 44

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Air Activity
near Saipan) (C)
TO:
INFO:

27/1702 July

(4th Fleet) (B)
(Base Force #4) (C)

*Convoy #37 blank (Koggyo Maru

, Too blank

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 44, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Maru), and depart Yokosuka at 1700
July 27, for Truk. Noon position July 28 through
August 3 (37008).

32-00 North, 139-22 East.

27-30 North, 139-00 East.

23-05 North, 139-46 East.

18-54 North, 141-46 East.

15-12 North, 144-12 East.

11-34 North, 146-38 East.

08-06 North, 149-00 East.

At blank time 3 August pass 8 miles North of Point R."

GI COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 1912 (-9) 28th.

No. A-2

FROM: MEKESO (Yokosuka
CofS)

27/1702 July

TO: OSA 7

INFO: HIA 3 (4th Fleet)

CO 7

WIMO 1

MEHA 11

NOTA 12

"#37 blank Convoy /Kogyo Maru?). To blank Maru,
and blank Maru () escorted by /depart
Yokosuka at blank 00, July 27 for Truk.
Noon positions (July 28 to August 3):

32-00 N, 139-22 E.

27-blank N, 139-00 E.

23-05 E, 139-46 E.

18-54 E, blank-46 E.

15-12 E, 144-12 E.

11-34 N, 146-blank E.

08-06 E, 149-00 E.

Blanks."

BAKER COMMENT: Baker has only 1 copy of despatch.
Cannot get minutes of Latitude for July 29. Will
continue work on message.

(GI COMMENT: HYPO 281136 July version more complete
and information given to ComSubPac 1912 (-9) 28th.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 44 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: POGY
STEELHEAD
INFO: CINCPAC

29/0928 July

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ANOTHER ULTRA FOR POGY AND STEELHEAD X SERIAL 2
FROM COMSUBPAC X CONVOY X 0300 OCT X 1 AUGUST X
TERP 1212 (15-12 NORTH 144-12 EAST) X POSITIONS AT
SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAY ARE AS FOLLOWS: WEJY
3438 (11-34 NORTH 14638 EAST) KINZ 0600 (08-06 NORTH
149-00 EAST) X WISH EACH OF YOU WERE THERE.

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Pogy

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

SEE VII, Case 37, C-1 - C-3.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Second War Patrol

No. C-2

August 3

0403 (L)

During morning twilight at
Latitude 9-25 N, Longitude 152-39 E sighted
what at first appeared to be a bright star
on horizon. It appeared to come closer,
however, and just as we made it out to be a
plane showing running lights and a search-

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 44, No. C-2 (Cont.)

light, it fired a green rocket, and we dove. No bombs were dropped and as it was still dark we were not sure that we were seen.

Decided to make another sweep in the vicinity of Umi Island before leaving area and headed in that direction. At

August 4

1252 (L) Latitude 08-42 N, Longitude 151-26 E
Sighted EAST PAYU ISLAND bearing 222 T.
distance eight miles and passed it abeam to starboard.

Case 45

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

28/1000 July -

INFO: (Palao Guard
Division 43)
(4th Fleet)

"From Captain of - unident Man of War).
For information to Palao Embarkation Commander.

The assault force convoy - Nansei Maru?) and
Hissho Maru (). Speed 13 knots/ will operate
as follows:

Depart Ambon at 1700 on 28th. Noon positions:
29th, 01-36 S, 129-32 E.
30th, 01-46 N, 132-30 E.
31st, 06-24 N, 133-43 E.

Arrive Palao at 1000 on 1st."

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 45. No. A-1 (Cont.)

NEGAT COMMENT: This is an army outfit.

GI COMMENT: Information given to CcmSubPac at
290750 (-9)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: MINGO
INFO: CINCPAC

29/0937 July

PRIO: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

UTTRA FOR MINGO FROM COMSUBPAC SERIAL 3 X 2
TRANSPORTS X 0500 GCT X JULY 30 X WRJH 4630
(01-48 NORTH 132-32 EAST) X ALGAROBIA X VTBU
2443 (06-24 NORTH 133-43 EAST)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Mingo

First War Patrol

No. C-1

See VII, Case 20, C-2 - C-3.

Case 46

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Truk Base
Force #4)

24/1735 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 46, No. A-1 (Cont.)

TO: (Saipan Air Base)
(Chichijima Comm Unit)
(Yokosuka Naval District
Commander)
(Yokosuka Defense Force
Commander)
(Chief Transportation Section
Tokyo)

INFO:

(4th Fleet)

(1st Section Naval General Staff)
(Chief of Staff Kure Naval District)
(Yokosuka Local Transportation Section)
(Vessel)

"Gaihaya Maru () and blank TSU Ward escorted
by Yagiri

Blanks. Noon positions 25th to 1st:
25th, 10-07 North, 149-55 East.
26th, 13-18 North, 147-43 East.
27th, 16-16 North, 145-56 East.
28th, 20-15 North, 145-blank East.
29th, 23-34 North, 142-blank East.
30th, 27-24 North, 141-20 East.
31st, 30-55 North, 140-22 East.
1st, 34-49 North, 139-32 East."

NEGAT COMMENT: Something peculiar about the position
for the 29th, but the noon positions which are yet to
be reached look very good.

GI COMMENT: COMSUBPAC informed by phone at 0305
(-9) July 31.

ORIGINAL
II January 1946

Case 46, (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: SKIPJACK CINCPAC
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOR

30/1901 July

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR SKIPJACK X 2 MERCHANTMEN (TYPE UNKNOWN) 1
DESTROYER X 0300 GCT X 31ST 30-55 N 140-22 E
ALCAROBA 34-49 N 139-32 E I

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Skipjack

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See VII, Case 15, C-12.

No. C-2

July 31

Patrolling southeastern approaches to Tokyo Bay.

1252 (I) Sighted large patrol vessel or trawler (Par. F-13), bearing 237 T 6 miles. As it was at first believed he might have been a small freighter, commenced a submerged approach.

1325 (I) Ship definitely identified as trawler or large patrol boat. Broke off approach. He passed out of sight around the northern end of Miyake Shima.

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 46, No. C-2 (Cont.)

August 1

Continued patrolling southeastern approaches to Tokyo Bay east of Ilu Shoto. The SJ Radar is permanently out of commission.

August 2

Shifted patrol to northward to cover eastern approaches to Tokyo Bay.

0822 (I) Sighted patrol vessel bearing 070 T, 4 miles, on westerly course. (Par. F-16).
Avoided.

1348 (I) Sighted four engine bomber bearing 210 true 2 miles (par G-2).

August 3

Patrolling off shore in vicinity of Katsunra Wan.

0759 (I) Sighted large plane, type unidentified bearing 040 T 5 miles on southeasterly course (Par G-6).

1545 (I) Sighted four engine patrol plane bearing 115 T 3 miles, on westerly course (Par G-7).

1633 (I) Sighted distant plane bearing 348 T, _____ miles on westerly course.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Hot:	15
Time:	1252 (I)
Date:	July 31.
Latitude:	34-01
Longitude:	139-44
Type(s)	Large PG or Trawler
Initial Range:	6 mi. 237(T)
Course:	330
Speed:	10 knots
How Contacted:	Periscope

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 47

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Chief of
Staff, Yokosuka)

30/2046 July

TO:
INFO:

(4th Fleet)

"Convoy #3731 consisting of Shinyubari Maru and Lyons Maru?, escorted (to NAA) by Taian Maru?, unident ship, will depart NAA at 1200 on 31st for PS. Noon positions: (1st to 6th)

Aug. 1, 32-52 North, 139-40 East.
Aug. 2, 29-50 North, 140-35 East.
Aug. 3, 26-55 North, 142-00 East.
Aug. 4, 23-50 North, 142-45 East.
Aug. 5, 20-40 North, 143-50 East.
Aug. 6, 17-40 North, 144-50 East."

NEGAT COMMENT: Parenthetical "to NAA" preceding the escorting vessel does not make any sense but there it is must mean "From NAA."

GI COMMENT: HYPO's translation of this phoned at 0815 (-9) July 31 to ComSubPacFor.

GI COMMENT: NAA is Yokosuka (CD)
PS is Saipan (CD)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CCM SUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
HFM FOX
PADDIE
POLLACK
PIKE

30/2206 July

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 47. No. B-1 (Cont.)

INFO: CINCPAC

FREQ: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

POLLACK GETS A JOB POSSIBLY ASSISTED BY PADDLE AND
PIKE X ULTRA X SERIAL 6 FROM COMSUBPAC X PECAN-
(CONVOY) X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 X MINUS 14
(0300, 1 AUGUST) X TML 5240 ALGAROBA (32-52 NORTH,
139-40 EAST) ISHA 5035 (29-50 NORTH, 140-35 EAST)
RDSO 5500 (26-55 NORTH, 142-00 EAST) TTSD 5045 (23-50
NORTH, 142-45 EAST) WCOT 4050 (20-40 NORTH, 143-50
EAST) JTRP 4050 (17-40 N, 144-50 EAST) I

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pollack

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Throughout the patrol was entirely
satisfactory and complete.

No. C-2

July 31

1606 (X) Made battle surface and fired all guns.

August 2

0412 (I) Dived.

August 3

0432 (I) Dived.

1859 (I) Surfaced.

August 4

0430 (I) Dived.

ORIGINAL

II January 1946

Case 47, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1014 (I) Surfaced and headed for Sofu Gan to fix position.
- 1432 (I) Sighted Sofu Gan.
- 1452 (I) Dived and proceeded to close rock submerged.
- 1919 (I) Surfaced and closed Sofu Gan to 10,000 yards to tune SJ radar.

August 5

- 0420 (I) Dived.
- 1325 (I) Surfaced.
- 2250 (I) Made radar contact dead ahead at 4100 yards; nothing in sight. Turned away to commence tracking. Radar showed definite interference from an outside source indicating the presence of another radar on the same frequency. The range opened rapidly indicating that the contact had also turned away. Turned toward; but contact was lost at 6100 yards and could not be regained. Considered it possible that this might have been another one of our own subs.

August 6

- 0430 (I) Dived.
- 0850 (I) Sighted two freighters on course 000° T., bearing 084° T., range 12,000 yards. Waited until freighters were out of sight and at
- 1020 (I) Surfaced to give chase.
- 1036 (I) Sighted three ship convoy on course 200° T., bearing 340° T., range 20,000 yards. As we were in a much better position to get in on this group, gave up the chase on the two freighters and commenced maneuvering to obtain position ahead of the three ship convoy.
- 1336 (I) Dived and commenced submerged approach. Freighters appeared to be about 1200 yards apart, with the second in column about 1200 yards apart, with the second in column slight on the starboard quarter of the leader, and the third on the port quarter still further

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 47, No. C-2 (Cont.)

astern. The formation was zig-zagging from 15 to 40 degrees at intervals of five and six minutes. No escorts in sight. Leading freighter was tentatively identified as being similar to the AMAGISAN MARU listed on page 123 of ONI 208-J. It appeared to be the most important target. The other two freighters were not identified but appeared to be of about 5,000 tons.

1440 (I) Coming in for a 60° track on the leading freighter when it zigged toward, leaving us about 300 yards from the track. Turned away and at

1446 (I) Fired two stern tubes at leading freighter on 126 track at a range of 800 yards. Missed. Commenced swinging left to get the second freighter with the bow tubes.

1451 (I) Depth charge exploded, not too close, while we were still turning at 80 feet. Came to periscope depth and found that we were about 600 yards ahead of the second freighter. This ship was clearly seen to be towing a heavy cable similar to those used by our magnetic mine sweepers except that it seemed to be towing much deeper. Shortly after the periscope was raised she commenced blowing her whistle. Took a quick look around and discovered a DE escort on our starboard quarter coming in. The escort must have been trailing the convoy and masked by the freighters, as I had been unable to see it previously. We did not have time to turn for a straight bow shot at the second freighter and the set up did not look good for a large angle shot, so went to deep submergence and rigged for depth charge. Two sets of high speed screws were heard indicating the presence of a second escort which had not been sighted. Echo ranging was heard from one escort, probably the DE; but much to my surprise no further depth charges were dropped. We were, however, under a sharp negative temperature gradient as indicated by the Bathythermograph; so undoubtedly the escorts were

ORIGINAL
11 January 1946

Case 47, No. C-2 (Cont.)

unable to pick us up.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No: 2
Time: 0850 (I)
Date: August 6
Latitude: 29-03 N.
Longitude: 141-12 E.
Type(s): 2-5000
T. AKs
Initial Range: 12,000
Course: 000° T
Speed: 8 knots.
How Contacted: P
Remarks: Out of range. Surfaced and gave chase.

No: 3
Time: 1036 (I)
Date: August 6
Latitude: 29-10 N.
Longitude: 141-00 E.
Type(s): 1-7000
T. AK
2-5000
T. AKs
1-DE
1-PC
Initial Range: 20,000
Course: 210° T
Speed: 10 knots.
How Contacted: SD
Remarks: Sighted while chasing contact No. 2.
7,000 ton AK similar to Amagisan Maru.
Other two AK's not identified. DE
appeared to be fairly new ship with sing-
stack and destroyer lines. Made
attacks #1 and 2 on 7,000 ton AK.

U.S.S. Paddle
First War Patrol

ORIGINAL
11 January 1948

Case 47, (Cont.)

No. C-4

Radio Reception: Generally good and complete.

No. C-5

August 2

- 0005 (I) At D.R. position 22-40N 158-56 E. Commenced one engine patrol of triangular area about desired 0800 position. Sky overcast. Occasional showers, clearing just before dawn and in time to obtain star sights.
- 0500 (I) Obtained a good fix showing us to be 18 miles due south of desired 0800 position. Had experienced unusual set to south.
- 0502 (I) Changed course to 010° T at 15 knots to close 0800 position.
- 0522 (I) Changed course to 090° T at 15 knots.
- 0613 (I) Submerged for periscope patrol, assuming that further search was impracticable in view of expected air patrol and low clouds.
- 0830 (I) Heavy rain to southwest. Sky generally overcast. Light choppy swell. Numerous white caps. Occasional showers throughout the morning. Visibility variable from poor to good.
- 0840 (I) Changed course to 330° T
- 1155 (I) Sighted land or carrier based plane bearing 121-30 T on horizon.
- 1156 (I) Plane lost in clouds.
- 1157 (I) Changed course to 090° T.
- 1203 (I) Sighted bomber bearing 044° T distant 6 miles. Both planes on a southerly course.
- 1300 (I) Occasional showers throughout afternoon.
- 1515 (I) Heavy rain at 1515 (I). Visibility variable.
- 1858 (I) Surfaced on course 090° T and commenced one engine (10 knots) patrol to eastward.

August 3

- 1205 (I) Position 22-20-30 N 142-07-00 E. Changed course to 021° T.
- 1412 (I) Position 22-47-00 N 142-18-00 E. Changed course to 000° T.

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Case 47. No. C-5 (Cont.)

August 4

- 0055 (I) Look-out and OOD simultaneously picked up odor of attack gases on southeasterly bearing.
- 0058 (I) Changed course to 135 T.
- 0432 (I) Made trim dive.
- 0446 (I) Surfaced. Continued surface patrol, searching with #1 periscope.
- 2000 (I) Changed course to west to pass between Kita Io Shima and Io Shima of Ogasawara Gunto group.
- 2320 (I) SJ radar picked up Kita Io Shima (2651 ft.) at approximate range of 45,000 yds.

August 5

Slow speed on auxiliary engine during night to save fuel.

August 6

- 1024 (I) Submerged to routine all torpedoes.
- 1330 (I) Surfaced and continued one engine speed patrol on course for area.

August 7

- 0500 (I) Changed course to 110 T. Sea building up during the morning from the east. Heavy swells at 1200 I.
- 1225 (I) Increased to two engine propulsion because of heavy seas.
- 1300 (I) Position 27-41N 137-14E. Sighted ship by #1 periscope on horizon bearing 072 T.
- 1303 (I) Ship in sight determined to be a submarine.
- 1304 (I) Submerged and closed track on northerly course.
- 1326 (I) It is a U.S. Submarine on a westerly course.
- 1328 (I) Opened range on course 180 T.
- 1404 (I) Surfaced. Submarine in sight only from #1 periscope. Set course 106 T.
- 1909 (I) Commenced search on base course 353 T.

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Case 47, No. C-5 (Cont.)

August 8

Wind increased during morning. Moderately heavy sea by late afternoon. Visibility remained good although sky usually overcast.
1745 (I) Changed to course north.

U.S.S. Pike

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-6

Radio Reception: Generally good on the higher frequencies

No. C-7

August 3

0522 (L) Made trim dive.
1525 (L) Sighted single wing unidentified airplane bearing 080° T, distance approximately 4 miles. Submerged to 120 feet. Lat. 24-28 N. Long. 155-31 E.
1854 (K) Surfaced.

August 4

0245 (K) Radar contact bearing 337° T, distance 10,000 yards. Target identified as Marcus Island. Turned to course 160° T, to open range.
0412 (K) Submerged. Closed island.
0611 (K) Sighted radio towers on Marcus Island bearing 350° T, distance 12 miles. Conducted submerged patrol off south coast of Marcus Island. One medium size tanker and one small freighter were discovered at the pier on the middle of the south coast.
1800 (K) Sighted armed trawler patrolling off south coast of Marcus Island. Increased smoking noted on tanker at pier.
1905 (K) Tanker with small unidentified escort cleared the pier and headed westward in twilight. Set course 290° T, to obtain trailing position

ORIGINAL

11 January 1946

Case 47, No. C-7 (Cont.)

- when ships cleared the southwest point of Marcus Island. Too dark for accurate submerged approach.
- 1950 (K) Surfaced about 7,000 yards astern of tanker and commenced tracking and battery charge. Night dark, partly overcast; visibility with binoculars 6,000-8,000 yards. Used radar and visual bearing tracking and maneuvered to reach tanker's starboard bow. Tanker and escort were zigzagging on base course 290° T, at 8.5 knots.

August 5

- 0245 (K) Battle stations. Commenced surface approach on tanker.
- 0304 (K) Fired 3 torpedoes from bow tubes from position on starboard beam of tanker, about 1,500 yards. Lat. 24-37 N., Long. 152-45 E.
- 0305 (K) Three explosions observed on tanker. Tanker fired yellow flare from stern and shell from stern gun. Escort appeared from opposite bow of tanker blinking signal light rapidly and firing promiscuously. PIKE reversed course to the left and retired at maximum speed on 4 main engines. Tanker was observed sinking with bow in the air.
- 0307 (K) Radar lost contact on tanker.
- 0324 (K) Secured from general quarters. Proceeding in easterly and then southerly directions to clear attack area.
- 0431 (K) Submerged. Continued on course 180° T submerged - All hands catching up on lost sleep.
- 1915 (K) Surfaced. Set course 165° T at maximum cruising speed.

August 6

- 0607 (K) Submerged. Proceeding at 3 knots submerged. Unable to fix position since leaving Marcus due to overcast sky.

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11 January 1945

Case 47, No. C-7 (Cont.)

- 0738 (K) Breached with conning tower hatch clear of water to obtain sun line for verifying longitude. Changed course to 180° T.
- 1308 (K) Sighted Japanese converted aircraft carrier of KASUGA class escorted by one FUBUKI class destroyer bearing 180° T, distance approximately 16,000 yards, steering in northerly direction.
- 1313 (K) Went to battle stations. Commenced submerged approach. Target making high speed, 20-22 knots, zigzagging radically.
- 1350 (K) Rigged ship for depth charge attack. Made ready bow and deck tubes. Planned to fire deck tubes on MK 8 angle solver bearings, bow tubes with TDC, white light method.
- 1356 (K) Fired #7 deck tube on incorrect firing bearing. Shifted immediately to bow tubes and fired 4 torpedoes by "white light method" followed by #8 deck tube on a MK 8 angle solver firing bearing. Firing range 2,200 yards. Lat. 21-03 N., Long. 153-31 E.
- 1357½(K) Heard two distinct explosions 14 seconds apart. (Some personnel reported hearing a third explosion about 30 seconds after the first one). Heavy firing from guns of carrier directed at periscope. Shells exploding very close. Made ready stern tubes. Destroyer observed on the port beam heading for periscope at high speed, range 1,700 yards. Ordered deep submergence (240 feet).
- 1400 (K) First depth charges went off on port quarter, estimated range 400 yards.

ORIGINAL

